A court ruling just changed how we pick our president

[Kilgore]

https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/faithless-elector-court-ruling-just-changed-how-we-pick-our-n1044961

A federal appeals court ruled late Tuesday that presidential electors who cast the actual ballots for president and vice president are free to vote as they wish and cannot be required to follow the results of the popular vote in their states.

But once the electors are chosen and report in December to cast their votes as members of the Electoral College, they are fulfilling a federal function, and a state's authority has ended. "The states' power to appoint electors does not include the power to remove them or nullify their votes," the court said.

[uponit7771]

1. Damn

[Kilgore]

2. Tax returns are next

[hlthe2b]

3. We have no choice but to end the EC, either directly or indirectly

via the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Popular_Vote_Interstate_Compact

[Kilgore]

6. How does that help?

Any elector selected by any process still could be faithless under this ruling and vote counter to the process that sent him/her there.

[hlthe2b]

8. ???? Do you know what the National Interstate Compact is?

I guess not. Please read the link provided. It would basically replace the EC without a constitutional amendment. Obviously, there would be court challenges, but no less than Neal Katyal and Laurence Tribe believe it would be constitutional. It doesn't take effect until enough states ratify to supply 270 EC votes and they have 196 pledged now.

And, yes, it structurally replaces the independence of individual state electors. If you don't think this would be hard for an elector to ignore, I got news for you. These electors might well be subject to ruinous civil suits if nothing else, for violating their oaths to the electorate.

[Kilgore]

11. Yes

I don't see where it changes the Constitution, just how electors are selected. Once selected the state process ends according to the current ruling, and it's that point the elector can become faithless.

[hlthe2b]

12. Kindly try reponding to my actual post argument rather than kneejerk, reflexive nay-saying.

[Kilgore]

14. I did

There are folks who would be glad to endure

"These electors might well be subject to ruinous civil suits if nothing else, for violating their oaths to the electorate"

On principal.

Unless the Constitution is changed, it's still a dubious process

[onenote]

41. The NIC would not "replace" the EC. It would change how states choose their electors

And the court decision, if upheld, would still allow those electors to vote their conscience notwithstanding state law.

[hlthe2b]

43. I never said it did replace EC. Kindly stop rephrasing or attributing words I never said.

This has been discussed in detail by those who have pushed the move in each of the states that have passed. I am on the way out now and don't have time to do your research for you, but it is out there.

[onenote]

47. Actually, you said it would 'end' the EC 'indirectly.'

Of course, it really wouldn't. There would still be an EC. There could still be faithless electors if the 10th Circuit ruling isn't overturned.

I don't need for you to do any research on the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NIC) -- I've been following it for a very long time. The supporters claim that faithless electors won't be a problem for the following reasons: (1) faithless electors are rare; (2) state laws (or a federal law) could bar faithless electors; and (3) the margins of victory would make it highly unlikely that faithless electors could change the outcome of an election once the NIC goes into effect.

The problem with those explanations are: (1) if faithless electors are rare (and they have been) then the NIC won't really change things in that regard; (2) the court case calls into question whether such laws would withstand judicial review; and (3) if all states or states representing a sizable majority of the EC votes joined the NIC then it would make it very difficult for faithless electors to change the outcome. But by its terms the NIC will take effect when it is approved by states representing a bare majority (270) of the electoral college. And its likely that if and when the NIC takes effect it will be by a small margin since no state that voted for Trump has signed on to the NIC. So in theory, the NIC could take effect and still result in a close EC vote that could be undone by a handful of faithless electors. Apart from GWB's narrow victory, the margins in most elections under the current system also have been large enough (in the modern era) to make it unlikely that a faithless electors will change the outcome.

My point isn't that the EC is a good system. It's absolutely not. But the court ruling on faithless electors doesn't really change anything when it comes to arguments for or against the NIC or the current system. The NIC is to be preferred over the current system not because of anything having to do with faithless electors) but because it is the closest we can get to popular vote basis for choosing the president short of a constitutional amendment.

[hlthe2b]

49. It does-- INDIRECTLY-- end it if successful. INDIRECTLY--look it up.

[hlthe2b]

44. Your answers assertions addressed in detail:

https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/section_9.10

9.10 Myths about Faithless Electors

9.10.1 MYTH: Faithless presidential electors would be a problem under the National Popular Vote compact.
9.10.2 MYTH: It might be difficult to coerce presidential electors to vote for the national popular vote winner.
9.10.3 MYTH: Presidential electors might succumb to outside pressure and abandon the national popular vote winner in favor of the winner of the popular vote in their state.

9.10.1 MYTH: Faithless presidential electors would be a problem under the National Popular Vote compact.
QUICK ANSWER:

There is no practical problem with faithless presidential electors. There have been only 17 deviant votes for President out of the 22,991 electoral votes cast in the nation’s 57 presidential elections between 1789 and 2012, and only one of them, in 1796, was a true faithless elector.
To the extent that anyone believes that there is a problem, the states have ample constitutional authority to remedy it, and effective solutions are available (such as the proposed Uniform Faithful Presidential Electors Act).
One of the collateral benefits of the National Popular Vote plan is that it would virtually eliminate the possibility of faithless electors actually affecting the outcome of a presidential election because it would typically generate an exaggerated margin of victory in the Electoral College of about 75% for the national popular vote winner (namely, an absolute majority of the electoral votes from the compacting states plus about half of the remaining electoral votes of the non-compacting states).

The myth about faithless electors is yet another example of a potential problem that the National Popular Vote plan handles in a manner that is equal to, and arguably superior to, the current system.

The Founding Fathers envisioned that the presidential electors would be outstanding citizens who would meet and debate and exercise independent judgment in choosing the best person to become President. However, that expectation was dashed with the emergence of political parties in the nation’s first competitive presidential election in 1796.

Since 1796, presidential electors have been committed party activists who are nominated by their political party to cast their vote in the Electoral College for their party’s nominee. That is, presidential electors have simply been willing “rubber-stamps” for their party’s nominee for President.

Faithless presidential electors are not a practical problem in the first place. Of the 22,991 electoral votes cast for President in the nation’s 57 presidential elections between 1789 and 2012, only 17 were cast in a deviant way.[266] Moreover, among these 17 cases, the unexpected vote of Samuel Miles for Thomas Jefferson in 1796 was the only instance of a true faithless elector (where the elector might have thought, at the time he voted, that his vote might affect the national outcome).

Fifteen of the 17 cases were post-election grand-standing votes cast by publicity-seeking electors who knew, at the time they voted, that their vote would not affect the outcome in the Electoral College.

One electoral vote was accidentally and unintentionally cast by an unidentified Democratic presidential elector in Minnesota who absentmindedly voted for his party’s vice-presidential candidate for both President and Vice President.[267]

Nonetheless, the possibility of faithless electors exists under both the current system and the National Popular Vote plan.

For example, in September 2012, three Republican electors (who had favored Ron Paul during the nomination process) publicly raised doubt as to their loyalty to Mitt Romney, the eventual Republican presidential nominee.[268] Defection by multiple presidential electors could potentially throw a close presidential election into the U.S. House of Representatives.[269]

Second, if anyone perceives faithless presidential electors to be a real problem, the states already have ample constitutional authority to remedy the situation by state law.

In most states, each political party nominates candidates for the position of presidential elector (typically at a combination of party conventions at the congressional district level and state level).

About half of the states currently have laws involving pledges, penalties, or other procedures to ensure that presidential electors vote for their party’s nominees.

In upholding the constitutionality of a pledge guaranteeing faithful voting by presidential electors, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote in the 1952 case of Ray v. Blair:

“No one faithful to our history can deny that the plan originally contemplated, what is implicit in its text, that electors would be free agents, to exercise an independent and nonpartisan judgment as to the men best qualified for the Nation's highest offices.…

“This arrangement miscarried. Electors, although often personally eminent, independent, and respectable, officially become voluntary party lackeys and intellectual nonentities to whose memory we might justly paraphrase a tuneful satire:

‘They always voted at their party’s call

‘And never thought of thinking for themselves at all’”[270] [Emphasis added]

Existing Pennsylvania law is noteworthy in that it empowers each party’s presidential candidate to nominate all elector candidates directly. The presidential nominee is, after all, the person whose name actually appears on the ballot on Election Day and who has the greatest immediate interest in faithful voting by presidential electors.

Existing North Carolina law declares vacant the position of any contrary-voting elector, voids that elector’s vote, and empowers the state’s remaining electors to replace the contrary-voting elector immediately with an elector loyal to the party’s nominee.

At its 119th annual meeting in 2010, the Uniform Law Commission (also known as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) approved a “Uniform Faithful Presidential Electors Act” and submitted this model legislation to the state legislatures for their consideration. The Conference, formed in 1892, is a non-governmental body that has produced more than 200 recommended uniform state laws. The Conference is most widely known for its work on the Uniform Commercial Code.

The Uniform Faithful Presidential Electors Act has many of the features of North Carolina’s existing law. The proposed uniform law calls for the election of both electors and alternate electors. The Act has a state-administered pledge of faithfulness. Any attempt by a presidential elector to cast a vote in violation of that pledge effectively constitutes resignation from the office of elector. The Act provides a mechanism for immediately filling a vacancy created for that reason (or any other reason). The National Popular Vote organization has endorsed this proposed uniform law.

Third, in case anyone views faithless presidential electors to be a real problem, the National Popular Vote plan is actually superior to the current system in ensuring that a wayward elector would be unlikely to impact the ultimate choice of the President. Under the National Popular Vote compact, the national popular vote winner would generally receive an exaggerated margin (roughly 75%) of the votes in the Electoral College in any given presidential election. The reason is that the National Popular Vote compact guarantees that the presidential candidate receiving the most popular votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia would receive at least 270 (of the 538) electoral votes from the states belonging to the compact. Then, beyond that guaranteed bloc of at least 270 electoral votes, the national popular vote winner would receive additional electoral votes from whichever non-compacting states he or she happened to carry (presumably under existing winner-take-all statutes in those states). If the non-compacting states divided approximately equally between the candidates, the nationwide winning candidate would generally receive an exaggerated margin (roughly 75%) of the votes in the Electoral College (that is, about 404 out of 538 electoral votes). This cushion would make it highly unlikely that faithless electors could affect the outcome of a presidential election (where 270 electoral votes are required to win the Presidency).

For additional information about faithless electors, see section 2.12.
Footnotes

[266] See section 2.12.

[267] The accidental vote was cast in Minnesota in 2004. After the ballots were counted, all 10 electors said that they intended to vote for John Kerry for President and John Edwards for Vice President. However, one of the 10 accidentally voted for John Edwards for both President and Vice President.

[268] Baker, Mike. Three Electoral College members may pass on GOP ticket. Associated Press. September 12, 2012.

[269] As discussed in section 2.12, in 1836, 23 Democratic presidential electors from Virginia did not vote for the Democratic Party’s vice-presidential nominee (Richard M. Johnson). The Virginia Democratic Party had announced their vigorous opposition to Johnson at the party’s national convention (both before and after Johnson’s nomination). Johnson failed to receive an absolute majority of the electoral votes and the vice-presidential election was therefore thrown into the U.S. Senate. The Democratic Party was in control of the Senate, and Johnson won by an overwhelmingly 33–16 vote.

[270] Ray v. Blair 343 U.S. 214 at 232. 1952.
9.10.2 MYTH: It might be difficult to coerce presidential electors to vote for the national popular vote winner.
QUICK ANSWER:

No coercion would be required to force presidential electors to vote for the national popular vote winner under the National Popular Vote compact, because the compact (like the current system) would result in the election to the Electoral College of presidential electors who are avid supporters of the national popular vote winner.

No coercion is required to force presidential electors to vote as intended under either the current system or the National Popular Vote system.

Under both systems, each political party nominates opinionated party activists for the ceremonial position of presidential elector under existing state laws. Each party’s nominees for the position of presidential elector are selected precisely because they are passionate supporters of their party’s candidate and because they can be relied upon to act as willing “rubber-stamps” for their party’s nominee.

When voters go to the polls on Election Day in November, they are, in reality, choosing amongst competing slates of presidential electors associated with the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, or some other party. Under the winner-take-all system (currently used in 48 of the 50 states and the District of Columbia), the entire slate of elector candidates associated with the presidential candidate receiving the most popular votes within each separate state is elected as the state’s presidential electors.[271]

Under the National Popular Vote compact, the state’s presidential electors would be the elector candidates associated with the presidential candidate who won the most popular votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. This bloc of 270 (or more) presidential electors would reflect the will of the voters nationwide. All of these 270 or more presidential electors would be loyal and avid supporters of the national popular vote winner. These presidential electors would come from the political party that won the election nationally. Thus, no one in this bloc of 270 (or more) presidential electors would be asked to vote contrary to his or her own political inclinations or conscience. Instead, these electors would vote for their own strongly held personal choice, namely the nominee of their own political party.

Under the National Popular Vote plan, these 270 (or more) presidential electors would operate as willing “rubber-stamps” for the nationwide choice of the voters, just as presidential electors currently act as willing “rubber-stamps” for the statewide choice of the voters (or district-wide choice, in the cases of Maine and Nebraska).
Footnotes

[271] In two states (Maine and Nebraska), the elector candidates associated with the presidential candidate who receives the most popular votes in each of the state’s congressional districts are elected (along with the two additional at-large elector candidates associated with the presidential candidate who receives the most popular votes in the state as a whole).
9.10.3 MYTH: Presidential electors might succumb to outside pressure and abandon the national popular vote winner in favor of the winner of the popular vote in their state.
QUICK ANSWER:

Presidential electors are loyal party activists who are selected precisely because they can be relied upon to act as willing “rubber-stamps” for their party’s nominee.
The low probability of presidential electors succumbing to outside pressure is illustrated by the fact that none of the 271 Republican presidential electors in 2000 voted for Al Gore despite the fact that Gore received the most popular votes nationwide and despite the fact that the American public overwhelmingly believes that the President should be the candidate who receives the most popular votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Instead, all 271 Republican presidential electors dutifully voted for their party’s nominee in accordance with the virtually universal view of how the system that was legally in effect at the time was supposed to operate.

Some have suggested that, under the National Popular Vote compact, presidential electors might, after the people vote in November, succumb to outside pressure and abandon the national popular vote in favor of the winner of the popular vote in their state.

This hypothetical scenario is based on the following incorrect assumptions:

There is any substantial pool of people who would support the notion of changing the rules after the public has voted on Election Day.
The public favors the current state-by-state winner-take-all approach for electing the President, and hence there would be a vast pool of people to apply such pressure on presidential electors.
The supporters of the presidential candidate who just won the national popular vote, under laws that were in place on Election Day, would care about—much less actually succumb to—pressure from people representing the losing party.

The reality is that there would be no substantial pressure in the first place. The public simply does not favor the current system of awarding all of a state’s electoral votes to the presidential candidate who receives the most popular votes in each separate state (the winner-take-all-rule). In polls since 1944, at least 70% (usually more) of the American people have said that they favored the idea that the presidential candidate receiving the most votes throughout the United States should win the Presidency. A mere 20% of the public supports the current state-by-state winner-take-all system (with 10% undecided). Far from being attached to the state-by-state winner-take-all system of awarding electoral votes, the public strongly opposes it.

The environment in which this hypothetical scenario would arise has the following five elements:

About 70% of the voters of any given state believe that the presidential candidate receiving the most votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia should win the Presidency;
The state legislature and Governor of the state have responded to the wishes of its own voters and enacted the National Popular Vote law in their state;
States possessing a majority of the electoral votes (essentially more than half the population of the country) have similarly enacted the National Popular Vote law, and the law has taken effect nationally;
A nationwide presidential campaign has been conducted, over a period of many months, with the candidates, the media, and everyone else in the United States knowing that the National Popular Vote plan is the law that will govern the presidential election; and
On Election Day in November, one presidential candidate emerged with the most popular votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.

The hypothetical scenario then conjectures that when the time comes for the Electoral College to meet in mid-December, the 270 (or more) presidential electors (who are avid supporters of their own party’s presidential candidate who just won the national popular vote) would respond to pressure from supporters of the political party that just lost the election.

In fact, there would be little inclination for party activists to vote against their own strongly held personal preferences, against their own party’s presidential nominee, against their own state’s law, and against the desires of an overwhelming majority of their state’s voters (who favor a national popular vote for President).

The country has actual experience that relates to the hypothesized scenario. In 2000, Al Gore won the national popular vote by a margin of over 537,000 votes. However, under the laws in place at the time, there were 271 Republican presidential electors (just one more than the 270 needed to elect a President) who were nominated for that position by their party on the presumption that they would vote for George W. Bush. About 70% of the American people believed (then and now) that the Presidency should go to the candidate who receives the most popular votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Nevertheless, none of the 271 Republican presidential electors succumbed to public pressure and voted in favor of the winner of the national popular vote.

[Ms. Toad]

57. You're misunderstanding what the compact does, or how it would work

with ths ruling.

From one of the articles you linked to:

The compact would modify the way participating states implement Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which requires each state legislature to define a method to appoint its electors to vote in the Electoral College.

So even if every state adopted the compact, they would appoint electors and direct them to vote for the winner of the popular vote.

But what this decision says - if it is upheld - is that the state's role ends upon appointment (before the electoral college vote). Their directon as to how to vote is not binding on the electors. That means that even though the state directed its electors to vote for the winner of the popular vote, this decision says they are under no obligation to do so.

That means this decision - and the compact could well counter each other.

It doesn't matter whether constitutional scholars believe the compact is constitutional (I agree it is), this court decision has the potential to undo what states have adopted by freeing the electors from the constraint to cast the vote in the manner directed by the state.

[hlthe2b]

58. I fully understand. You are misinterpreting my posts intentionally it would appear.

That has been a pattern with our past interactions, so bye. Not worth it.

[Ms. Toad]

60. Then please explain

in your own words - not a massive cut-and-past word dump - why the electors chosen under the compact woud NOT be subject to this new decision that allows electoral voters to cast their ballots however they choose during the electoral college vote? (In other words - why would they, any more than current electors, be required to vote as the state tells them under this new decision.)

[Sgent]

19. This doesn't fix the problem of faithless electors

it does fix the popular vote not deciding the presidency.

As long as there are electors, then once selected they are free to vote for whomever they want. Presumably parties will not nominate some they expect to be faithless, but it has happened before.

[hlthe2b]

20. Laurence Tribe believes it will.

Link to tweet

[onenote]

42. Tribe doesn't offer an explanation as to how the National Popular Vote compact would do away with

faithless electors.

[hlthe2b]

45. Your answers assertions addressed in detail:

https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/section_9.10

9.10 Myths about Faithless Electors

9.10.1 MYTH: Faithless presidential electors would be a problem under the National Popular Vote compact.
9.10.2 MYTH: It might be difficult to coerce presidential electors to vote for the national popular vote winner.
9.10.3 MYTH: Presidential electors might succumb to outside pressure and abandon the national popular vote winner in favor of the winner of the popular vote in their state.

9.10.1 MYTH: Faithless presidential electors would be a problem under the National Popular Vote compact.
QUICK ANSWER:

There is no practical problem with faithless presidential electors. There have been only 17 deviant votes for President out of the 22,991 electoral votes cast in the nation’s 57 presidential elections between 1789 and 2012, and only one of them, in 1796, was a true faithless elector.
To the extent that anyone believes that there is a problem, the states have ample constitutional authority to remedy it, and effective solutions are available (such as the proposed Uniform Faithful Presidential Electors Act).
One of the collateral benefits of the National Popular Vote plan is that it would virtually eliminate the possibility of faithless electors actually affecting the outcome of a presidential election because it would typically generate an exaggerated margin of victory in the Electoral College of about 75% for the national popular vote winner (namely, an absolute majority of the electoral votes from the compacting states plus about half of the remaining electoral votes of the non-compacting states).

The myth about faithless electors is yet another example of a potential problem that the National Popular Vote plan handles in a manner that is equal to, and arguably superior to, the current system.

The Founding Fathers envisioned that the presidential electors would be outstanding citizens who would meet and debate and exercise independent judgment in choosing the best person to become President. However, that expectation was dashed with the emergence of political parties in the nation’s first competitive presidential election in 1796.

Since 1796, presidential electors have been committed party activists who are nominated by their political party to cast their vote in the Electoral College for their party’s nominee. That is, presidential electors have simply been willing “rubber-stamps” for their party’s nominee for President.

Faithless presidential electors are not a practical problem in the first place. Of the 22,991 electoral votes cast for President in the nation’s 57 presidential elections between 1789 and 2012, only 17 were cast in a deviant way.[266] Moreover, among these 17 cases, the unexpected vote of Samuel Miles for Thomas Jefferson in 1796 was the only instance of a true faithless elector (where the elector might have thought, at the time he voted, that his vote might affect the national outcome).

Fifteen of the 17 cases were post-election grand-standing votes cast by publicity-seeking electors who knew, at the time they voted, that their vote would not affect the outcome in the Electoral College.

One electoral vote was accidentally and unintentionally cast by an unidentified Democratic presidential elector in Minnesota who absentmindedly voted for his party’s vice-presidential candidate for both President and Vice President.[267]

Nonetheless, the possibility of faithless electors exists under both the current system and the National Popular Vote plan.

For example, in September 2012, three Republican electors (who had favored Ron Paul during the nomination process) publicly raised doubt as to their loyalty to Mitt Romney, the eventual Republican presidential nominee.[268] Defection by multiple presidential electors could potentially throw a close presidential election into the U.S. House of Representatives.[269]

Second, if anyone perceives faithless presidential electors to be a real problem, the states already have ample constitutional authority to remedy the situation by state law.

In most states, each political party nominates candidates for the position of presidential elector (typically at a combination of party conventions at the congressional district level and state level).

About half of the states currently have laws involving pledges, penalties, or other procedures to ensure that presidential electors vote for their party’s nominees.

In upholding the constitutionality of a pledge guaranteeing faithful voting by presidential electors, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote in the 1952 case of Ray v. Blair:

“No one faithful to our history can deny that the plan originally contemplated, what is implicit in its text, that electors would be free agents, to exercise an independent and nonpartisan judgment as to the men best qualified for the Nation's highest offices.…

“This arrangement miscarried. Electors, although often personally eminent, independent, and respectable, officially become voluntary party lackeys and intellectual nonentities to whose memory we might justly paraphrase a tuneful satire:

‘They always voted at their party’s call

‘And never thought of thinking for themselves at all’”[270] [Emphasis added]

Existing Pennsylvania law is noteworthy in that it empowers each party’s presidential candidate to nominate all elector candidates directly. The presidential nominee is, after all, the person whose name actually appears on the ballot on Election Day and who has the greatest immediate interest in faithful voting by presidential electors.

Existing North Carolina law declares vacant the position of any contrary-voting elector, voids that elector’s vote, and empowers the state’s remaining electors to replace the contrary-voting elector immediately with an elector loyal to the party’s nominee.

At its 119th annual meeting in 2010, the Uniform Law Commission (also known as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) approved a “Uniform Faithful Presidential Electors Act” and submitted this model legislation to the state legislatures for their consideration. The Conference, formed in 1892, is a non-governmental body that has produced more than 200 recommended uniform state laws. The Conference is most widely known for its work on the Uniform Commercial Code.

The Uniform Faithful Presidential Electors Act has many of the features of North Carolina’s existing law. The proposed uniform law calls for the election of both electors and alternate electors. The Act has a state-administered pledge of faithfulness. Any attempt by a presidential elector to cast a vote in violation of that pledge effectively constitutes resignation from the office of elector. The Act provides a mechanism for immediately filling a vacancy created for that reason (or any other reason). The National Popular Vote organization has endorsed this proposed uniform law.

Third, in case anyone views faithless presidential electors to be a real problem, the National Popular Vote plan is actually superior to the current system in ensuring that a wayward elector would be unlikely to impact the ultimate choice of the President. Under the National Popular Vote compact, the national popular vote winner would generally receive an exaggerated margin (roughly 75%) of the votes in the Electoral College in any given presidential election. The reason is that the National Popular Vote compact guarantees that the presidential candidate receiving the most popular votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia would receive at least 270 (of the 538) electoral votes from the states belonging to the compact. Then, beyond that guaranteed bloc of at least 270 electoral votes, the national popular vote winner would receive additional electoral votes from whichever non-compacting states he or she happened to carry (presumably under existing winner-take-all statutes in those states). If the non-compacting states divided approximately equally between the candidates, the nationwide winning candidate would generally receive an exaggerated margin (roughly 75%) of the votes in the Electoral College (that is, about 404 out of 538 electoral votes). This cushion would make it highly unlikely that faithless electors could affect the outcome of a presidential election (where 270 electoral votes are required to win the Presidency).

For additional information about faithless electors, see section 2.12.
Footnotes

[266] See section 2.12.

[267] The accidental vote was cast in Minnesota in 2004. After the ballots were counted, all 10 electors said that they intended to vote for John Kerry for President and John Edwards for Vice President. However, one of the 10 accidentally voted for John Edwards for both President and Vice President.

[268] Baker, Mike. Three Electoral College members may pass on GOP ticket. Associated Press. September 12, 2012.

[269] As discussed in section 2.12, in 1836, 23 Democratic presidential electors from Virginia did not vote for the Democratic Party’s vice-presidential nominee (Richard M. Johnson). The Virginia Democratic Party had announced their vigorous opposition to Johnson at the party’s national convention (both before and after Johnson’s nomination). Johnson failed to receive an absolute majority of the electoral votes and the vice-presidential election was therefore thrown into the U.S. Senate. The Democratic Party was in control of the Senate, and Johnson won by an overwhelmingly 33–16 vote.

[270] Ray v. Blair 343 U.S. 214 at 232. 1952.
9.10.2 MYTH: It might be difficult to coerce presidential electors to vote for the national popular vote winner.
QUICK ANSWER:

No coercion would be required to force presidential electors to vote for the national popular vote winner under the National Popular Vote compact, because the compact (like the current system) would result in the election to the Electoral College of presidential electors who are avid supporters of the national popular vote winner.

No coercion is required to force presidential electors to vote as intended under either the current system or the National Popular Vote system.

Under both systems, each political party nominates opinionated party activists for the ceremonial position of presidential elector under existing state laws. Each party’s nominees for the position of presidential elector are selected precisely because they are passionate supporters of their party’s candidate and because they can be relied upon to act as willing “rubber-stamps” for their party’s nominee.

When voters go to the polls on Election Day in November, they are, in reality, choosing amongst competing slates of presidential electors associated with the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, or some other party. Under the winner-take-all system (currently used in 48 of the 50 states and the District of Columbia), the entire slate of elector candidates associated with the presidential candidate receiving the most popular votes within each separate state is elected as the state’s presidential electors.[271]

Under the National Popular Vote compact, the state’s presidential electors would be the elector candidates associated with the presidential candidate who won the most popular votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. This bloc of 270 (or more) presidential electors would reflect the will of the voters nationwide. All of these 270 or more presidential electors would be loyal and avid supporters of the national popular vote winner. These presidential electors would come from the political party that won the election nationally. Thus, no one in this bloc of 270 (or more) presidential electors would be asked to vote contrary to his or her own political inclinations or conscience. Instead, these electors would vote for their own strongly held personal choice, namely the nominee of their own political party.

Under the National Popular Vote plan, these 270 (or more) presidential electors would operate as willing “rubber-stamps” for the nationwide choice of the voters, just as presidential electors currently act as willing “rubber-stamps” for the statewide choice of the voters (or district-wide choice, in the cases of Maine and Nebraska).
Footnotes

[271] In two states (Maine and Nebraska), the elector candidates associated with the presidential candidate who receives the most popular votes in each of the state’s congressional districts are elected (along with the two additional at-large elector candidates associated with the presidential candidate who receives the most popular votes in the state as a whole).
9.10.3 MYTH: Presidential electors might succumb to outside pressure and abandon the national popular vote winner in favor of the winner of the popular vote in their state.
QUICK ANSWER:

Presidential electors are loyal party activists who are selected precisely because they can be relied upon to act as willing “rubber-stamps” for their party’s nominee.
The low probability of presidential electors succumbing to outside pressure is illustrated by the fact that none of the 271 Republican presidential electors in 2000 voted for Al Gore despite the fact that Gore received the most popular votes nationwide and despite the fact that the American public overwhelmingly believes that the President should be the candidate who receives the most popular votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Instead, all 271 Republican presidential electors dutifully voted for their party’s nominee in accordance with the virtually universal view of how the system that was legally in effect at the time was supposed to operate.

Some have suggested that, under the National Popular Vote compact, presidential electors might, after the people vote in November, succumb to outside pressure and abandon the national popular vote in favor of the winner of the popular vote in their state.

This hypothetical scenario is based on the following incorrect assumptions:

There is any substantial pool of people who would support the notion of changing the rules after the public has voted on Election Day.
The public favors the current state-by-state winner-take-all approach for electing the President, and hence there would be a vast pool of people to apply such pressure on presidential electors.
The supporters of the presidential candidate who just won the national popular vote, under laws that were in place on Election Day, would care about—much less actually succumb to—pressure from people representing the losing party.

The reality is that there would be no substantial pressure in the first place. The public simply does not favor the current system of awarding all of a state’s electoral votes to the presidential candidate who receives the most popular votes in each separate state (the winner-take-all-rule). In polls since 1944, at least 70% (usually more) of the American people have said that they favored the idea that the presidential candidate receiving the most votes throughout the United States should win the Presidency. A mere 20% of the public supports the current state-by-state winner-take-all system (with 10% undecided). Far from being attached to the state-by-state winner-take-all system of awarding electoral votes, the public strongly opposes it.

The environment in which this hypothetical scenario would arise has the following five elements:

About 70% of the voters of any given state believe that the presidential candidate receiving the most votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia should win the Presidency;
The state legislature and Governor of the state have responded to the wishes of its own voters and enacted the National Popular Vote law in their state;
States possessing a majority of the electoral votes (essentially more than half the population of the country) have similarly enacted the National Popular Vote law, and the law has taken effect nationally;
A nationwide presidential campaign has been conducted, over a period of many months, with the candidates, the media, and everyone else in the United States knowing that the National Popular Vote plan is the law that will govern the presidential election; and
On Election Day in November, one presidential candidate emerged with the most popular votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.

The hypothetical scenario then conjectures that when the time comes for the Electoral College to meet in mid-December, the 270 (or more) presidential electors (who are avid supporters of their own party’s presidential candidate who just won the national popular vote) would respond to pressure from supporters of the political party that just lost the election.

In fact, there would be little inclination for party activists to vote against their own strongly held personal preferences, against their own party’s presidential nominee, against their own state’s law, and against the desires of an overwhelming majority of their state’s voters (who favor a national popular vote for President).

The country has actual experience that relates to the hypothesized scenario. In 2000, Al Gore won the national popular vote by a margin of over 537,000 votes. However, under the laws in place at the time, there were 271 Republican presidential electors (just one more than the 270 needed to elect a President) who were nominated for that position by their party on the presumption that they would vote for George W. Bush. About 70% of the American people believed (then and now) that the Presidency should go to the candidate who receives the most popular votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Nevertheless, none of the 271 Republican presidential electors succumbed to public pressure and voted in favor of the winner of the national popular vote.

[onenote]

48. See my response - post #47

All of that "myth" busting is well and good. It just doesn't prove that the NIC will render the issue of faithless electors any less relevant than it is today.
There are good reasons to support the NIC. None of them really have anything to do with faithless electors.

[hlthe2b]

50. See my response that you didn't bother to read.

[onenote]

51. Your response was to cut and paste a page I've read in the past and was responding to in my post.

Again, the problem of faithless electors doesn't go away with the NIC unless and until something more than states representing a bare majority of the EC adopt it (in which case it goes away as a practical matter although not as a theoretical matter -- which is pretty much the situation today anyway).

[hlthe2b]

46. Your answers/ assertions addressed in detail:

9.10 Myths about Faithless Electors

9.10.1 MYTH: Faithless presidential electors would be a problem under the National Popular Vote compact.
9.10.2 MYTH: It might be difficult to coerce presidential electors to vote for the national popular vote winner.
9.10.3 MYTH: Presidential electors might succumb to outside pressure and abandon the national popular vote winner in favor of the winner of the popular vote in their state.

9.10.1 MYTH: Faithless presidential electors would be a problem under the National Popular Vote compact.
QUICK ANSWER:

There is no practical problem with faithless presidential electors. There have been only 17 deviant votes for President out of the 22,991 electoral votes cast in the nation’s 57 presidential elections between 1789 and 2012, and only one of them, in 1796, was a true faithless elector.
To the extent that anyone believes that there is a problem, the states have ample constitutional authority to remedy it, and effective solutions are available (such as the proposed Uniform Faithful Presidential Electors Act).
One of the collateral benefits of the National Popular Vote plan is that it would virtually eliminate the possibility of faithless electors actually affecting the outcome of a presidential election because it would typically generate an exaggerated margin of victory in the Electoral College of about 75% for the national popular vote winner (namely, an absolute majority of the electoral votes from the compacting states plus about half of the remaining electoral votes of the non-compacting states).

The myth about faithless electors is yet another example of a potential problem that the National Popular Vote plan handles in a manner that is equal to, and arguably superior to, the current system.

The Founding Fathers envisioned that the presidential electors would be outstanding citizens who would meet and debate and exercise independent judgment in choosing the best person to become President. However, that expectation was dashed with the emergence of political parties in the nation’s first competitive presidential election in 1796.

Since 1796, presidential electors have been committed party activists who are nominated by their political party to cast their vote in the Electoral College for their party’s nominee. That is, presidential electors have simply been willing “rubber-stamps” for their party’s nominee for President.

Faithless presidential electors are not a practical problem in the first place. Of the 22,991 electoral votes cast for President in the nation’s 57 presidential elections between 1789 and 2012, only 17 were cast in a deviant way.[266] Moreover, among these 17 cases, the unexpected vote of Samuel Miles for Thomas Jefferson in 1796 was the only instance of a true faithless elector (where the elector might have thought, at the time he voted, that his vote might affect the national outcome).

Fifteen of the 17 cases were post-election grand-standing votes cast by publicity-seeking electors who knew, at the time they voted, that their vote would not affect the outcome in the Electoral College.

One electoral vote was accidentally and unintentionally cast by an unidentified Democratic presidential elector in Minnesota who absentmindedly voted for his party’s vice-presidential candidate for both President and Vice President.[267]

Nonetheless, the possibility of faithless electors exists under both the current system and the National Popular Vote plan.

For example, in September 2012, three Republican electors (who had favored Ron Paul during the nomination process) publicly raised doubt as to their loyalty to Mitt Romney, the eventual Republican presidential nominee.[268] Defection by multiple presidential electors could potentially throw a close presidential election into the U.S. House of Representatives.[269]

Second, if anyone perceives faithless presidential electors to be a real problem, the states already have ample constitutional authority to remedy the situation by state law.

In most states, each political party nominates candidates for the position of presidential elector (typically at a combination of party conventions at the congressional district level and state level).

About half of the states currently have laws involving pledges, penalties, or other procedures to ensure that presidential electors vote for their party’s nominees.

In upholding the constitutionality of a pledge guaranteeing faithful voting by presidential electors, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote in the 1952 case of Ray v. Blair:

“No one faithful to our history can deny that the plan originally contemplated, what is implicit in its text, that electors would be free agents, to exercise an independent and nonpartisan judgment as to the men best qualified for the Nation's highest offices.…

“This arrangement miscarried. Electors, although often personally eminent, independent, and respectable, officially become voluntary party lackeys and intellectual nonentities to whose memory we might justly paraphrase a tuneful satire:

‘They always voted at their party’s call

‘And never thought of thinking for themselves at all’”[270] [Emphasis added]

Existing Pennsylvania law is noteworthy in that it empowers each party’s presidential candidate to nominate all elector candidates directly. The presidential nominee is, after all, the person whose name actually appears on the ballot on Election Day and who has the greatest immediate interest in faithful voting by presidential electors.

Existing North Carolina law declares vacant the position of any contrary-voting elector, voids that elector’s vote, and empowers the state’s remaining electors to replace the contrary-voting elector immediately with an elector loyal to the party’s nominee.

At its 119th annual meeting in 2010, the Uniform Law Commission (also known as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) approved a “Uniform Faithful Presidential Electors Act” and submitted this model legislation to the state legislatures for their consideration. The Conference, formed in 1892, is a non-governmental body that has produced more than 200 recommended uniform state laws. The Conference is most widely known for its work on the Uniform Commercial Code.

The Uniform Faithful Presidential Electors Act has many of the features of North Carolina’s existing law. The proposed uniform law calls for the election of both electors and alternate electors. The Act has a state-administered pledge of faithfulness. Any attempt by a presidential elector to cast a vote in violation of that pledge effectively constitutes resignation from the office of elector. The Act provides a mechanism for immediately filling a vacancy created for that reason (or any other reason). The National Popular Vote organization has endorsed this proposed uniform law.

Third, in case anyone views faithless presidential electors to be a real problem, the National Popular Vote plan is actually superior to the current system in ensuring that a wayward elector would be unlikely to impact the ultimate choice of the President. Under the National Popular Vote compact, the national popular vote winner would generally receive an exaggerated margin (roughly 75%) of the votes in the Electoral College in any given presidential election. The reason is that the National Popular Vote compact guarantees that the presidential candidate receiving the most popular votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia would receive at least 270 (of the 538) electoral votes from the states belonging to the compact. Then, beyond that guaranteed bloc of at least 270 electoral votes, the national popular vote winner would receive additional electoral votes from whichever non-compacting states he or she happened to carry (presumably under existing winner-take-all statutes in those states). If the non-compacting states divided approximately equally between the candidates, the nationwide winning candidate would generally receive an exaggerated margin (roughly 75%) of the votes in the Electoral College (that is, about 404 out of 538 electoral votes). This cushion would make it highly unlikely that faithless electors could affect the outcome of a presidential election (where 270 electoral votes are required to win the Presidency).

For additional information about faithless electors, see section 2.12.
Footnotes

[266] See section 2.12.

[267] The accidental vote was cast in Minnesota in 2004. After the ballots were counted, all 10 electors said that they intended to vote for John Kerry for President and John Edwards for Vice President. However, one of the 10 accidentally voted for John Edwards for both President and Vice President.

[268] Baker, Mike. Three Electoral College members may pass on GOP ticket. Associated Press. September 12, 2012.

[269] As discussed in section 2.12, in 1836, 23 Democratic presidential electors from Virginia did not vote for the Democratic Party’s vice-presidential nominee (Richard M. Johnson). The Virginia Democratic Party had announced their vigorous opposition to Johnson at the party’s national convention (both before and after Johnson’s nomination). Johnson failed to receive an absolute majority of the electoral votes and the vice-presidential election was therefore thrown into the U.S. Senate. The Democratic Party was in control of the Senate, and Johnson won by an overwhelmingly 33–16 vote.

[270] Ray v. Blair 343 U.S. 214 at 232. 1952.
9.10.2 MYTH: It might be difficult to coerce presidential electors to vote for the national popular vote winner.
QUICK ANSWER:

No coercion would be required to force presidential electors to vote for the national popular vote winner under the National Popular Vote compact, because the compact (like the current system) would result in the election to the Electoral College of presidential electors who are avid supporters of the national popular vote winner.

No coercion is required to force presidential electors to vote as intended under either the current system or the National Popular Vote system.

Under both systems, each political party nominates opinionated party activists for the ceremonial position of presidential elector under existing state laws. Each party’s nominees for the position of presidential elector are selected precisely because they are passionate supporters of their party’s candidate and because they can be relied upon to act as willing “rubber-stamps” for their party’s nominee.

When voters go to the polls on Election Day in November, they are, in reality, choosing amongst competing slates of presidential electors associated with the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, or some other party. Under the winner-take-all system (currently used in 48 of the 50 states and the District of Columbia), the entire slate of elector candidates associated with the presidential candidate receiving the most popular votes within each separate state is elected as the state’s presidential electors.[271]

Under the National Popular Vote compact, the state’s presidential electors would be the elector candidates associated with the presidential candidate who won the most popular votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. This bloc of 270 (or more) presidential electors would reflect the will of the voters nationwide. All of these 270 or more presidential electors would be loyal and avid supporters of the national popular vote winner. These presidential electors would come from the political party that won the election nationally. Thus, no one in this bloc of 270 (or more) presidential electors would be asked to vote contrary to his or her own political inclinations or conscience. Instead, these electors would vote for their own strongly held personal choice, namely the nominee of their own political party.

Under the National Popular Vote plan, these 270 (or more) presidential electors would operate as willing “rubber-stamps” for the nationwide choice of the voters, just as presidential electors currently act as willing “rubber-stamps” for the statewide choice of the voters (or district-wide choice, in the cases of Maine and Nebraska).
Footnotes

[271] In two states (Maine and Nebraska), the elector candidates associated with the presidential candidate who receives the most popular votes in each of the state’s congressional districts are elected (along with the two additional at-large elector candidates associated with the presidential candidate who receives the most popular votes in the state as a whole).
9.10.3 MYTH: Presidential electors might succumb to outside pressure and abandon the national popular vote winner in favor of the winner of the popular vote in their state.
QUICK ANSWER:

Presidential electors are loyal party activists who are selected precisely because they can be relied upon to act as willing “rubber-stamps” for their party’s nominee.
The low probability of presidential electors succumbing to outside pressure is illustrated by the fact that none of the 271 Republican presidential electors in 2000 voted for Al Gore despite the fact that Gore received the most popular votes nationwide and despite the fact that the American public overwhelmingly believes that the President should be the candidate who receives the most popular votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Instead, all 271 Republican presidential electors dutifully voted for their party’s nominee in accordance with the virtually universal view of how the system that was legally in effect at the time was supposed to operate.

Some have suggested that, under the National Popular Vote compact, presidential electors might, after the people vote in November, succumb to outside pressure and abandon the national popular vote in favor of the winner of the popular vote in their state.

This hypothetical scenario is based on the following incorrect assumptions:

There is any substantial pool of people who would support the notion of changing the rules after the public has voted on Election Day.
The public favors the current state-by-state winner-take-all approach for electing the President, and hence there would be a vast pool of people to apply such pressure on presidential electors.
The supporters of the presidential candidate who just won the national popular vote, under laws that were in place on Election Day, would care about—much less actually succumb to—pressure from people representing the losing party.

The reality is that there would be no substantial pressure in the first place. The public simply does not favor the current system of awarding all of a state’s electoral votes to the presidential candidate who receives the most popular votes in each separate state (the winner-take-all-rule). In polls since 1944, at least 70% (usually more) of the American people have said that they favored the idea that the presidential candidate receiving the most votes throughout the United States should win the Presidency. A mere 20% of the public supports the current state-by-state winner-take-all system (with 10% undecided). Far from being attached to the state-by-state winner-take-all system of awarding electoral votes, the public strongly opposes it.

The environment in which this hypothetical scenario would arise has the following five elements:

About 70% of the voters of any given state believe that the presidential candidate receiving the most votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia should win the Presidency;
The state legislature and Governor of the state have responded to the wishes of its own voters and enacted the National Popular Vote law in their state;
States possessing a majority of the electoral votes (essentially more than half the population of the country) have similarly enacted the National Popular Vote law, and the law has taken effect nationally;
A nationwide presidential campaign has been conducted, over a period of many months, with the candidates, the media, and everyone else in the United States knowing that the National Popular Vote plan is the law that will govern the presidential election; and
On Election Day in November, one presidential candidate emerged with the most popular votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.

The hypothetical scenario then conjectures that when the time comes for the Electoral College to meet in mid-December, the 270 (or more) presidential electors (who are avid supporters of their own party’s presidential candidate who just won the national popular vote) would respond to pressure from supporters of the political party that just lost the election.

In fact, there would be little inclination for party activists to vote against their own strongly held personal preferences, against their own party’s presidential nominee, against their own state’s law, and against the desires of an overwhelming majority of their state’s voters (who favor a national popular vote for President).

The country has actual experience that relates to the hypothesized scenario. In 2000, Al Gore won the national popular vote by a margin of over 537,000 votes. However, under the laws in place at the time, there were 271 Republican presidential electors (just one more than the 270 needed to elect a President) who were nominated for that position by their party on the presumption that they would vote for George W. Bush. About 70% of the American people believed (then and now) that the Presidency should go to the candidate who receives the most popular votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Nevertheless, none of the 271 Republican presidential electors succumbed to public pressure and voted in favor of the winner of the national popular vote.

[sarisataka]

28. I brought this up yesterday but

the poster I replied to simply dodged and ignored this issue:

"I expect the compact will last until

The first time it is invoked. 

I noticed most of the states are "blue" states. Picture this scenario 
A three way race splits the Democratic vote. A Republican candidate gets 44% of the popular vote and 240 Electoral votes. A Democratic candidate gets 38% and 224 Electoral votes. The third candidate only gets 17% but is very popular on the West coast and picks up 74 Electoral votes in those three states. Per the compact, those states should support the Republican and bring his total to 314. 
Do you really see those states giving their votes to a Republican because a non-binding compact says they should? 
Or would they go against the compact and support a candidate with a lesser popular vote but more politically aligned? 

If it was a reversed situation with a split Republican vote- very few "red" states have signed on so they don't even have a non-binding obligation to support a Democrat."

[hlthe2b]

29. You miss the point that they require (currently) states supplying more than 70 more EC votes.

That will by necessity have to include quite a few red or at least battleground states. Right now, it is non-binding because they have insufficient votes to enact it. Even if one only assumes the whole effort to be a stepping stone to raising awareness and support for a constitutional amendment abolishing the EC, there is value.

One can drum up scenarios for ANY and all possible solutions that could defeat or at least be a loop-hole, no matter how improbable. Constitutional and electoral scholars far more versed on the issues, practicalities, legalities and implications than you or I believe it will work. I won't spend all day countering them or the endless "what-ifs". I may be dead tomorrow. So may you. What if? Honestly, it never stops.

[sarisataka]

33. It still leaves no incentive for red states,

Especially small red states to join the compact or support an Amendment to change/abolish the EC. Arguably red states are not needed, or at least very few, to get to 270 and make non-participation by the others moot but it is an unbalanced system.

I agree that scenarios can be designed to "what-if" something to death, e.g. say an alien and his robot land in DC on election day...
However not considering any "what-ifs" is very myopic. A three way split scenario is not much less plausible than a candidate with a lower popular vote total receiving more electoral votes.

I believe even though I am not a learned scholar on a subject I am still allowed to have an opinion. And if I, an amateur, can poke a hole in the idea of an expert that cannot be plugged, maybe the idea needs further consideration.

[hlthe2b]

35. Had someone endlessly brought up the what-ifs of a Donald Trump to the founding fathers

at the Constitutional Convention, they MIGHT have petitioned England to take us back.

There is a "law of unintended consequences" to EVERYTHING. All we can do is try to fix the horrifically unjust system now and ATTEMPT to correct them while anticipating as much as possible. Remaining paralyzed and doing NOTHING is not an option. Nor will I be a naysayer that critiques everything to death yet offers no alternatives. I dare say if our democracy is to survive we need more of my philosophy and less of the former.

[sarisataka]

38. Different philosophies

I do not believe in expending political capital to do something just for the sake of doing. I will challenge, will it do anything, will it make the situation better and it the impact greater than the effort to make the change.

In the case of this compact my answers are, it will do very little, it may help in some situations but may make it worse in rare cases, it requires very little capital.

So what that means to me is I won't actively support or oppose it but will point out potential issues.

The solution, as I see it is an Amendment. Since the Amendment is essentially asking smaller states to lessen their influence it is unlikely to pass. However by appealing to the people and making it a direct election for President has the potential to overcome the state level resistance.

[hlthe2b]

39. Yet you offer no alternative...

THAT is consistent with my point. This could advance a constitutional amendment, which is obviously not going to emerge without public pressure.

[Recursion]

37. Yup. The litigation would be epic (nt)

[maddiemom]

31. And NOW we're told that the 2020 presidential winner...

could lose the popular vote by as much as SIX million votes and still be inaugurated. Twenty years will have passed, with two of the last three POTUSes taking office after losing the popular vote by half a million, then three million votes. This is just INSANE! And for a volunteer who's worked since a teenage "Kennedy Girl" to GOTV, it's truly heartbreaking.

[hlthe2b]

4. SC appeal next and there is time before 2020...

From same article:

Lawyers from the nonprofit Equal Citizens, which represented the Washington state electors and Baca in Colorado, said they will appeal the Washington ruling to the Supreme Court.

“We know Electoral College contests are going to be closer in the future than they have been in the past. And as they get closer and closer, even a small number of electors could change the results of an election," said Lawrence Lessig, a Harvard law professor who founded Equal Citizens and is part of its legal team. "Whether you think that’s a good system or not, we believe it is critical to resolve it before it would decide an election.”

If the Supreme Court chooses to take up the dispute, it would have time to rule on the issue before the Electoral College meets in December 2020 to cast the formal vote for president.

[Kilgore]

7. Honestly do you think the outcome will change

Given the current composition of the court?

[hlthe2b]

9. Kneejerk response, but we won't know until they take it up.

[Kilgore]

16. True

[PoliticAverse]

52. This is the type of issue more likely to come down 9-0 than 5-4. n/t

[Kilgore]

61. Your probably correct

[FBaggins]

40. Have you looked at the composition of the panel that made the ruling?

One judge appointed each by Clinton, Bush, and Obama. The Obama judge was the dissent, but only on procedural grounds (he would have dismissed it as moot).

[infullview]

5. So now they can be bought and paid for by a bribe and no one can contest thier vote.

[Farmer-Rick]

25. It's so much easier to pay off a few electors than to try

And convince an entire state's population to vote for the Putin puppet. And that little man in Russia, despite slowly turning his country radioactive, has a lot of money to pass out. Russian citizens suffer in poverty while the pampered Putin hands out tens of millions to criminals in the US.

The Supremes making it easier for Russian bribes every day. They must really be good friends of Putin. Have you seen any of them lunching with Russian mobsters? They all own stocks and get paid off for speaking and travel gigs.Many, many ways to hide bribes from Putin.

[Buns_of_Fire]

10. "I know you're pledged to vote for Candidate X, and can give me

a million reasons why, and Candidate X received more votes, but I have 328,265,500 reasons why Comrade Trump is a better choice, if you get my drift..."

(328,265,500 Rubles = 5 million USD, at the current rate of 65.65 to 1)

[Kilgore]

13. Well Played!!!!!

[Captain Zero]

15. And money is speech according to Citizens United

so that bribe of an elector is legal.

[samnsara]

17. then why do we even vote?

[Farmer-Rick]

26. 40 percent don't

And if this is blessed by the Supremes, even more people wont.

I hope we get the crazy mad American king out before the Supremes get paid off for this decision.

[Kid Berwyn]

32. Show.

And John Roberts can go to bed at night with a clear, if somewhat empty, conscience.

[sarisataka]

34. I have pointed out for years

That the Presidential popular election is just an illusion.

[Hortensis]

18. Hmmm. But not over even at this level. The 10th Circuit returned it

to the lower court for "further consideration," whatever that means. Waiting for a good analysis. Also would be interesting to know what the dissenting vote of the 2-1 decision says.

Or just what Lessig means here: “This is an incredibly thoughtful decision that could advance substantially our campaign to reform the Electoral College.” Lessig (representing the electors here) thinks fixing the EC is a legally lot easier than fixing gerrymandering and has been working to get rid of "winner take all" state laws for electors as counter to the principle of "one man, one vote" that decides most electoral issues, but this? In any case, he and his team are not unhappy.

[WePurrsevere]

23. The Lessig name was familiar so I looked him up...

If this ruling doesn't make him unhappy than I think that I'm going to take a wait and see approach before adding this to my already overloaded 'things I'm stressing out over' list.

Here's more on Lessig for anyone interested:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawrence_Lessig_2016_presidential_campaign

[Hortensis]

24. Exactly. Me too.

[Fiendish Thingy]

22. Perhaps not as big a deal as it seems

Currently, most/all states have different slates of electors- a Trump/GOP Slate, a Clinton/Dem slate, that are appointed based on the laws of that state. IIRC, There was one faithless Trump elector in 2016 who voted for another Republican as a protest.

If a state has joined the interstate compact, and appoints electors based on the popular vote, then in 2016, those states would have sent their Clinton slates to DC.

Does anyone know in which states the actual named electors are on the ballot instead of the Presidential candidates?

[dlk]

27. At Some Point, If We Are to Remain a Democracy, the Electoral College Must Go

Not coincidentally, the presidents installed in office with the minority of the popular vote have done the most damage to our country.

[PRETZEL]

36. My own view is that I don't think it's so much

that the EC needs to be eliminated, but states do need to take a look at the effects of the "winner takes all" approach to how their respective slates of electors are chosen. There's only a couple of states that select their electors based on proportionality. My preference would be to see this concept expanded to more states and using the 2 senate electors as the prize for winning a state.

[Sgent]

62. Meh....

That would allow a candidate to win a state and get fewer electors -- sometimes by a wide margin -- due to gerrymandering of house seats.

[ProudMNDemocrat]

30. Electors in Red states may just come around. Trump does not deserve a 2nd term.

For they must also pay attention to the events unfolding that Trump is not fit to serve a second term. The evidence of the past 2 weeks, and things yet to take place, will determine who gets elected. If they are tampered with by the Trump people, then they have been corrupted.

But I agree, the Electoral College has to go. The voice of the American people must take precedence.

[PoliticAverse]

53. No, it didn't "change how we pick our president". Electors could always vote for whomever they

wished. This law was an attempt to change things but as we see when challenged it failed.

For history and background, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faithless_elector

[roamer65]

54. Time to get rid of the EC.

Popular vote runoff system.

[UTUSN]

55. The "Democratic" elector in the case voted for KASICH against Hillary?!1 This decision is NOT GOOD!1

[Shrek]

56. Three others voted for Colin Powell

And Sanders got one as well as I recall.

[Joe941]

59. Changed? Isn't this how it's always been?

[IdealsAndReal42]

63. Stealing 2020 in its early stages?