The Myth Of 'Shock And Awe': Why The Iraqi Invasion Was A Disaster
By Richard Sanders6:19AM GMT 19 Mar 2013
The lead unit of the US Marine Corps arrived at the gates of Baghdad on the late afternoon of Sunday, April 6, 2003, less than three weeks after crossing the border from Kuwait. Nicknamed “The Dark Side", the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment had a reputation for aggression. Its commander, Lt. Colonel Brian McCoy, led his men from the front in a hard-topped Humvee and was renowned for leaping out of his vehicle in the midst of fighting and throwing hand grenades.
McCoy also had an eye for publicity. He’d welcomed a large number of journalists and photographers under his wing over the previous two weeks. And with the decisive battle for Baghdad looming, the press men now surged forward, eager to capture the iconic images of the Marines storming the bridge over the Diyala River, which marked the southeastern boundary of Baghdad, and the scenes of rejoicing and celebration it was assumed would follow.
But there was a problem – the lack of an enemy. There was desultory Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) and small arms fire from the north side of the river on the evening of April 6 and by nightfall this had petered out entirely. The following morning it seemed clear to the press – many of them hardened war correspondents far more experienced in combat than the young Marines – that the north bank had been deserted.
Then, as the Marines prepared for the assault, one of their armoured personnel carriers suffered a direct hit from an artillery round. Two Marines were killed. It was unclear if the shell was Iraqi or had come from the American side. But the Marines’ blood was up. “They were angry young men,” said one photographer present. A journalist spoke of there being a “blood lust” in the air.
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