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Related: Editorials & Other Articles, Issue Forums, Alliance Forums, Region ForumsWhat The Deadly Attack On A Kenya Mall Was Really About
What The Deadly Attack On A Kenya Mall Was Really About
By Ken Menkhaus
The bloody Shabaab attack on Nairobis Westgate shopping mall on September 21 was an act of desperation by a jihadi group beset by internal power struggles and plummeting support. It is intended to provoke a violent backlash against ethnic Somalis by the Kenyan government and Kenyan citizens. Angry and frustrated Kenyans must resist the urge to play into Shabaabs hands.
Ever since Shabaabs ascent to power in 2007, security and country experts have worried about the possibility that Shabaab which has long had a network in Kenya would attack one of Kenyas many soft targets. Nairobis busy shopping malls have always been a top concern...What was constraining Shabaab, even at the height of its power and popularity in Somalia in 2007-08, from taking the war to Kenya? <...> Shabaab did not want to disrupt the interests of hundreds of thousands of Somalis living and investing in Kenya. Since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, over a million Somalis have fled to and through Kenya, and many now have extensive business and real estate investments there. For all of the deep tensions between Somalis and Kenyans, Somalis are major stakeholders in Kenya today. Were Shabaab to launch a large-scale terrorist attack in Kenya, the argument went, it would risk provoking a heavy Kenyan crackdown on all of those Somali businesses. That in turn would provoke a backlash by Somalis against Shabaab. At that point, Shabaab would not have to worry about what the Kenyan or US governments would do to them theyd have to worry about what fellow Somalis would do to them. Messing with Somali business interests has never advanced the interests of any political actor in Somalia, foreign or local.
But the argument went further than this. Many of us also warned that Shabaabs reluctance to attack soft targets in Kenya (or elsewhere, including in the US) was contingent on the groups continued success in Somalia. Were the group to weaken and fragment, it would be more likely to consider high-risk terrorism abroad. Paradoxically, a weakened Shabaab is a greater threat outside Somalia than a stronger Shabaab...make no mistake Shabaab is weakened. It is still one of the strongest armed groups in south-central Somalia, and still capable of daily assassinations and terrorist attacks in Mogadishu, but it is in a state of serious decline. Over the past two years, it has lost control of almost all urban areas and the lucrative revenues from seaports like Kismayo. Its deep internal divisions exploded in armed conflict this year, resulting in the deaths of several of its top leaders and the splintering of the group. Most foreign mujahedeen have become disillusioned and left Somalia. And, most importantly, far fewer Somalis, both in country and in the large Somali diaspora, actively support the group.
The Westgate attack is the latest sign of the groups weakness. It was a desperate, high-risk gamble by Shabaab to reverse its prospects. If the deadly attack succeeds in prompting vigilante violence by Kenyan citizens or heavy-handed government reactions against Somali residents, Shabaab stands a chance of recasting itself as the vanguard militia protecting Somalis against external enemies. It desperately needs to reframe the conflict in Somalia as Somalis versus the foreigners, not as Somalis who seek peace and a return to normalcy versus a toxic jihadi movement.
- more -
http://thinkprogress.org/security/2013/09/22/2662191/deadly-attack-kenya-mall-sign-desperation/
By Ken Menkhaus
The bloody Shabaab attack on Nairobis Westgate shopping mall on September 21 was an act of desperation by a jihadi group beset by internal power struggles and plummeting support. It is intended to provoke a violent backlash against ethnic Somalis by the Kenyan government and Kenyan citizens. Angry and frustrated Kenyans must resist the urge to play into Shabaabs hands.
Ever since Shabaabs ascent to power in 2007, security and country experts have worried about the possibility that Shabaab which has long had a network in Kenya would attack one of Kenyas many soft targets. Nairobis busy shopping malls have always been a top concern...What was constraining Shabaab, even at the height of its power and popularity in Somalia in 2007-08, from taking the war to Kenya? <...> Shabaab did not want to disrupt the interests of hundreds of thousands of Somalis living and investing in Kenya. Since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, over a million Somalis have fled to and through Kenya, and many now have extensive business and real estate investments there. For all of the deep tensions between Somalis and Kenyans, Somalis are major stakeholders in Kenya today. Were Shabaab to launch a large-scale terrorist attack in Kenya, the argument went, it would risk provoking a heavy Kenyan crackdown on all of those Somali businesses. That in turn would provoke a backlash by Somalis against Shabaab. At that point, Shabaab would not have to worry about what the Kenyan or US governments would do to them theyd have to worry about what fellow Somalis would do to them. Messing with Somali business interests has never advanced the interests of any political actor in Somalia, foreign or local.
But the argument went further than this. Many of us also warned that Shabaabs reluctance to attack soft targets in Kenya (or elsewhere, including in the US) was contingent on the groups continued success in Somalia. Were the group to weaken and fragment, it would be more likely to consider high-risk terrorism abroad. Paradoxically, a weakened Shabaab is a greater threat outside Somalia than a stronger Shabaab...make no mistake Shabaab is weakened. It is still one of the strongest armed groups in south-central Somalia, and still capable of daily assassinations and terrorist attacks in Mogadishu, but it is in a state of serious decline. Over the past two years, it has lost control of almost all urban areas and the lucrative revenues from seaports like Kismayo. Its deep internal divisions exploded in armed conflict this year, resulting in the deaths of several of its top leaders and the splintering of the group. Most foreign mujahedeen have become disillusioned and left Somalia. And, most importantly, far fewer Somalis, both in country and in the large Somali diaspora, actively support the group.
The Westgate attack is the latest sign of the groups weakness. It was a desperate, high-risk gamble by Shabaab to reverse its prospects. If the deadly attack succeeds in prompting vigilante violence by Kenyan citizens or heavy-handed government reactions against Somali residents, Shabaab stands a chance of recasting itself as the vanguard militia protecting Somalis against external enemies. It desperately needs to reframe the conflict in Somalia as Somalis versus the foreigners, not as Somalis who seek peace and a return to normalcy versus a toxic jihadi movement.
- more -
http://thinkprogress.org/security/2013/09/22/2662191/deadly-attack-kenya-mall-sign-desperation/
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What The Deadly Attack On A Kenya Mall Was Really About (Original Post)
ProSense
Sep 2013
OP
I recall, the same thing was said about the MAK after UBL took it over to the far side.
leveymg
Sep 2013
#1
leveymg
(36,418 posts)1. I recall, the same thing was said about the MAK after UBL took it over to the far side.
It's a classic model for revolutionary groups subverted from the top down.
ProSense
(116,464 posts)2. Kick! n/t
JI7
(89,247 posts)3. it is interesting because especially in the last 1-2 years i have mostly read about them losing
power. they really are not popular among most of the somali community and this is why they seem to target younger people in places like the US to join them. these young people probably have no idea of the history or politics or anything like that but they are just not happy with their lives so they can easily be manipulated and made to feel like they have this purpose in life by joining.
i really hope people do not take out their anger over what happened on the somali community in Kenya and elsewhere.
ProSense
(116,464 posts)4. Kick! n/t