A caller who builds websites called in to Smerconish show listen what he is predicting on the ACA

[bigdarryl]

Website you have to reload the page to listen to the show https://soundcloud.com/smerconishshow/a-listener-who-builds

[Warren Stupidity]

1. How about a short summary?

[penultimate]

6. The caller is the CEO of a company that creates healthcare related sites for government

He said it was a no bid contract without any competition and given to the company that doesn't have direct experience creating health care website development. He then proceeded to say that the it will take longer until January to get it to work as expected. The caller didn't give any real technical specifics on what the issues are, or how he knows exactly what the real problems are. It might be legit, but it might also be someone just pulling that time frame out of his ass. It's kinda hard to say. I suppose we'll see.

[VanillaRhapsody]

28. there were 16 companies eligible to bid....only 4 did so...

I'd guess "out his ass".

[GReedDiamond]

7. The caller claims to be the CEO...

...of a web development company which does sites of the same level of size and complexity - or larger - as healthcare.gov, for the DOD. IOW, he runs a big operation with large Govt contracts which serve millions of people.

He says the first problem was that the company awarded the $600 million contract got the contract with no competition from other companies, such as the caller's, it was a no-bid contract. He said he would have loved to be able to bid on the healthcare.gov contract, but the first anybody in his business heard of it was when the announcement was made on the company awarded the contract.

He also states that the company awarded the no-bid $600 million contract does not have the appropriate experience for doing such a project.

He says the main issue that was miscalculated in designing the site, was that the individual states to put up their own health insurance exchanges was far fewer than expected (due to Repug obstructionism, although the caller does not say that), so, therefore, traffic to healthcare.gov was far more than the site was built to support.

He went on to use a plumbing metaphor - the site was built with a "half inch pipe when it needed a 5 inch pipe," and they need to tear stuff up to be able to go in and "replace the pipes."

That's pretty much what he had to say, and he emphasized the no-bid aspect of the whole situation as being very unusual, and possibly illegal the way the contract was awarded.

He also said that the site would probably not really be working properly until January.

[rurallib]

9. When he said $600 million I called bullshit and shut it off

I wouldn't trust Smerconish with a nickel.
And when the guy pulled up the bogus RW $600 million that was enough for me.

[Whisp]

10. ah, okay. I don't know Smerconish and didn't know the Pugs are saying it cost that much...

Hopefully we will learn more soon.

[FreakinDJ]

14. I'm going to call Bullshit on the "Plumber's Anology" too

Internet s designed to reroute traffic seamlessly to mirrored servers

[GReedDiamond]

16. Smerconish asked the caller to put what he was saying...

...in simple terms which Smercky could actually understand, so the caller threw out the plumbing pipe analogy.

Smercky responded to the plumbing analogy with glee, like he really "got it"!

[targetpractice]

17. No. The internet is not magic. The ACA application and infrastructure must handle the load.

The designers did not plan for so many red states opting out and punting to the Federal exchange. The fundamental requirements (needs) of the Healthcare.gov project changed midstream, and the designers/programmers did not adapt their plan to handle the increased load requirements.

To be fair to CGI... I'm hard pressed to think of any web site launch in history that was ready for millions of users upon launch. Usually, there is a gradual ramp up of users. In many ways, the Healthcare.gov site is unprecedented. If you were an early Twitter user... Remember the "Fail Whale" screen when too many users were tweeting at once?

[FreakinDJ]

31. The router is ahead of the server -btw

Cute little protocols like "Choke Bits" determine exactly how much traffic the server can take before it is re-routed off to another identical mirrored server

[penultimate]

36. Load balancing isn't something that magically happens

That has to be built into the system that does it. Also, this doesn't seem to be an issue with traffic congestion in which flow control concepts or even rerouting of network traffic may be of relevance. No one is having issues hitting the servers that are serving the web pages. From the location of the errors and the messages it throws out, it seems like it's issues purely on the back end. Their databases and whatever other services they have working in the background that communicate with other entities that we don't directly see, are where the problems exist. Unless any of us have some inside knowledge on how the thing is designed, it's all just speculation as to what exactly is going on in there. But all that stuff that takes place behind the scenes isn't automagically fault tolerant and scalelable because of magical protocols, that stuff has to be designed to be so.

[MADem]

20. But..... but...... but......!!! It's a series of TUBES, I tell ya!!! A series of TUBES! nt

[Blue_In_AK]

23. RIP, Senator Stevens

He will be remembered in perpetuity for that quote.

[MADem]

35. Won't he, though!!! And it was probably his best work on the Hill!

[Blue_In_AK]

50. Not to come TOO much to his defense

but he actually did do some good work on the Hill -- Title IX, for instance. We'd be better off if there were more Republicans like him who were willing to compromise.

[MADem]

51. OK, I'll give him props for Title IX....but wasn't he on the Bridge to Nowhere train, too?

That puts him back in "Let's mock him for the 'tubes' comment" territory!!!



Oh well...he's where politics won't touch him, no more, no more!

[Blue_In_AK]

52. Yeah, although that was actually more Don Young's baby,

at least the Anchorage bridge was. Ted may have had more to do with the Ketchikan bridge. The Anchorage bridge is still in the planning stages, and maybe won't get off the ground, but the KABATA (Knik Arm Bridge and Toll Authority) is busy buying up land in one of Anchorage's oldest neighborhoods for their easement. I personally am opposed, but the fact is that there IS only one road out of town going that direction so an alternate route might come in handy at some point.

Anchorage, with a population of almost 300,000, has only one road going out of town to the north and one road out going south. None east and west, of course, because of the mountains and the water. We'd be in big trouble if we ever had to evacuate.

[enough]

2. What is the gist?

[bhikkhu]

8. He works in the industry and thinks his company would have done it better

if given the opportunity. Whatever...hindsight isn't worth much at this point.

On the other hand, Healthcare.gov does seem to be working well enough (certainly better than my own state's exchange), and I expect we will have good news on the November enrollment numbers.

[Historic NY]

3. So who approved the bid on the contract????????

The people who wanted to see this fail.

[Whisp]

11. That could be true. I have no idea how these things are done.

I would hope that it was someone trustworthy in the admin that was given this responsibility. But who knows, the Bush/Cheney Plants are all over still.

[Guy Whitey Corngood]

4. No.

[Whisp]

5. Interesting. I wonder whose idea it was to not have competition bids on the job?

For those who don't want to bother listening (it's a very short audio file) a caller with experience in websites like healthcare.gov said that it was 'unique' that a 600 million dollar project was not put up for bids. It was done by a company who does not specialize in this sort of set up - they do insurance, among some other things that were mentioned.

The caller also said that the traffic was not anticipated because it was thought more states would have their own websites. He also said he doesn't think it can be redone properly by end of November, more like sometimes in January. The problem was put out like this: if you have a 1 inch pipe in your plumbing when you really needed a 5 inch pipe, you are going to have to tear down the foundation to start over again.

[moondust]

12. I would question that "5-inch pipe" metaphor.

After the initial flood of sign-ups won't traffic then slow to a manageable trickle? After all, something like 80% of Americans aren't affected at all because they have some other insurance.

[Whisp]

15. Yes. The caller sounded informed and convincing enough

but as you say - opening night(s) is always a nightmare for new launches of that size and the engine isn't made to withstand that initial traffic for all time, things taper off and that is what the focus should be on.

[sendero]

33. The problem is not just "pipes"..

... the problem (from what info is out there) is that healthcare.gov tries to verify every bit of information you enter as you go along. To do this it has to "talk" to various other databases in various other locations.

healthcare.gov has NO CONTROL over the capacity, up-time and response time of these other databases. This is a HUGE design error. These other databases should not be accessed until a person places an actual BUY order. Half or more of the users of the site will bail out once they see price/terms of the policy offered. THERE IS NO REASON TO VERIFY ANY OF THIS INFO UNTIL THERE IS A BUY.

[VanillaRhapsody]

40. Then how do you get that information OUT of those databases...

you cannot access those databases without the appropriate input data...and ALL of them will have different requirements....THAT is why they verify all the input data upfront.

[moondust]

48. "these other databases"

You mean databases of information provided by and maybe even located and maintained at multiple private insurance companies? What could possibly go wrong?

Single-payer would seem to simplify all that by eliminating external databases where "healthcare.gov has NO CONTROL over the capacity, up-time and response time."

[VanillaRhapsody]

29. Because it's simply not true.....16 contractors were eligible to bid...4 did. CGI got chosen.

[Whisp]

32. I didn't know that. thanks for the info.

dirty rotters.

[penultimate]

37. Do you have links to the documents that state that?

Nearly everything I read so far says the opposite, but they don't give their source of information either. I'm curious to see the documents where the various claims are coming from.

[VanillaRhapsody]

39. Yes I can...

An HHS source told The Daily Caller that the agency received four proposals out of 16 pre-qualified bidders. The source would not say which companies were pre-qualified, nor which companies submitted proposals.

Cheryl Campbell, senior vice president for CGI Federal, testified before the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health in September that CMS chose CGI Federal in Sept. 2011.

“On September 30, 2011, CMS conducted a competitive procurement and selected CGI Federal to design and develop the FFM,” said Campbell.

The FFM, or Federally Facilitated Marketplace, is the technical term for the Obamacare exchange.



Read more: http://dailycaller.com/2013/10/15/hhs-denies-cgi-federal-was-sole-bid-for-obamacare-exchange/#ixzz2m9F5u4u3

For a better source I found this..


The work on Healthcare.gov grew out of a contract for open-ended technology services first issued in 2007 with a place-holder value of $1,000. There were 31 bidders. An extension, awarded in September 2011 specifically to build Healthcare.gov, drew four bidders, the documents show, including CGI Federal.

That 2011 extension is called a "delivery order" rather than a contract because it fell under the original 2007 agreement for CGI Federal to provide IT services to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, the lead Obamacare agency. CGI Federal reported at the time of the extension that it had received $55.7 million for the first year's work to build Healthcare.gov.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/17/obamacare-site-contractors_n_4114116.html

[OilemFirchen]

41. More specifics

Here's the list of 16 "pre-qualified" companies. This is the omnibus contract which would ultimately include healthcare.gov:

Northrop Grumman
CGI Federal
EDS
Computer Science Corp.
IBM
Lockheed Martin
Science Applications International Corp.
ViPS of Baltimore, Md.
Buccaneer Computer Systems of Baltimore, Md.
IDL Solutions of Vienna, Va.
Quality Software Services of Gaithersburg, Md.
Maricom Systems of Baltimore
2020 LLC of Falls Church, Va.
iFed LLC
Alta Systems Inc. of Fairfax, Va.
Data Computer Corp. of America (DCCA) of Ellicott City, Md.

Here's the contract itself. Note the field "Number of Offers Received" near the bottom.

[VanillaRhapsody]

42. Thanks...I was not having as good a luck today...

[penultimate]

43. I read just read another article that from business insider

that stated that they limited the pool to 16 pre-screened companies to bid on the project.

[VanillaRhapsody]

47. they didn't "limit" them....they were the ones that were eligible...govt contracting

is not the same as private industry contracting. Those competing HAVE to know all the ins and outs of govt work. You cannot just walk in off the streets and bid because of various types of legislation...govt contracting is time consuming and expensive up-front...before the actual work even begins

[targetpractice]

13. Sometimes, rather than refactor, it's best to blow it up and put it back together again properly...

If I were managing this situation... I would have a small, agile "Contingency Pan B" team start from scratch... They would use the current site the "requirements", model, or prototype. Code it over... better, leaner without regard to the existing codebase. Then see who finishes first. The folks fixing the monstrosity, or the folks creating the new version. In my experience... My prediction would be that the the "do-over" project would finish faster than failed project... Especially, if there was a proper assessment of what went wrong in the first place.

This is a classic sunk-cost scenario... How much good money should be wasted after bad expenditure? I've never encountered a huge failed project where throwing more bodies (i.e., a "tech surge) at the problem helped solve anything.

[VanillaRhapsody]

44. Govt. doesn't do work like that....they don't do speculation. They always want

hard figures....

[OilemFirchen]

18. Total, absolute, unmitigated bullshit.

CGI was pre-qualified, had experience in the field (albeit to mixed reviews) and "according to USASpending.gov, CGI Federal got a total of $678 million for various services under the contract — including the $93.7 million Healthcare.gov job, which CGI Federal won over three other companies in late 2011". (per http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/16/meet-cgi-federal-the-company-behind-the-botched-launch-of-healthcare-gov/)

Everything spouted by this wannabe executive is cribbed verbatim from rightwing sites (WND, Washington Examiner, American "Thinker", etc.) Google remains your friend.

[Whisp]

19. Thank you. What a Liar! ugh.

I got sucked in.

[Gormy Cuss]

22. It sounds like a typical task order procurement.

There's more to the process but this is a short description of how it works.

Typically when a government agency needs to hire outside contractors for a specific task a Request for Proposal (RFP) is issued. Companies and individuals respond to the RFP with a detailed proposal on how they would accomplish the task meeting the government's schedule and what it would cost plus CV for key personnel and the company's direct experience. The government employees must then review each proposal carefully and interview each responder to clarify as needed. Once all proposals are reviewed the contract is awarded to one winner. An open RFP may generate DOZENS of qualified proposals. It represents a considerable effort to review them within the constraints of government procurement. It can take months to make a decision.

When a government agency knows that they will need a series of related tasks using contractors and there is need for rapid startup and response, they may issue a Request for Qualifications (RFQ) which resembles a usual proposal except that the costing and schedule is for hypothetical tasks. The agency staff must sift through all of the responses but instead of awarding a contract, they select a handful of contractors that all seem capable of doing the scope of work. Then when a specific task comes up, the qualified contractors submit proposals to do the work, the agency staff reviews 5 or fewer proposals and is ready to issue the contract and start work much more quickly.


(Gormy, former government contractor.)

[maced666]

24. CGI 'won' the bid - okay.

Per your own linked article after spending almost 1 million on lobbying efforts. And I'm not naïve enough to think it ended there.
This 'executive' may be full of crap but so is CGI - just look at their product.
Other than the American people President Obama is the one most screwed here. This fat-cat deal resulting in crap results are screwing up his Affordable Care legislation and it exactly the kind of thing that goes on in Washington he campaigned against but can't seem to squash.

[rusty fender]

27. Crony capitalism

It didn't go away with GWB.

[VanillaRhapsody]

45. where is the crony part when there are 3 other bidders?

[VanillaRhapsody]

30. Exactly my point....there were 3 other contractors that bid...it wasn't a no bid contract at all.

and 16 were eligible (pre-qualified) CGI among them.

[Sheri]

38. nice post. thanks.

something seemed fishy to me.

[LisaL]

46. If it had experience, why didn't it design the website that actually worked well?

[OilemFirchen]

49. Lots of reasons...

some benign and some not. The web is replete with post-mortems about this, but I'd venture that two major factors led to its dismal rollout:

1) As mentioned elsewhere, the USSC ruling allowing for states to opt out of exchanges dramatically changed the enrollment process mid-design. That CGI was unable to accommodate the change and/or that the government failed to delay the rollout pretty much guaranteed "failure". Of course, had the implementation been delayed, or had the price tag been raised, there would have been political hell to pay. Damned if they did, et al.

2) I believe that the project was underfunded at the outset. There was a reason that only four companies bid, and it's a given that CGI's bid was the lowest. Again, this was a political hot potato so cost overruns and delays - normal for a project of this size - were out of the question. The website was going to be rolled out by a date certain at a predetermined cost... period.

[octoberlib]

21. Clay Johnson did a blog post about the government procurement process

In 2004, Johnson was the lead programmer for Howard Dean’s presidential campaign.[5] Along with three other Howard Dean staffers (Ben Self, Jascha Franklin-Hodge, and Joe Rospars), Clay Johnson founded Blue State Digital, a company that provided technology services and online strategy for the 2008 Barack Obama Presidential Campaign.[6][7] In 2006, Blue State Digital was one of Fast Company’s Fast 50.[8]
In August 2012, Clay was selected as a Presidential Innovation Fellow and is currently supporting a project called RFP-EZ. The basic goal of RFP-EZ is to make it easier for small IT services firms to bid on and win government contracts for IT services (like coding and web development)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clay_Johnson_(technologist)

The cancer starts with fear. Contracting officers — people inside of the government in charge of selecting who gets to do what work — are afraid of their buys being contested by people who didn’t get selected. They’re also afraid of things going wrong down the line inside of a procurement, so they select vendors with a lot of “federal experience” to do the work. Over time, those vendors have been consolidated into pre-approved lists like GSA’s Alliant schedule. Then, for risk mitigation’s sake, they end up being the only ones allowed to compete for bids.

This results in a culturally accepted idea that cost implies quality. To ensure no disasters happen, throw lots of money at it. And when things go terribly wrong, throw more money at the same people who caused the problem to fix the problem. While this assumption may work well with commodities (want to ensure that you get lots of high-quality gravel? Buy a lot more gravel than you need, then throw out the bad gravel) the evidence points to the contrary with large IT purchases: they usually fail.

On top of this culture of fear? 6,500 pages of regulation, cumbersome business registration processes, and hostile bidding environments ensure that very few new businesses can compete for contracts, and the ones that do, end up becoming specialists in those regulatory burdens, not in doing the right thing.

The truth is, the people inside of government would like nothing more than to have the best and brightest minds in the world working on Healthcare.gov. But the best they’ve got to choose from are 58 different companies. That’s *the* problem.

http://blog.dobt.co/post/63381111778/the-healthcare-gov-fiasco

[TroglodyteScholar]

25. This is great info...

Thanks!

[OilemFirchen]

26. Seems that Johnson could use a little history lesson.

I don't know his age, but I was nearing retirement when Johnson was an undergrad. It's actually the case that procurement for small and/or startup companies is vastly superior to days gone by and that, perhaps, he should stick to subjects about which he has a whit or two of comprehension.

When I was a young pup, spending my mornings at the GSA RFP board, it was a given that the preponderance of IT/MIS/CIS requests were specifically written for one or two companies - as there were only one or two companies capable of satisfying the needs of the proposal. Most of the projects were turnkey and required both hardware and software competency and availability, familiarity with government protocol and procedures, usually a certain percentage of cleared personnel, ad infinitum. One can only imagine that, historically, contracts were let to an even more select group. Imagine, for example, a 1920's RFP for telephony equipment and services. Now, with open source platforms, hardware interchangeability and worldwide web protocols, there are few big dogs in the computer bidness.

Frankly, the excerpt above is tendentious mewling. The man may have leftish bonafides, but the "6,500 pages of regulation, cumbersome business registration processes, and hostile bidding environments" sure as shit sounds like a Looneytarian screed from a pampered lout.

[panader0]

53. Question: Does any member of the family of the owner of CGI have a friendship with Michelle Obama?

A right wing co-worker recently made the claim that CGI only got the contract because one of the daughters of a bigwig went to school with our FLOTUS. I would like to set him straight.

[spanone]

54. who gives a shit what 'anybody' says on a radio talk show. lies are generally accepted.

no offense to poster bigdarryl