In the communal sphere, the preferences of the mass public are arbitrary and vague, shaped through the acquisition of information (Jost et al., 2003) from opinion leaders whose function is to attach idea-elements together (Converse, 1964).
As one progresses downward from elites to the mass public on a conceptual rationality scale, further examination reveals the majority of the population sampled are unable to express an understanding of the constraints affecting political parties and issues without being prompted by political elites, resulting in frequent instances of logical inconsistencies (Converse, 1964). Consequently, abstract concepts such as ideological principles give way to simple, concrete belief systems which revolve around family, work, etc. Furthermore, the majority of the population rely on group politics, i.e., their primary means of identifying parties is through the treatment they and other groups received from political parties.
This process of acquiring information from authoritative sources to satisfy preferences which include survival is described as laying the foundation for a belief system (Converse, 1964; Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a, 1999b as cited in Jost et al., 2003; McGuire, 1985, as cited in Jost et al., 2003). Converse (1964) and Kunda (1990, as cited in Jost et al., 2003) suggest that this belief system is regulated by multiple constraints. The constraints offer a probability that a specific attitude held in a belief system will result in certain other attitudes being held (Converse, 1964). These constraints are identified as logical, psychological, and social (Converse, 1964). Jost et al. (2003) further expand on the concept by describing these constraints as existential (fear, curiosity), epistemic (authoritarian, liberal), and ideological (group dominance, egalitarianism). According to Jost et al. (2003), belief systems fulfill psychological needs.
Within the constraints, belief systems provide a principled doctrine by which new information obtained is compared to prior associations in order to choose a course which provides the greatest utility (Jost et al., 2003). However, these belief systems do not operate in a vacuum; uncertain conditions and numerous variables can influence personal motivations by invoking emotional responses, leading to a reformulation of logic that while not syllogistically sound, is principled nonetheless (Jost et al., 2003).
Information gathering in early childhood requires the formation of relationships (Weber & Federico, 2007). Attachment theory states that relationships are sought in order to reduce anxiety and provide a sense of security (Sroufe & Waters, 1977, as cited in Weber & Federico, 2007). Successful proximity-seeking efforts create a secure attachment style, inspiring self confidence, curiosity and an openness to new experiences (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978, as cited in Weber & Federico, 2007). Failed proximity-seeking efforts result in anxiety stemming from the lack of security, compounded by distress over the failure to establish a relationship (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003, as cited in Weber and Federico, 2007). Recurring failure or inconsistency (Ainsworth et al., 1978, as cited in Weber & Federico, 2007) in proximity-seeking efforts creates two insecure attachment styles; anxious and avoidant (Weber & Federico, 2007).
Anxious attachment style is associated with fixations on proximity-seeking and emotional support (Weber & Federico, 2007). Avoidant attachment style abandons proximity-seeking and instead relies on self-dependence to control anxiety (Weber & Federico, 2007). Brennan, Clark, & Shaver (1998, as cited in Weber & Federico, 2007) have determined that anxious and avoidant attachment styles in adults manifest themselves as either elevated states of arousal with a fixation on close relationships, or as an emotional disconnect with an aversion to close relationships, respectively.
Duckitt (2001, as cited in Weber & Federico, 2007) proposes that childrearing practices lead to the development of personality traits which endorse world views that form ideology. Children who have attained a secure attachment style are open to new information more than those with either of the two insecure attachment styles (Cassidy, 1986, as cited in Weber & Federico, 2007), as well as being less dogmatic and less reliant on ethnic stereotypes (Mikulincer, 1997, as cited in Weber & Federico, 2007). Additionally, Mikulincer & Florian (2000, as cited in Weber & Federico, 2007) have shown that secure attachment styles “mitigate the effect of mortality salience on the denigration of moral transgressors” (p. 394).
It has been demonstrated that children who have attained insecure attachment styles later as adults develop Right Wing Authoritarian (RWA) ideologies, in which the world is viewed as a dangerous place (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003, as cited by Weber & Federico, 2007), or Social Dominance Order (SDO) ideologies, in which the world is viewed as a competitive jungle (Duckitt, 2001, as cited by Weber & Federico, 2007). RWA’s are defined by a deference to authority figures, an endorsement of severe punishment by authority figures, and a high degree of conventionalism (Altemeyer, 2006). SDO’s differ from RWA’s in that rather than embracing authoritarianism as a means of protection against an out-group which threatens society, SDO’s feel that society has already fallen and that only the strong shall survive, prompting group domination, punishment, and humiliation against out-groups (Altemeyer, 1998). Altemeyer (1998, as cited in Jost et al., 2003) and Pratto, Sidanious, Stallworth & Malle (1994, as cited in Jost et al., 2003) have shown that SDO’s correlate with Republican party identification.
In response to criticism that scales of authoritarianism neglected left-wing personalities, Rokeach (1960, as cited in Jost et al., 2003) developed a scale of dogmatism which included measures of logically contradictory beliefs and denial of contradictions in belief systems.
According to Rokeach:
All belief-disbelief systems serve two powerful and conflicting sets of motives at the same time: the need for a cognitive framework to know and to understand and the need to ward off threatening aspects of reality. To the extent that the cognitive need to know is predominant and the need to ward off threat is absent, open systems should result. . . . But as the need to ward off threat becomes stronger, the cognitive need to know should become weaker, resulting in more closed belief systems (p. 67, as quoted in Jost et al., 2003, p. 346).
Thus, closed belief systems reduce ambiguity-induced anxiety by satisfying the need to know (Rokeach, 1960, as cited in Jost et al., 2003).
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