Welcome to DU!
The truly grassroots left-of-center political community where regular people, not algorithms, drive the discussions and set the standards.
Join the community:
Create a free account
Support DU (and get rid of ads!):
Become a Star Member
Latest Breaking News
General Discussion
The DU Lounge
All Forums
Issue Forums
Culture Forums
Alliance Forums
Region Forums
Support Forums
Help & Search
When the CIA Got It Right
I was cleaning house this morning, and I found this. Yes, I know I should clean house more often.
When the CIA Got It Right
By David Ignatius
Sunday, September 23, 2007
davidignatius@washpost.com
https://twitter.com/IgnatiusPost
The Central Intelligence Agency celebrated its 60th birthday last week, its public standing seemingly at an all-time low. The agency is viewed as having gotten it wrong on Iraq and nearly everything else over its six decades of unlovableness. ... A new book that purports to be a history of the CIA, "Legacy of Ashes," argues that it is indeed a nearly unbroken chain of error. The United States "has failed to create a first-rate spy service," writes Tim Weiner. "We are back where we began six decades ago, in a state of disarray."
....
But the catalogue of catastrophe isn't the whole story. As a 60th-birthday surprise, it's worth considering an example of how the agency got it right. This particular case study involves Iraq -- an area where the public (thanks to some dirty tricks by the Bush administration) wrongly thinks the agency messed up totally -- and a career CIA intelligence analyst named Paul R. Pillar.
Pillar told his story at a seminar at Georgetown University last week and in the current edition of the National Interest. He recounted the details of Iraq intelligence estimates that the agency produced in January 2003 -- not the famous one that wrongly embraced the Bush administration's jeremiads about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction but two others that warned in stark terms about the dangers of a U.S. invasion.
Pillar, who retired in 2005 after a 28-year career at the CIA, was the government's top Middle East analyst during the run-up to the invasion. Knowing that President Bush was pushing for war, Pillar felt a duty to warn of the likely consequences. So in late 2002, he prepared two quick estimates -- one on the likelihood of domestic turmoil in postwar Iraq and another on the risky consequences for the region. He arranged for the Policy Planning bureau at the State Department, which shared his worries, to commission the studies. ... The estimates were circulated in January 2003. You don't have to take my word or Pillar's for what they said: They are posted on the Web site of the Senate intelligence committee. They make haunting reading now, to put it mildly -- because nearly every setback we have seen in Iraq was forecast by Pillar and the analysts in their effort to break through the administration's happy talk.
By David Ignatius
Sunday, September 23, 2007
davidignatius@washpost.com
https://twitter.com/IgnatiusPost
The Central Intelligence Agency celebrated its 60th birthday last week, its public standing seemingly at an all-time low. The agency is viewed as having gotten it wrong on Iraq and nearly everything else over its six decades of unlovableness. ... A new book that purports to be a history of the CIA, "Legacy of Ashes," argues that it is indeed a nearly unbroken chain of error. The United States "has failed to create a first-rate spy service," writes Tim Weiner. "We are back where we began six decades ago, in a state of disarray."
....
But the catalogue of catastrophe isn't the whole story. As a 60th-birthday surprise, it's worth considering an example of how the agency got it right. This particular case study involves Iraq -- an area where the public (thanks to some dirty tricks by the Bush administration) wrongly thinks the agency messed up totally -- and a career CIA intelligence analyst named Paul R. Pillar.
Pillar told his story at a seminar at Georgetown University last week and in the current edition of the National Interest. He recounted the details of Iraq intelligence estimates that the agency produced in January 2003 -- not the famous one that wrongly embraced the Bush administration's jeremiads about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction but two others that warned in stark terms about the dangers of a U.S. invasion.
Pillar, who retired in 2005 after a 28-year career at the CIA, was the government's top Middle East analyst during the run-up to the invasion. Knowing that President Bush was pushing for war, Pillar felt a duty to warn of the likely consequences. So in late 2002, he prepared two quick estimates -- one on the likelihood of domestic turmoil in postwar Iraq and another on the risky consequences for the region. He arranged for the Policy Planning bureau at the State Department, which shared his worries, to commission the studies. ... The estimates were circulated in January 2003. You don't have to take my word or Pillar's for what they said: They are posted on the Web site of the Senate intelligence committee. They make haunting reading now, to put it mildly -- because nearly every setback we have seen in Iraq was forecast by Pillar and the analysts in their effort to break through the administration's happy talk.