There were several items in this appeal, but only two of the three items the court ruled on were is dispute.
1. They is no dispute between the Majority and the Dissent over that this case was ripe for a decision.
2. The Second issue was the use of "Cost Benefit" analysis by the EPA to set up the "Transport rule" as to which upstate polluter was to reduce pollution that drifts into another state. The Majority found this was permissible for HOW the EPA was to handle muliti-state pollution since such situation was NOT address in the Clean Air Act and thus the EPA thus had the right to adopt a "Cost Benefit" analysis when it came to which up state polluter was to cut back pollution. The Dissent said this was WRONG, the ACC has its own provision and that is one or proportion of pollution that drift into another state and thus the use of "Cost Benefit" analysis was improper (Yes, Scalia was advocating that "Cost Benefit" analysis NOT be used when it comes to Pollution).
3. Was it an abuse of discretion by the EPA when it adopted a rule that once a State plan had been rejected, the EPA could issue its own rule as to such interstate pollution. Here the Majority said, not, such a rule was within the powers of the EPA under the Clean Air Act (ACC). the Dissent's position was it was an abuse of discretion for the Clean Air Act (ACC) clearly makes the primary controller of pollution the State and Local Government, not the Federal Government and as such great discretion must be given to the States when it comes to plans to reduce pollution within their state.
The Majority position:
But, as just explained, see supra, at 21–22, the Agency cannot avoid the task of choosing which among equal “amounts” to eliminate. The Agency has chosen, sensibly in our view, to reduce the amount easier, i.e., less costly, to eradicate, and nothing in the text of the Good Neighbor Provision precludes that choice.....
In sum, we hold that the CAA does not command that States be given a second opportunity to file a SIP after EPA has quantified the State’s interstate pollution obligations. We further conclude that the Good Neighbor Provision does not require EPA to disregard costs and consider exclusively each upwind State’s physically proportionate responsibility for each downwind air quality problem. EPA’s cost-effective allocation of emission reductions among upwind States, we hold, is a permissible, workable, and equitable interpretation of the Good Neighbor Provision.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Dissents position:
Too many important decisions of the Federal Government are made nowadays by unelected agency officials exercising broad lawmaking authority, rather than by the people’s representatives in Congress. With the statute involved in the present cases, however, Congress did it right. It specified quite precisely the responsibility of an upwind State under the Good Neighbor Provision: to eliminate those amounts of pollutants that it contributes to downwind problem areas. But the Environmental Protection Agency was unsatisfied with this system. Agency personnel, perhaps correctly, thought it more efficient to require reductions not in proportion to the amounts of pollutants for which each upwind State is responsible, but on the basis of how cost-effectively each can decrease emissions.
= new reply since forum marked as read
