Why are anti-war Democrats silent on Iran deal?

[Jefferson23]

Liberal doves often decry AIPAC's outsized influence on U.S. foreign policy, but the bigger question is: Why can’t they compete?

By Peter Beinart | Apr. 10, 2015


Allard Lowenstein. Like Lowennstein challenged Lyndon Johnson, liberal activists should find someone to run against Chuck Schumer for majority leader. Photo by Robert Swirsky / Wikimedia Commons

Many in Congress want the chance to kill the Iran deal. President Obama doesn't want to give them that opportunity. I’m torn.

Like many liberals, I think America is generally better off when Congress has more oversight over foreign policy. It’s no coincidence that the greatest foreign policy disaster of the twentieth century, Vietnam, occurred near the height of what Arthur Schlesinger Jr. called “The Imperial Presidency.” And the greatest foreign policy disaster of the twenty-first century occurred when George W. Bush and Dick Cheney created another imperial presidency after 9/11. Seeking unaccountable presidential power is a bipartisan affliction, and so even progressives who sympathize with Barack Obama’s foreign policy should be worried by his efforts to deny Congress a voice over something as big as a nuclear deal with Iran.

On the other hand, although the legislative branch’s constitutional prerogatives don’t depend on whether Congress reflects public opinion, it’s worth noting on that on Iran, it most certainly does not. Since last Thursday’s framework agreement, polls from both The Washington Post/ABC News and Reuters/Ipsos have shown that a small plurality of Republican voters actually support the Iran deal. Yet it’s likely that every single Republican senator will oppose it. Democrats, the polls show, back the agreement by margins of three or five to one. Yet key Senate Democrats are skeptical of the deal, and few have endorsed it enthusiastically.

What’s the reason for this gulf between popular and congressional opinion? In part, it’s because hawks are more mobilized. An ultra-hard line against Iran has been near the top of the agenda of AIPAC—and pro-Israel political action committees—for two decades now. AIPAC supporters distribute their money to both parties.* But in recent years they have been joined by GOP billionaires, like Sheldon Adelson, who have been liberated by the Supreme Court to spend vast sums for the purposes of shifting the Israel and Iran debates further right. Tom Cotton alone got more than $2 million from these Iran hawks in his 2014 Senate run.

Doves often decry this, but the bigger question is: Why can’t they compete? MoveOn.org and a variety of other progressive groups recently sent a letter warning Democratic senators not to kill the Iran deal. And in the absence of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, Iran has moved near the top of J Street’s agenda. Still, the discrepancy between the political pressure being exerted by hawks and doves is stunning. A GOP senator who supported the Iran deal would become a virtual pariah in his party and quite likely face a primary challenge—despite the fact that a plurality of rank-and-file Republicans support the deal. In the Democratic Party, by contrast, where public support for last Thursday’s agreement is overwhelming, Charles Schumer can vocally endorse the Corker-Menendez bill, which might well scuttle the Iran deal, without at all imperiling his rise to Senate Majority Leader.

remainder in full: http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/1.651219

[Agnosticsherbet]

1. This articical form the Harvard Law Journal discusses executiv and congressional power in foreign

diplomacy.

EXECUTIVE POWER IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ALEX KOZINSKI*
Article II of the U.S. Constitution begins by declaring that “the executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”1 This so‐called Executive Vesting Clause has been the subject of intense constitutional discussion since the Constitution was ratified. For instance, in 1793 Alex‐ ander Hamilton and James Madison debated whether this clause grants residual authority to the President beyond the enumerated powers listed in the Constitution.2 The answer to this question is significant not only because it affects the power and the authority of the President, but also, as a necessary im‐ plication, because it impacts the rights and freedoms of U.S. citizens here and abroad.
Some of the most notable Supreme Court cases concerning the contours of executive power have arisen in the context of war3 and foreign affairs.4 Thus, it is not surprising that now, during the War on Terror, the subject of executive power is once again at the forefront of both American law and politics.
Modern executive power jurisprudence finds much of its ba‐ sis in Justice Robert Jackson’s concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure Case. In that case, Justice Jackson declared, “Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their dis‐ junction or conjunction with those of Congress.”5 He then went on to fashion a sliding scale for the exercise of executive power vis‐à‐vis congressional power.
According to Justice Jackson, the President’s power is at its “maximum” when Congress actually confers power on the President to act.6 The President’s power occupies a middle po‐ sition, a “zone of twilight,” when the President acts without authorization or opposition from Congress.7 Finally, presiden‐ tial power is at its “lowest ebb” when the President acts con‐ trary to laws passed by Congress.8 It is both important and in‐ teresting to note that Justice Jackson did not say that the President may not act contrary to legislation; he simply said the power to act was at its “lowest ebb” and that under these cir‐ cumstances the President must “rely only upon his own consti‐ tutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”9 Thus, even Justice Jackson’s framework al‐ lows for the possibility that the President may have powers that in fact supersede constraints imposed by the other branches of government.

[Jefferson23]

2. Thanks for the additional information..great and much appreciated. n/t

[Agnosticsherbet]

3. You are welcome.

[quadrature]

4. what has been the role of Congress in the past, relations with Iran

have some/all of the sanctions
against Iran -->
were the '???s' merely 'Executive Agreements/Orders',
were some of them 'Treaties' (unlikely)
were some of them 'congressional-executive'agreements?

if a C/E agreement, is there an 'escape clause'
that Pres.Obama could use?

please be as specific as you can be.
thanks.

[Jefferson23]

5. Iran Sanctions

http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/index.htm

[quadrature]

6. that is just one side of the story.

what I would like to know is,
how has Congress been involved
in the past?

I don't want to be LBJed into another war.

[Jefferson23]

7. Yea, they have but Obama can still call it.

snip*Lawmakers also point out that the president is negotiating away sanctions that Congress itself approved, so Congress must approve their removal. That’s true, but President Obama can “suspend” congressional sanctions for two years before needing congressional approval to lift them. The administration hopes that an Iran deal will have proven its worth by then.

http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2015/0403/Iran-nuclear-deal-Will-Congress-have-a-say

[quadrature]

8. thank you for that info ... nt

[Agnosticsherbet]

9. See Reply #1 for a Harvard Law article about Executive and Congressional power in Foreign Policy.

The Executive and Legislative branch share powers. Republicans are not abusing their authority by passing a law. The President is within his power as the executive to ignore them.

[blkmusclmachine]

10. ,

,

[Doctor_J]

11. all are afraid of aipac at this point