Afghan lies mirror deception of Vietnam War

[sad sally]

Thursday, April 19, 2012 - By GWYNNE DYER

LONDON — In the midst of the Taliban attacks in central Kabul on Sunday, a journalist called the British embassy for a comment. "I really don't know why they are doing this," said the exasperated diplomat who answered the phone. "We'll be out of here in two years' time. All they have to do is wait."

The official line is that by two years from now, when U.S. and NATO forces leave Afghanistan, the regime they installed will be able to stay in power without foreign support. The British diplomat clearly didn't believe that, and neither do most other foreign observers.

However, Gen. John Allen, commander of the International Security Assistance Force, predictably said that he was "enormously proud" of the response of the Afghan security forces, and various other senior commanders said that it showed that all the foreign training was paying off. You have to admire their cheek: Simultaneous attacks in Kabul and three other cities prove that the Western strategy is working

(snip)

The U.S. government has already declared its intention to withdraw from Afghanistan in two years' time, just as it did in Vietnam in 1971. Richard Nixon wanted his second-term presidential election out of the way before he pulled the plug, just as President Barack Obama does now.

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/eo20120419gd.html

[n2doc]

1. k n r nt

[bemildred]

2. That was the tragedy, this is the farce. nt

[bemildred]

3. Tet '68, Kabul '12: We still don't get it

Add another one:

Recently, after Afghan militants unleashed sophisticated, synchronized attacks across Afghanistan, including in the capital, Kabul, the Pentagon was quick to emphasize what hadn't happened.

"I'm not minimizing the seriousness of this, but this was in no way akin to the Tet offensive," said George Little, the Pentagon's top spokesman. "We are looking at suicide bombers, RPG [rocket-propelled grenade], mortar fire, etc. This was not a large-scale offensive sweeping into Kabul or other parts of the country."

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Even granting the need to spin the assaults as failures, the official American reaction to the coordinated attacks reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of guerrilla warfare in general and of the type waged by the Haqqani network in particular. It's a lesson the United States should have learned decades ago.

But more than 40 years after the Vietnam War's Tet offensive, after more than a decade of war in Afghanistan, the U.S. military still doesn't get it.

http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-turse-afghanistan-and-vietnam-20120424,0,23947.story

[polly7]

4. America's Wars of Attrition

America's Wars of Attrition
More than 40 years after the Vietnam War’s Tet Offensive, after more than a decade of war in Afghanistan, the U.S. military still doesn’t get it.
April 24, 2012 |

http://www.alternet.org/world/155131/america%27s_wars_of_attrition__?page=1

Recently, after insurgents unleashed sophisticated, synchronized attacks across Afghanistan involving dozens of fighters armed with suicide vests, rocket-propelled grenades, and small arms, as well as car bombs, the Pentagon was quick to emphasize what hadn’t happened. “I’m not minimizing the seriousness of this, but this was in no way akin to the Tet Offensive,” said George Little, the Pentagon’s top spokesman. “We are looking at suicide bombers, RPG [rocket propelled grenade], mortar fire, etcetera. This was not a large-scale offensive sweeping into Kabul or other parts of the country.”

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta weighed in similarly. “There were,” he insisted, “no tactical gains here. These are isolated attacks that are done for symbolic purposes, and they have not regained any territory.” Such sentiments were echoed by many in the media, who emphasized that the attacks “didn’t accomplish much” or were “unsuccessful.”

Even granting the need to spin the assaults as failures, the official American reaction to the coordinated attacks in Kabul, the Afghan capital, as well as at Jalalabad airbase, and in Paktika and Logar Provinces, reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of guerrilla warfare and, in particular, of the type being waged by the Haqqani network, a crime syndicate transformed by the conflict into a leading insurgent group. Here’s the “lede” that should have run in every newspaper in America: More than 40 years after the Vietnam War’s Tet Offensive, after more than a decade of war in Afghanistan, even after reviving counterinsurgency doctrine (only to see it crash-and-burn in short order), the U.S. military still doesn’t get it.

Think of this as a remarkably unblemished record of “failure to understand” stretching from the 1960s to 2012, and undoubtedly beyond.