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The more we learn about nuclear past, the more an 'accident' seems likely
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/01/are-we-ready-for-nuclear-consequences
The more we learn about nuclear past, the more an 'accident' seems likely
As more countries develop nuclear arsenals, an ever larger group of people must be trusted with power to trigger catastrophe
Rupert Myers
Saturday 1 February 2014 07.00 EST
How have we not had a nuclear war? It is hard to maintain much faith in the long-term safety of our nuclear deterrent with each glimpse of the all-too human flaws of those with their finger on the button. Thirty-four Air Force officers in charge of launching nuclear missiles have been suspended over accusations that they cheated in proficiency tests about their knowledge of how to operate the weapons. The cheating, uncovered during a probe into the use of drugs by nuclear launch officers, betrays the complacency and boredom of men and women whose job is to refrain from doing the one thing they are trained to do.
Officials have been quick to reassure the public that these suspensions pose no risk of nuclear accident, but it's hard to be convinced. Consider the types of incidents that we now know happened during the cold war era: bombs almost detonating by accident and military exercises being twitchily misunderstood by officers on the other side. The pattern has been one in which the government reassures the public that no danger exists, while privately acknowledging their fears that human and technical error could conspire to catastrophic effect. The classification of military documents will hide current blushes for decades to come.
<snip>
As long as we have nuclear weapons, we are compelled to place the ability to launch them in the hands of mere mortals. It is an unlikely gamble on human nature. Classification of information means that we usually only learn of the truly scary moments long after the fact, by which time they lose their ability to horrify us. A rare exception to this is 1995, when the Russians mistook a Norwegian research rocket for a US ballistic missile heading for Russia. Despite the end of the Cold War, it was the first time that the leader of a nuclear country was forced to literally open the "nuclear briefcase". Boris Yeltsin had inserted his nuclear key and was two minutes away from launching Russia's own nuclear missiles, when the flying object detected by Russian radars fell into the sea.
As we learn of near misses, and the failings of our last line of defense, it becomes harder to believe that nuclear proliferation will not ultimately lead to an accident. There is no knowing how professional the launch officers of other nuclear states are, or how they would react to a nuclear incident. As more countries develop their nuclear arsenals, an ever larger group of people must be trusted with the power to trigger nuclear catastrophe. The greater the number of men and women with the responsibility of not launching nuclear weapons, the greater the likelihood that the weakest link in this deadly international standoff will fail. Clouded in secrecy, the dangers are hard to quantify. The greatest danger might not be in a bunker near Tehran, but a silo in Montana.
The more we learn about nuclear past, the more an 'accident' seems likely
As more countries develop nuclear arsenals, an ever larger group of people must be trusted with power to trigger catastrophe
Rupert Myers
Saturday 1 February 2014 07.00 EST
How have we not had a nuclear war? It is hard to maintain much faith in the long-term safety of our nuclear deterrent with each glimpse of the all-too human flaws of those with their finger on the button. Thirty-four Air Force officers in charge of launching nuclear missiles have been suspended over accusations that they cheated in proficiency tests about their knowledge of how to operate the weapons. The cheating, uncovered during a probe into the use of drugs by nuclear launch officers, betrays the complacency and boredom of men and women whose job is to refrain from doing the one thing they are trained to do.
Officials have been quick to reassure the public that these suspensions pose no risk of nuclear accident, but it's hard to be convinced. Consider the types of incidents that we now know happened during the cold war era: bombs almost detonating by accident and military exercises being twitchily misunderstood by officers on the other side. The pattern has been one in which the government reassures the public that no danger exists, while privately acknowledging their fears that human and technical error could conspire to catastrophic effect. The classification of military documents will hide current blushes for decades to come.
<snip>
As long as we have nuclear weapons, we are compelled to place the ability to launch them in the hands of mere mortals. It is an unlikely gamble on human nature. Classification of information means that we usually only learn of the truly scary moments long after the fact, by which time they lose their ability to horrify us. A rare exception to this is 1995, when the Russians mistook a Norwegian research rocket for a US ballistic missile heading for Russia. Despite the end of the Cold War, it was the first time that the leader of a nuclear country was forced to literally open the "nuclear briefcase". Boris Yeltsin had inserted his nuclear key and was two minutes away from launching Russia's own nuclear missiles, when the flying object detected by Russian radars fell into the sea.
As we learn of near misses, and the failings of our last line of defense, it becomes harder to believe that nuclear proliferation will not ultimately lead to an accident. There is no knowing how professional the launch officers of other nuclear states are, or how they would react to a nuclear incident. As more countries develop their nuclear arsenals, an ever larger group of people must be trusted with the power to trigger nuclear catastrophe. The greater the number of men and women with the responsibility of not launching nuclear weapons, the greater the likelihood that the weakest link in this deadly international standoff will fail. Clouded in secrecy, the dangers are hard to quantify. The greatest danger might not be in a bunker near Tehran, but a silo in Montana.