Moscow’s weaknesses explain Crimea Crisis, not Washington’s

[bemildred]

There is a common but seriously flawed thesis running through too many commentaries on the unfolding crisis in Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula. According to this widely shared view, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Crimea was a direct product of America’s declining global influence, President Barack Obama’s weak and feckless foreign policies in places like Libya, Syria and North Korea, and a dangerous deficiency in American capabilities and resolve to credibly deter opponents.

According to GOP Senator Lindsey Graham, for example, “it started with Benghazi. When you kill Americans and nobody pays a price, you invite this type of aggression.” This interpretation of the link between contemporary U.S. foreign policy and Mr. Putin’s motivations is seriously flawed.

Mr. Obama’s application of U.S. power and coercive diplomacy in Syria succeeded. It was virtually impossible for officials in Damascus and Moscow to know with any certainty whether U.S. officials would be able to limit the threatened air attacks to an “unbelievably small” campaign (to use Secretary of State John Kerry’s words). If the airstrikes produced no clear signs of progress, if the regime retaliated by using chemical weapons again, or if humanitarian conditions on the ground continued to deteriorate, the pressure on Washington to sustain the bombing campaign would have been significant. When Mr. Kerry suggested in a press conference that Bashar al-Assad could avoid the air strikes if he turned over “every single bit of his chemical weapons to the international community,” Mr. Putin jumped at the offer, persuaded Mr. Assad to take the deal, and immediately initiated discussions leading to the UN disarmament resolution.

Consider the evidence of U.S. power and influence in this case: without firing a single shot, Washington forced Mr. Assad (Russia’s key ally in the Middle East) to acknowledge Syria’s possession of chemical weapons, sign the Chemical Weapons Convention prohibiting further production and deployment of proscribed weapons, and identify the exact location of the regime’s stockpiles and production facilities. In light of the strategic role chemical weapons played in the conflict up to that point, and the deterrent value Syrian officials assigned to these weapons in relation to their rivalry with Israeli, a formal agreement to destroy these weapons constitutes an impressive foreign policy success and a clear victory for the credible application of coercive diplomacy. None of this would have occurred had the Obama administration lacked power and credibility, or followed the critics’ recommendation to back down and retreat.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/moscows-weaknesses-explain-crimea-crisis-not-washingtons/article17341736/

[The Magistrate]

1. A Sensible And Clear-Eyed Analysis, Sir

Thank you for sharing it.

[bemildred]

2. Thank you.

Essentially agrees with my impressions, so far, but one can't be sure.

[The Magistrate]

3. One Thing Which Has Annoyed Me, Sir

Is a pattern often displayed by right-wing commentators. A local paper's drudge struck the note perfectly. He spent the first half of the piece noting, correctly, that no military option exists, that the E.U. is unlikely to unite behind behind strong sanctions owing to its dependence on Russian gas, and that things like listing officials as human rights violators can have no effect. He then spent the last half of the column claiming Putin was enticed to this action by President Obama's 'weakness', and particularly that President Obama had learned the wrong lesson from Russia's action in Georgia while Bush was still in office. In other words, the structure of political reality dictates little can be done to force Mr. Putin to back down, and it's all because of President Obama....

[bemildred]

5. We kissed logic off some time ago, Sir, but I see what you mean.

The "weakness" canard has been popular among US pols as long as I can remember, and ordinarily I pay no attention as it marks the speaker as naive (at best).

It's sort of like the "security" shibboleth we are served ad nauseum, as though we had not two oceans on either side, huge military expenditures, thousands of nukes, and a vast economy to protect us. Other nations can only look with envy at the power and security we enjoy, and yet we are still afraid.

[Laelth]

4. Yes and no.

I think Russia's occupation of the Crimea has to do with Russia's strength, rather than either Russia's or America's weakness. The fact is that Western Europe is absolutely dependent upon natural gas from Russia. Putin knew he could occupy the Crimea because our European allies can not afford open hostility with Russia that could spike the price of natural gas and, then, insure the defeat of every political party currently in power in Western Europe. This isn't about weakness. It's about strength, and Russia has the stronger hand in this case.

-Laelth

[The Magistrate]

6. It Depends, Ma'am

On which end of the telescope one looks through, so to speak.

In the Crimea itself, today, Russia has a stronger hand. Globally, in the long run, Russia is a weakening power, and certainly is not supplanting or out-pointing the United States. A victory for Russia in the Crimea is likely to prove pyrhric, driving any former Soviet states to align more closely with the West as a matter of self-defense. If it is Mr. Putin's intention to effectively oppose eastward expansion of the NATO bloc, his actions at present are more likely than not to undermine that intent.

[Laelth]

8. It's already too late to prevent that.

Nearly all the East-European states are already seeking closer ties to Western Europe. The United States has a fighter squadron patrolling the skies over the Baltic States now. Putin knows that Eastern Europe is, for the most part, a lost cause.

The Crimea, however, is different. It's populated by mostly ethnic Russians who are (I suppose) terrified of the pro-oligarchy, right-wing, and marginally fascist government that we helped install through an unconstitutional coup. Putin knew he could "protect" the Russians in the Crimea because Western European governments are not about to risk a spike in natural gas prices. Putin has Western Europe "by the nether regions," shall we say. He knows it, and that's why he wasn't afraid to occupy the Crimean peninsula.

-Laelth

[The Magistrate]

12. Which Pro-Oligarchic, Right Wing, Semi-Fascist Government Would That Be, Ma'am?

It sounds like an overly mild description of Mr. Putin's government, though perhaps oligarchic dominated, fascist kleptocracy would be a fairer characterization of the man's achievements in power.

There is no particular danger menacing ethnic Russians in Crimea, any more than there was actual danger menacing ethnic Germans in Czechoslovakia or Danzig. These people are simply pretext for Mr. Putin to act to maintain access to the Black Sea, and by that to the Mediterranean and beyond. That is something Russia requires to maintain its claim to Great Power status, and something which Mr. Putin's own botch of his relations with the people of the Ukraine has certainly put in jeopardy recently: a Ukrainian government formed by people who had thrown out his protege Yanukovich might well be expected to look with disfavor on continuing the leasehold upon which Russia's Crimea bases rest.

[Laelth]

13. Nevermind, Sir. n/t

-Laelth

[bemildred]

7. It depends on what you think he wants.

If you think he wants to take Ukraine back, then it's scary. I don't think that's what he wants. That would just be a headache, if not a guerilla war, and he's got enough terrorism already. And he doesn't have the military for it, he'd have to ramp up.

I think he started out reacting to the revolt in Crimea and having his guy run out of town. But now, I think he will just sit there and negotiate.

[Laelth]

9. No. I don't think he wants to "take back" the Ukraine.

He wants to secure his warm-water port, and he wants to protect the ethnic Russians, who are the majority in Crimea, from a pro-oligarchy, right-wing, and marginally fascist government that we helped install through an unconstitutional coup.

At least, that's what I think he wants.



-Laelth

[bemildred]

10. Roughly, yeah. And to sell a lot of gas and be friends with Germany. nt

[Laelth]

11. I was unaware that Russia sought a closer relationship with Germany.

That's quite interesting.



-Laelth

[bemildred]

14. It is. I don't want to push it, it's a new idea to me too, but I think it works. Some links:

http://en.itar-tass.com/russia/722319

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-04/merkel-ties-to-russia-gain-putin-s-ear-while-limiting-options.html

http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2014/03/ukraine-crisis-keep-your-eyes-on-angela-merkel.html

It explains certain mysteries.

[Laelth]

15. Hmm ...

Forgive me if I missed it, but none of those articles say that Russia seeks Germany's friendship. Quite the contrary. Those show that Germany seeks Russia's friendship, and that's probably because Russia has a near-monopoly on natural gas shipments to Germany. Merkel knows that she and her party are toast if Putin raises the price of natural gas. It is Germany that is at Russia's mercy and it's Germany that wants to appease Russia (for good political reasons, I might add).

Did I miss something?



-Laelth

[bemildred]

16. Let's see what happens. nt

[okaawhatever]

17. That near monopoly was created by former Chancellor Schroder and Putin during their close

political and personal friendship. Putin has been trying to break up the power of NATO for years. He tried to pick off Germany and France. He came close with Kohl and Schroder. The Nord Stream gas pipeline was designed to by-pass Ukraine to weaken Ukraine's position and give Germany an opportunity to sell the gas at a higher price to UK (it has to do with a gas pricing cooperation agreement that the UK didn't sign but other European countries did). German businesses were given contracts to help build it and Schroder pushed the approval through two weeks before leaving office, and then took a million euro per year job at the pipeline.

Russia wants influence over Germany. Merkel investing so heavily in alternative energy projects diminished it. Russia wants the Crimea for military reasons and because it's a profitable area of the country. It also wants control of the pipelines (which it got in Belarus) and continued dependence on Russian gas.

[Laelth]

18. Interesting and informative post. Thanks. n/t

-Laelth

[bemildred]

21. Thanks, that kind of fills it in for me.

I was attracted to it originally because it explains why Ms. Nuland might say things like "Fuck the EU", and why we are trying to convert Russia into Nazi Germany. Ordinary evil will not do.

We want to drive a wedge between them. Everybody is always trying to drive wedges.

If one is to give credence to the Nuland tape, it seems he (Putin) has had some success.

Anyway, that's the main reason I don't think Putin is going to do much more than he has. He wants to do business. He just spent 50 billion on a big ad campaign in Sochi and the last thing he wants now is to be Hitler.

[Igel]

23. You can go one step further.

Not only to make Rossiya! as strong as possible, but to ensure that he is surrounded by either firm allies or countries as weak as possible.

Blocking where Ukrainian ships are lest they leave and find another port has less to do with a substantial strengthening of the Russian Navy than a substantial weakening of the Ukrainian Navy.

The Crimea is well centered in the Black Sea. Any treaty stipulating economic zones or martime rights will severely limit Ukraine's sea access.

The weaker the Ukraine, the stronger the Russia will appear. One more thing is necessary: To bring Ukraine as firmlly on its knees as possible to punish it. If he gets away with the Crimea, expect a future bit of wrangling to be the Donbas.

Russia got what it wanted--notice, this wasn't Putin but Russia--in Georgia. A divided Georgia that's pretty much friendly, neutered, and truncated, with two mini-vassal buffer states. It took two rounds, the first being Abkhazia and the second being S. Ossetia.

The next round will be either Donbas or Trans-Dniestria.

Russia was straitened when it came to the Baltics. Too quickly Westerners intervened to protect the formerly occupied peoples. While the Baltics had significant Russian/Russian-speaking minorities (or even a near majority) Russia was too disorganized at the time to do much more than bluster. Otherwise much of the rhetoric was the same--from the threats against Russians to oppression and the Responsibility to Protect. That was the '90s, though.

[Laelth]

24. All that makes sense to me.

Thanks for the thoughtful reply.

-Laelth

[Chan790]

19. I'm not sure if I can buy that totally.

Not because it's untrue but because it's more complex than that.

Russia may have Western Europe by the short-hairs by controlling their supply of natural gas, but they have Putin right back because Russia buys food off the same people it sells gas to and is a net food-importing nation. (It imports more food than it exports or produces for domestic consumption.)

While Russia can bring Europe to its knees by cutting off gas, every day it does is a day when food-stores will get scarcer. It's a game of chicken.

[bemildred]

20. Yes, that's the way I see it. Putin can't afford to push his luck either. nt

[Laelth]

25. Interesting. Thanks for that perspective. n/t

-Laelth

[bemildred]

22. Commentary: What’s behind Russia’s moves in Ukraine? Fear of NATO

By Edward W. Walker

The causes of the unfolding crisis in Ukraine are many, but most fundamentally its roots can be found in an enormously consequential decision made by the United States and its allies in the early 1990s. Faced with a strategic challenge of constructing a new security architecture for post-Cold War Europe, the decision was made to embark on a program of gradual NATO expansion to the east.

A first round of accession took place in 1999, with membership for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. That was followed in 2004 by membership for Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, and in 2009 by membership for Albania and Croatia.

Officially, NATO’s position is that any country that wishes to join the alliance and meets its accession criteria will be welcomed. In practice, however, there was never any serious prospect that Russia would be allowed to join. Indeed, for many of NATO’s new members, the primary incentive to join was to deter aggression by, and deflect pressure from, Moscow.

Accordingly, Russians concluded that NATO expansion was directed first and foremost at containing Russia militarily and politically, and Moscow has been unambiguously and passionately opposed to the process since its inception. Today, the Russian political elite is virtually unanimous in viewing NATO expansion as an acute threat to Russian national security.

http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/opinion/commentary-whats-behind-russias-moves-in-ukraine-f/nd63f/