Assassination as Policy in Washington and How It Failed: 1990-2015
April 28, 2015
The Kingpin Strategy
Assassination as Policy in Washington and How It Failed: 1990-2015
by ANDREW COCKBURN
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The Kingpin Strategy Joins the War on Terror
Deep in the jungles of southern Colombia, coca farmers didnt need obscure economic theories to understand the consequences of the kingpin strategy. When the news arrived that Gilberto Rodríguez-Orijuela had been arrested, small traders in the remote settlement of Calamar erupted in cheers. Thank the blessed virgin! exclaimed one grandmother to a visiting American reporter.
Wait till the United States figures out what it really means, added another local resident. Hell, maybe theyll approve, since its really a victory for free enterprise. No more monopoly controlling the market and dictating what growers get paid. Its just like when they shot Pablo Escobar: now money will flow to everybody.
This assessment proved entirely correct. As the big cartels disappeared, the business reverted to smaller and even more ruthless groups that managed to maintain production and distribution quite satisfactorily, especially as they were closely linked either to Colombias Marxist FARC guerrillas or to the fascist anti-guerrilla paramilitary groups allied with the government and tacitly supported by the United States.
Much of Rivolos work on the subject remains classified. This is hardly surprising, given that it not only undercuts the official rationale for the kingpin strategy in the drug wars of the 1990s, but strikes a body blow at the doctrine of high-value targeting that so obsesses the Obama administration in its drone assassination campaigns across the Greater Middle East and parts of Africa today.
More:
http://www.counterpunch.org/2015/04/28/assassination-as-policy-in-washington-and-how-it-failed-1990-2015/