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World is ignoring most important lesson from Fukushima nuclear disaster
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Global-Viewpoint/2012/0405/World-is-ignoring-most-important-lesson-from-Fukushima-nuclear-disaster
World is ignoring most important lesson from Fukushima nuclear disaster
Fukushima's most important lesson is this: Probability theory (that disaster is unlikely) failed us. If you have made assumptions, you are not prepared. Nuclear power plants should have multiple, reliable ways to cool reactors. Any nuclear plant that doesn't heed this lesson is inviting disaster.
By Kenichi Ohmae / April 5, 2012
Tokyo
A year has now passed since the complete core meltdown of three boiling water reactors at Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Fukushima No.1 plant. Because of the limited information issued by the Japanese government – and its insistence that the disaster was only a result of the unanticipated magnitude of the earthquake and tsunami – the world does not know what really happened and will thus draw the wrong lessons.
The most critical lesson for the global nuclear industry to learn, since most plants around the world do not face tsunami or earthquake risks, is that no one imagined that the external electricity supply from outside the plant that would cool the reactors could be disrupted. That assumption, just like the assumption that a natural event of the size that took place was unlikely, was based on “probability theory” taught to all nuclear engineers. It is the basis – wrongly – for telling the public that nuclear power generation is “safe.”
As a nuclear core designer who obtained my doctorate from Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Nuclear Engineering, I volunteered to look into the situation at Fukushima No.1 in June of 2011. Goushi Hosono, Japan’s minister of Nuclear Power and Environment, personally granted me access to the information and personnel who were directly involved in the containment operations of the post-disaster nuclear plants.
<snip>
All the nuclear reactors in the world have been designed by probability assumptions, originally proposed by Prof. Norman Rasmussen of MIT. It is a scientific way of expressing what the public will accept.
<snip>
Assumptions and probability are for the theoretical dreamers. If you have a hot reactor, soaked in water and without power to circulate the coolant, then you still have to cool it no matter what. If you cannot equip the facility with a reliable last resort of power and heat sink, you should not operate the nuclear plant to begin with. That is the lesson of Fukushima.
<snip>
Kenichi Ohmae, an MIT-trained nuclear engineer also widely regarded as Japan’s top management guru, is dean of Business Breakthrough University. He was a founder of McKinsey & Co.’s strategic consulting practice and is the author of many books, including “The Borderless World.”
© 2012 Global Viewpoint Network/Tribune Media Services. Hosted online by The Christian Science Monitor.
World is ignoring most important lesson from Fukushima nuclear disaster
Fukushima's most important lesson is this: Probability theory (that disaster is unlikely) failed us. If you have made assumptions, you are not prepared. Nuclear power plants should have multiple, reliable ways to cool reactors. Any nuclear plant that doesn't heed this lesson is inviting disaster.
By Kenichi Ohmae / April 5, 2012
Tokyo
A year has now passed since the complete core meltdown of three boiling water reactors at Tokyo Electric Power Company’s Fukushima No.1 plant. Because of the limited information issued by the Japanese government – and its insistence that the disaster was only a result of the unanticipated magnitude of the earthquake and tsunami – the world does not know what really happened and will thus draw the wrong lessons.
The most critical lesson for the global nuclear industry to learn, since most plants around the world do not face tsunami or earthquake risks, is that no one imagined that the external electricity supply from outside the plant that would cool the reactors could be disrupted. That assumption, just like the assumption that a natural event of the size that took place was unlikely, was based on “probability theory” taught to all nuclear engineers. It is the basis – wrongly – for telling the public that nuclear power generation is “safe.”
As a nuclear core designer who obtained my doctorate from Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Nuclear Engineering, I volunteered to look into the situation at Fukushima No.1 in June of 2011. Goushi Hosono, Japan’s minister of Nuclear Power and Environment, personally granted me access to the information and personnel who were directly involved in the containment operations of the post-disaster nuclear plants.
<snip>
All the nuclear reactors in the world have been designed by probability assumptions, originally proposed by Prof. Norman Rasmussen of MIT. It is a scientific way of expressing what the public will accept.
<snip>
Assumptions and probability are for the theoretical dreamers. If you have a hot reactor, soaked in water and without power to circulate the coolant, then you still have to cool it no matter what. If you cannot equip the facility with a reliable last resort of power and heat sink, you should not operate the nuclear plant to begin with. That is the lesson of Fukushima.
<snip>
Kenichi Ohmae, an MIT-trained nuclear engineer also widely regarded as Japan’s top management guru, is dean of Business Breakthrough University. He was a founder of McKinsey & Co.’s strategic consulting practice and is the author of many books, including “The Borderless World.”
© 2012 Global Viewpoint Network/Tribune Media Services. Hosted online by The Christian Science Monitor.
41 replies
= new reply since forum marked as read
= new reply since forum marked as read
Your mind is working around this picture and thinking it is the only rendering of how a power system can self-organize.
However there is also this picture. It shows what it looks like when you bring on large quantities of variable renewables.
The text also explains how the gray area is filled in, which should cause you to modify your perception of the roll storage plays in your model.
Why Germany is phasing out nuclear power
By David Roberts
Germany is involved in a wildly ambitious overhaul of its power system. Its official targets are to hit 35 percent renewable power by 2020 and 80 percent by 2050. The Green Party advocates for 100 percent by 2030.
The most controversial aspect of this power overhaul is Germany’s post-Fukushima decision ...
...Putting those questions aside, though, I want to focus on one of the deeper debates about Germany’s nuclear gambit. Nuclear power’s proponents frequently point out that it is one of the only low-carbon sources that can serve as “baseload” (always on) power. Baseload power is needed, they say, because renewable sources like solar are intermittent (the sun isn’t always shining) and non-dispatchable (the sun can’t be turned on and off at will). You need large, steady, predictable power plants if you’re going to have all those flighty renewables involved.
Believe it or not, Germans have heard this argument before. They just think it’s wrong. They don’t think renewables and baseload are complimentary; they think they’re incompatible. In 2010, Federal Minister of the Environment Norbert Röttgen said:
It is economically nonsensical to pursue two strategies at the same time, for both a centralized and a decentralized energy supply system, since both strategies would involve enormous investment requirements. I am convinced that the investment in renewable energies is the economically more promising project. But we will have to make up our minds. We can’t go down both paths at the same time.
...
... what’s needed to complement renewables — to cover that “residual load” — is not baseload, not big, steady, always-on power plants. The residual load will fluctuate in ways that are only partially predictable. To cover it you need options that are flexible and responsive.
Nuclear power plants are not that....
By David Roberts
Germany is involved in a wildly ambitious overhaul of its power system. Its official targets are to hit 35 percent renewable power by 2020 and 80 percent by 2050. The Green Party advocates for 100 percent by 2030.
The most controversial aspect of this power overhaul is Germany’s post-Fukushima decision ...
...Putting those questions aside, though, I want to focus on one of the deeper debates about Germany’s nuclear gambit. Nuclear power’s proponents frequently point out that it is one of the only low-carbon sources that can serve as “baseload” (always on) power. Baseload power is needed, they say, because renewable sources like solar are intermittent (the sun isn’t always shining) and non-dispatchable (the sun can’t be turned on and off at will). You need large, steady, predictable power plants if you’re going to have all those flighty renewables involved.
Believe it or not, Germans have heard this argument before. They just think it’s wrong. They don’t think renewables and baseload are complimentary; they think they’re incompatible. In 2010, Federal Minister of the Environment Norbert Röttgen said:
It is economically nonsensical to pursue two strategies at the same time, for both a centralized and a decentralized energy supply system, since both strategies would involve enormous investment requirements. I am convinced that the investment in renewable energies is the economically more promising project. But we will have to make up our minds. We can’t go down both paths at the same time.
...
... what’s needed to complement renewables — to cover that “residual load” — is not baseload, not big, steady, always-on power plants. The residual load will fluctuate in ways that are only partially predictable. To cover it you need options that are flexible and responsive.
Nuclear power plants are not that....
http://grist.org/renewable-energy/why-germany-is-phasing-out-nuclear-power/
Whats wrong with this graph? It probably doesn't include offshore wind which usually creates pulses associated with the sun setting. And since its so similar to the Minnesota study, its likely only to represent a small study or simulation of a local area, not a national network. Even land based wind creates pulses.
In fact thats just what the Grist says:
Again, this is an idealized representation. Two things to note: first, there can be big surges from day to day and week to week, depending on the weather. And second, if you have enough renewables, they completely takes over the space once occupied by baseload.
Points, 1)the Grist chart represents a local artifact, hardly suitable for a conversation on national policy, and 2) they left out the surges or pulses, 3) After reading the Grist article, they are simply making the same point I am. They want to expand the renewable portfolio to replace fission nukes. And quite frankly how else would one do that?
Minnesota study
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonbruner/2011/10/20/the-high-stakes-math-behind-the-wests-greatest-river/
Even local area study shows these pulses
http://aspoireland.org/page/2/
Some Pulses in Ireland
Also seasonal heating should be taken into account, in 50 years theres no reason renewables cant eliminate major uses of nat gas and oil for home heating.
Once we throw in HVDC projects like the Atlantic Wind Connection and Maine Express- then things get very cool. You're up next.
"if you want to see those nukes put out of business, we need 23 gigs of 24/7 renewables in the market place"
That is a reflection of exactly what I wrote, you are shackled to a mental model that isn't accurate. Your criticisms of the Grist article have no merit; it is describing the way a system built around distributed renewables integrates, not a specific network of any size. Their graphs demonstrate that there is distinct difference between the mating of the characteristics in 1) a centralized large-scale thermal grid and 2) the renewable resources in a distributed grid.
You also misunderstand the performance characteristics of networked wind. Note the two graphs below that compare the performance of individual wind farms (red & blue) with the performance of a grid that networks many wind farms (black). Your mental model doesn't reflect the actual way the system will function.
You're welcome.
