Environment & Energy
Related: About this forumFast Breeder Reactor Programs: History and Status (without the hype)
Includes overview and history of the not so miraculous IFR in Chapter 7.
Fast Breeder Reactor Programs: History and Status
Thomas B. Cochran, Harold A. Feiveson, Walt Patterson, Gennadi Pshakin, M.V. Ramana, Mycle Schneider, Tatsujiro Suzuki, Frank von Hippel
www.fissilematerials.org
February 2010
About the IPFM i
1 Overview: The Rise and Fall of Plutonium Breeder Reactors
2 Fast Breeder Reactors in France Mycle Schneider
3 India and Fast Breeder Reactors M. V. Ramana
4 Japan’s Plutonium Breeder Reactor and its Fuel Cycle
5 The USSR-Russia Fast-Neutron Reactor Program Gennadi Pshakin
6 Fast Breeder Reactors in the United Kingdom Walt Patterson
7 Fast Reactor Development in the United States Thomas B. Cochran, Harold A. Feiveson,
© 2010 International Panel on Fissile Materials ISBN 978-0-9819275-6-5
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial License. To view a copy of this license, visit www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0
Fast Breeder Reactor Programs: History and Status
http://fissilematerials.org/library/rr08.pdf
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PamW
(1,825 posts)Unfortunately, the above referenced report is the same old propaganda that one gets from other reports from the same group of authors.
In particular, in the last paragraph of page 103, the group hypothesizes that a proliferant nation could "hijack" the pyroprocessing system to obtain plutonium. Unfortunately, what they don't tell you is that it is IMPOSSIBLE to make that plutonium into a weapon.
This is where one needs some science to discern the LIES. If something is "Plutonium"; that only tells you the chemical species. It will tell you how the material reacts in chemical reactions. But when it comes to nuclear reactions, all Plutonium is NOT the same. In the case of nuclear reactions, you have to know what the isotope of Plutonium that you have. The isotopes are denoted by the chemical symbol, with the mass number appended on. Hence, you have Pu-239, Pu-240, Pu-242...
The fuel for nuclear bombs is the fissile isotope, Pu-239. It is Pu-239 that supports a runaway nuclear fission excursion as in a nuclear bomb. The other two isotopes mentioned, Pu-240, and Pu-242, because of their propensity for spontaneous fission; actually INHIBIT the bomb-making process. Their high level of background neutrons, and the heat thereby produced are actually the BANE of the nuclear weapon designer.
As Dr. Till states in the following PBS Frontline interview is that the mixture of isotopes that comes out of an IFR is IMPOSSIBLE to make into a nuclear weapon:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/interviews/till.html
Q: So it would be very difficult to handle for weapons, would it?
A: It's impossible to handle for weapons, as it stands.
It's highly radioactive. It's highly heat producing. It has all of the characteristics that make it extremely, well, make it impossible for someone to make a weapon.
This assessment by Dr. Till is in response to a report issued by the nuclear weapons designers at Lawrence Livermore National Lab who were tasked with evaluating the potential of using spent IFR fuel to make a nuclear weapon. Senators Simon and Kempthorne refer to this report in their rebuttal to the New York Times:
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/05/opinion/l-new-reactor-solves-plutonium-problem-586307.html
You are mistaken in suggesting that the reactor produces bomb-grade plutonium: it never separates plutonium; the fuel goes into the reactor in a metal alloy form that contains highly radioactive actinides. A recent Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory study indicates that fuel from this reactor is more proliferation-resistant than spent commercial fuel, which also contains plutonium.
The scientists at Lawrence Livermore should know; and in fact they are among the ONLY people who know because the necessary scientific information to make such an assessment is LEGALLY RESTRICTED to those scientists at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore.
The claim that the IFR was a proliferation risk has been thoroughly DISCREDITED in the scientific community.
Besides, I find all this folderol about various nuclear fuel cycles being proliferation risks, very unconvincing.
If we are talking about the use of a particular reactor in the USA; then why are we worried about its proliferation potential? Are you worried that the US Government would use the IFR to make Plutonium for nuclear weapons? The US Government has all the Plutonium production reactors it wanted at Hanford and Savannah River. The USA doesn't run these reactors any more; because the US Government has all the Plutonium it needs / wants for weapons.
Are we worried about US reactors somehow being used to ship nuclear weapons materials to other countries? That is really a non-concern. The US Government controls what can be sent outside of the USA. After all, the US Government owns the weapons-grade Plutonium production facilities at Hanford and Savannah River; but they were operated by industrial companies under contract; principally DuPont Chemical. Did DuPont Chemical circumvent US regulations and sell weapon-grade Plutonium to other countries? NOPE.
Are you worried about other countries buying weapons technology from the USA and using it themselves. That is a legitimate concern; but easily dealt with. We do NOT have to sell them the technology. The USA has weapons-grade Plutonium production reactor technology; the technology in the reactors at Hanford and Savannah River. Just because we have it in the USA doesn't mean we have to sell it to Iran or Iraq or whoever.
Could another country develop such technology themselves? Sure - we did it on our own, so there's nothing to really stop other countries. All they need is the determination, the scientists, and the monetary expenditure. But that's true independent of whether we use the technology in the USA.
You don't make the proliferation risk worse by using the technology yourself and keeping it to yourself.
One thing that you can do that helps is to be the dominant force in terms of the technology. For example, Boeing and Airbus are THE dominant companies in terms of airliner technology. Other countries don't attempt to build airliners; it's just better to buy from Boeing and Airbus.
If the USA were the dominant force in reactor technology, as it was a few decades ago; the WE could control what other countries got. Just as other countries would buy from Boeing, they used to buy from Westinghouse and GE. So the US standards became the world's standards.
If you don't play the game, you don't make the rules. I believe it would be better for the USA to be the dominant force in reactor technology again.
PamW
kristopher
(29,798 posts)Thomas B. Cochran is a senior scientist in the nuclear program and holds the Wade Greene Chair for Nuclear Policy at the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). He served as director of the nuclear program until 2007. He is a member of the Department of Energy’s Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee. Cochran is the author of The Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor: An Environmental and Economic Critique (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1974). Cochran received his Ph.D. in physics from Vanderbilt University in 1967. He was a co-author of chapter 7, Fast Reactor Development in the United States.
Harold Feiveson is a Senior Research Scientist and Lecturer in Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School. He has a PhD in public affairs from Princeton University (1972). Feiveson is the editor of Science & Global Security. Along with Professor von Hippel, he was the co-founder and co-director of the Program on Science and Global Security until July 2006. Feiveson was a co-author of Chapter 7, Fast Reactor Development in the United States.
Walt Patterson is Associate Fellow in the Energy, Environment and Development Programme at Chatham House in London, UK, and a Visiting Fellow at the University of Sussex. A postgraduate nuclear physicist, he has been actively involved in energy and environmental issues since the late 1960s. Keeping The Lights On: Towards Sustainable Electricity (Chatham House/Earthscan 2007, paperback 2009) is his thirteenth book. He has also published hundreds of papers, articles and reviews, on topics including nuclear power, coal technology, renewable energy systems, energy policy and electricity. He has been specialist advisor to two Select Committees of the House of Commons, an expert witness at many official hearings, a frequent broadcaster and advisor to media, and speaker or chair in conferences around the world. He has been awarded the Melchett Medal of the Energy Institute. The Scientific American 50 named him ‘energy policy leader’ for his advocacy of decentralized electricity. His current project for Chatham House and the Sussex Energy Group is called “Managing Energy: for climate and security”. Patterson was the author of chapter 6, Fast Breeder Reactors in the United Kingdom.
Gennadi Pshakin is head of the Analytical Center for Nonproliferation at the Institute for Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE), Obninsk, and teaches at Obninsk Nuclear Technology University. Between 1985 and 1993, he worked as an IAEA safeguards inspector, and in 2003 was part of the IAEA team in Iraq. In the 1990s, he participated in negotiations on the trilateral initiative (USA – Russia – IAEA). Since 2001 he has been part of the INPRO project on developing a Proliferation Resistance Assessment Methodology and his recent research covers material protection, control, and accounting activities in Russia. His PhD (1980) was in nuclear engineering. Pshakin was the author of Chapter 5, The USSR- Russian Fast Neutron Reactor Program
M. V. Ramana is currently a Visiting Scholar with the Program in Science, Technology and Environmental Policy and the Program on Science and Global Security at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University. He has a PhD in physics (1994) and has held research positions at the University of Toronto, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Princeton University. He has taught at Boston University, Princeton University, and Yale University. His research focuses on India’s nuclear energy and weapon programs. Currently, he is examining the economic viability and environmental impacts of the Indian nuclear power program. He is actively involved in the peace and anti-nuclear movements, and is associated with the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace as well as Abolition-2000, a global network to abolish nuclear weapons. Ramana was the author of Chapter 3, India and Fast Breeder Reactors.
Mycle Schneider is an independent nuclear and energy consultant. He founded the Energy Information Agency WISE-Paris in 1983 and directed it until 2003. Since 1997 he has provided information and consulting services to the Belgian Energy Minister, the French and German Environment Ministries, the International Atomic Energy Agency, Greenpeace, the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, the Worldwide Fund for Nature, the European Commission, the European Parliament‘s Scientific and Technological Option Assessment Panel and its General Directorate for Research, the Oxford Research Group, the French National Scientific Research Council, and the French Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety. Since 2004 he has been in charge of the Environment and Energy Strategies lecture series for the International MSc in Project Management for Environmental and Energy Engineering Program at the French Ecole des Mines in Nantes. In 1997, along with Japan‘s Jinzaburo Takagi, he received Sweden‘s Right Livelihood Award “for serving to alert the world to the unparalleled dangers of plutonium to human life.” Schneider was the author of chapter 2, Fast Breeder Reactors in France.
Tatsujiro Suzuki is an Associate Vice President of the Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry, as well as a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Energy Economics of Japan. He is also a Visiting Professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy, University of Tokyo. He has a PhD in nuclear engineering from Tokyo University (1988). He was Associate Director of MIT’s International Program on Enhanced Nuclear Power Safety from 1988–1993 and a Research Associate at MIT’s Center for International Studies (1993–95) where he co-authored a report on Japan‘s plutonium program. For the past 20 years, he has been deeply involved in providing technical and policy assessments of the international implications of Japan’s plutonium fuel-cycle policies and in examining the feasibility of interim spent-fuel storage as an alternative. He is a member of the Advisory Group on International Affairs of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission and now is also a member of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry’s Advisory Committee on Energy. Suzuki was the author of chapter 4, Japan’s Plutonium Breeder Reactor and its Fuel Cycle.
Frank von Hippel is Professor of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson of Public and International Affairs. He has a PhD in nuclear physics (1962) from Oxford University. He is a co-founder of Princeton’s Program on Science and Global Security. In the 1980s, as chairman of the Federation of American Scientists, he partnered with Evgenyi Velikhov in advising Mikhail Gorbachev on the technical basis for steps to end the nuclear arms race. In 1994–95, he served as Assistant Director for National Security in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. He has worked on fissile material policy issues for the past 30 years, including contributing to: ending the U.S. program to foster the commercialization of plutonium breeder reactors; convincing the United States and the Soviet Union to embrace the idea of a Fissile Material Production Cutoff Treaty; launching the U.S.-Russian cooperative nuclear materials protection, control and accounting program; and broadening efforts to eliminate the use of HEU in civilian reactors worldwide. Von Hippel was the author of chapter 1, Overview: The Rise and Fall of Plutonium Breeder Reactors and a co-author of chapter 7, Fast Reactor Development in the United States.
Fast Breeder Reactor Programs: History and Status pg113&114
http://fissilematerials.org/library/rr08.pdf
PamW
(1,825 posts)kristopher,
What you FAIL to understand is that if someone is going to comment on the feasibility of using some material as fuel for a nuclear weapon; then that person should have some EXPERTISE in nuclear weapons. Wouldn't you say that is LOGICAL?
Absolutely NONE of the above authors are weapons physicists. NONE works at Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, or has the Q Clearance and need to know to be given access to the very information that is crucial to answering the question; namely, what are the necessary specifications for nuclear bomb fuel.
THEY DON'T KNOW!!
However, the scientists that DO know; the nuclear weapons designers at Lawrence Livermore told Congress that your so called "experts" are ALL WET
This is part of the old, if you can't dazzle them with brilliance, baffle them with B.S.
Sure they have lots of academic credentials, and have served on various study groups, and BLAH, BLAH, BLAH.
But they don't have the very expertise that is at the heart of the matter; the expertise in nuclear weapons. NOPE ZILCH NADA!!
It's like if you want a diagnosis for a medical condition. You can trot out all the doctors with PhDs in Economics, or Political Science, or International Studies; but if they aren't a Medical Doctor; then what good are they for offering a medical diagnosis.
So much for your ERSATZ, "pretend" experts.
I'm quoting the REAL experts.
PamW
kristopher
(29,798 posts)... when they have done such a magnificently evil job of pulling the wool over the eyes of the rest of the world...
Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 0892-9882 print / 1547-7800 online DOI: 10.1080/08929880903445514
Fast Reactor Development in the United States
Thomas B. Cochran,1 Harold A. Feiveson,2 and Frank von Hippel2
1Nuclear Program, Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington, DC, USA 2Program on Science and Global Security, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
This article chronicles the rise and fall of fast-reactor research in the United States. Research on fast reactors began at the end of World War II and represented a large fraction of the total U.S. research effort on civilian nuclear energy until the early 1980s. The goal of most of this research was to develop a plutonium breeder reactor capable of producing more plutonium from U-238 than is consumed. But with the termination of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor project in 1983, fast reactor development in the United States essentially ended. Safety issues played a role in this end to the fast breeder reactor program, but more important reasons were nuclear proliferation concerns and a growing conviction that breeder reactors would not be needed or economically competitive with light water reactors for decades, if ever.
http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs17cochran.pdf
PamW
(1,825 posts)The "excuse" that was given for the cancellation of the IFR and other fast reactors was concern over "proliferation".
However, the scientific record shows that was just an excuse; and these authors jumped on the bandwagon with the politicians instead of the scientists.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/interviews/till.html
Q: The argument most put on the Senate floor was that the IFR increases the risks of proliferation.
A: Yes. Well, it doesn't. As simply as that. There's no technical reason why one would make that argument. In order to produce weapons, you have to produce pure plutonium. The IFR process will not do that. The only possible argument that would hold any water whatsoever was that when showing people that plutonium is not the demon substance that it's been advertised as being, that, in fact, it's quite a workaday material, that in some way or other, the familiarity of it could be used to say that it doesn't hold the terrors that it's supposed to hold, and so, perhaps, more tempting in some way for someone to try to misuse it. But I mean, that's a far-out kind of argument, it seems to me, compared to the unquestioned benefits from simply using this stuff to produce energy.
The politicians had their "reasoning", and they "snookered" some "scientists" into believing it too.
The good thing about science is that it is true, whether or not you believe in it.
--Neil deGrasse Tyson
PamW
kristopher
(29,798 posts)I guess they are charlatans that also have everyone fooled?
In 2008 they rated the proliferation risks of the:
Once-Through Fuel Cycle
Full Actinide Recycle
Partial Actinide Recycle
in 6 categories.
The Full Actinide Recycle approach is rated in the category
"Fuel Cycle:Inherent proliferation risk of technology"
as
"Highest risk: Capable of separating weapons-usable material, though some modification may be needed depending on the separations technology used."
And in the category
"Material Attractiveness"
as
Highest: Removal of fission products and separation of actinides greatly reduces barriers to theft, misuse, or further processing, even without separation of pure plutonium. Fast reactor fuels have higher concentration of weapons-usable materials.
For the category
Safeguards
as
Highest cost and difficulty: Separation processes require continuous monitoring against diversion and novel bulk materials present new measurement challenges.
Whose judgement is that?
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
"NNSA has the best science, technology and engineering in the world, and we are fortunate to have dedicated professionals who are truly leaders in their fields working every day to promote our nuclear security mission."
http://nnsa.energy.gov/
Can you believe the gall of those antinuclear idiots and the degree they've infiltrated the government?
PamW
(1,825 posts)kristopher,
It all depends on WHICH fuel cycle. There's not just one "once through", or one "full actinide recycle"....
There are a whole host of fuel cycles. What you are doing is saying something akin to that there is "one antihistimine", or "one heart medication"....
The risk depends not only on the fuel cycle, and the reprocessing options, but also on the REACTOR
That's where you keep totally missing the point.
The Integral Fast Reactor produces a spent fuel, that although it has Plutonium in it; has a "bad mix" for weapons.
Recall the previous post where I said that saying that something is "Plutonium" only tells you the chemical species. In order to know how something is going to act in terms of nuclear reactions; you have to give the isotope; like "Pu-239", or "Pu-240", or "Pu-242".
The fissile Plutonium that is "bomb fuel" is Pu-239. The other two Plutonium isotopes actually INHIBIT making nuclear weapons because of their radioactivity and heat production, which are things you DON'T want in your bomb fuel.
The IFR is a great Pu-239 burner. The spent fuel has little of the Pu-239 that a bomb maker would want, and a bunch of Pu-240 and Pu-242 that the bomb maker DOESN'T want.
What you keep FAILING at comprehending; is that in order to have reprocessing / separation be a risk for nuclear proliferation; there has to be something in the spent fuel worth going after for a nuclear weapons perspective. You could chemically separate raw sewage; but is that a proliferation risk? NO - because there isn't anything in the raw sewage that the nuclear weapons designer would want.
If you have a production reactor, like the ones at Hanford and Savannah River, and you operate them; they produce an output that has Pu-239 that the weapons designer wants. In fact, those production reactors were designed to optimize the amount / purity of the Pu-239 produced.
The IFR was designed to optimize the burnup of Pu-239; and the production of a spent fuel that didn't contain weapons usable materials.
Unfortunately, there are people that just can't figure out that there can be multiple different things that belong to the same class. Again, there isn't just one "heart drug"; there are a whole host of drugs that belong in that category; and they do different things. Your condition may respond to some, and be aggravated by other "heart drugs". I think most people can understand that.
The same with "spent fuel". There are different "spent fuels" depending on which reactor we are talking about having produced it. There is the spent fuel that comes out of "production reactors" at Hanford and Savannah River. Those reactors are optimized to make nuclear weapons material.
Then there is "spent fuel" that comes from the IFR; which is optimized so that the spent fuel is USELESS for making weapons. That was part of the design; to make the spent fuel be useless for nuclear weapons.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/interviews/till.html
Q: So it would be very difficult to handle for weapons, would it?
A: It's impossible to handle for weapons, as it stands.
It's highly radioactive. It's highly heat producing. It has all of the characteristics that make it extremely, well, make it impossible for someone to make a weapon.
Kristopher, did you ever consider taking some courses in science so that you could understand this stuff better?
Again, why do we care if something were a proliferation risk; if we are only going to use it WITHIN the USA? The US Government has no interest in weapons material from commercial reactors; the Government has its own reactors that produce a better product and they are shutdown because the USA doesn't need any more weapons material. The USA isn't going to "proliferate"; it already has nuclear weapons.
Even if something is a proliferation risk; we want to keep it away from "would be" nuclear weapons states like Iran; but that's not a reason that the USA can't use that technology domestically.
The good thing about science is that it is true, whether or not you believe in it.
--Neil deGrasse Tyson
PamW
kristopher
(29,798 posts)Dude, when the NNSA says you are wrong - it's time to admit you are wrong.
PamW
(1,825 posts)kristopher,
The NNSA are the bureaucrats that oversee the NNSA laboratories.
This is a SCIENTIFIC decision, and NOT an administrative question.
The correct people to answer the question are the SCIENTISTS that work for the NNSA in the national labs. Those are the people that need to be answering the question; and they did. I refer you to the report cited by Senators Simon and Kempthorne in the following letter to the New York Times:
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/05/opinion/l-new-reactor-solves-plutonium-problem-586307.html
You are mistaken in suggesting that the reactor produces bomb-grade plutonium: it never separates plutonium; the fuel goes into the reactor in a metal alloy form that contains highly radioactive actinides. A recent Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory study indicates that fuel from this reactor is more proliferation-resistant than spent commercial fuel, which also contains plutonium.
Let's take an analogy. Suppose you want a diagnosis of your medical condition. Who do you consult, and who is going to give you the best assessment:
1) The Board of Directors of your local hospital comprised of community leaders of all different stripes; mostly businessmen and politicians.
2) The Medical Doctors of the hospital.
The NNSA is like the Board of Directors. They are the administrators; just like the hospital directors; but they are NOT doctors.
The people you want to evaluate your medical condition are the Medical Doctors.
The people you want to evaluate the SCIENCE are the SCIENTISTS at the national laboratories; and it was SCIENTISTS at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory that wrote the report cited by Senators Simon and Kempthorne.
When SCIENTISTS not administrators; say you are wrong about a SCIENCE question, not an administrative one; then it is time to admit you are wrong.
PamW
kristopher
(29,798 posts)Well, now you're saying the agency most responsible for "preventing proliferation" doesn't have the technical expertise to actually do their assigned mission. Amazing they didn't think of that problem when the agency was conceptualized and staffed.
Good thing for the world that you caught the lapse. You'd better call the White House right away and let them know how badly we've screwed up. Wow.
http://nnsa.energy.gov/ourmission
NNSA is responsible for the management and security of the nation’s nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval reactor programs. It also responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the United States and abroad. Additionally, NNSA federal agents provide safe and secure transportation of nuclear weapons and components and special nuclear materials along with other missions supporting the national security.
Managing the Stockpile
Maintaining the safety, security and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing – especially at lower numbers – requires increased investments across the nuclear security enterprise.
Preventing Proliferation
Keeping weapons of mass destruction (WMD) out of the hands of state and non-state actors requires a coordinated effort on the part of suppliers of proliferation-sensitive materials, equipment, and technologies.
Powering the Nuclear Navy
The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program provides militarily effective nuclear propulsion plants and ensures their safe, reliable and long-lived operation. This mission requires the combination of fully trained U.S. Navy men and women with ships that excel in endurance, stealth, speed, and independence from supply chains.
Emergency Response
NNSA ensures that capabilities are in place to respond to any NNSA and Department of Energy facility emergency. It is also the nation's premier responder to any nuclear or radiological incident within the United States or abroad and provides operational planning and training to counter both domestic and international nuclear terrorism.
Recapitalizing Our Infrastructure
The FY2011 Budget Request increase represents the investment need to transform a Cold War nuclear weapons complex into a 21st century Nuclear Security Enterprise.
Continuing Management Reform
NNSA is responsible for the management and security of the nation’s nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and naval reactor programs. It also responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the United States and abroad. Additionally, NNSA federal agents provide safe and secure transportation of nuclear weapons and components and special nuclear materials along with other missions supporting the national security.
Countering Nuclear Terrorism
NNSA provides expertise, practical tools, and technically informed policy recommendations required to advance U.S. nuclear counterterrorism and counterproliferation objectives. It executes a unique program of work focused solely on these missions and builds partnerships with U.S. government agencies and key foreign governments on these issues.
PamW
(1,825 posts)kristopher,
Yes - it is true that NNSA is responsible for the expertise listed above. However NNSA doesn't have that expertise. NNSA just oversees or administers that expertise.
Excuse me while a give kristopher a remedial history lesson. The USA developed nuclear weapons in World War II under the Army's "Manhattan Project". But the Army didn't have scientists. NO - the Manhattan Project was administered by General Leslie Groves who was previously responsible for constructing the Pentagon. General Groves wasn't a nuclear scientist. General Groves didn't have the scientific expertise to build atomic bombs. General Groves was the ADMINISTRATOR.
Where did the Manhattan Project get the scientists to do the actual technical work? The scientists were hired under contract from Universities. Particularly, the scientists that designed the nuclear weapons at Los Alamos were employed by the University of California. The UC was under contract to the Army. The scientists like Dr. Robert Oppenheimer and Dr. Ernest Lawrence and others were employed by the University of California
Do you see how that works kristopher? The Government doesn't need to directly employ scientists; they get them under contract.
The same is true today. The NNSA is the logical successor to General Groves. Just as General Groves didn't have to be a nuclear physicist; the NNSA isn't a scientific organization. It oversees the scientists; but isn't composed of scientists. The actual scientists are NOT federal employees with NNSA at the top of their paychecks. The actual scientists aren't even located in Washington DC at the Forrestal Building which is home of the Dept. of Energy.
No the SCIENTISTS are at the national laboratories; Los Alamos in New Mexico and Lawrence Livermore in California.
The expertise listed above is NOT expertise that NNSA itself has; but is expertise that the NNSA oversees. The actual people with the expertise are at the Labs. For example, one of the functions listed above is "Emergency Response". The last time that function was used was in March 2011 for the Fukushima accident in Japan.
Now when Fukushima happened; did NNSA people in Washington leave the Forrestal Building and rush to Japan to collect data. NOPE!
The people that actually did the science came from the Laboratories; like Lawrence Livermore:
Livermore Responds to Crisis in Post-Earthquake Japan
http://str.llnl.gov/JanFeb12/pdfs/1.12.2.pd
Unfortunately, kristopher is confused by the organization chart. There are federal employees that work for NNSA that are NOT scientists. They don't have the scientific expertise claimed by NNSA. They are the administrators. They work with the budget and interfacing with Congress and making sure everything is done in accordance with regulations; you know all the "bureaucratic" stuff.
The SCIENTISTS aren't directly employed by NNSA. The scientists are at the national Labs like Lawrence Livermore.
Now to the issue at hand. Evidently kristopher found some very general policy papers of the type that NNSA writes. Yes - when the NNSA writes a policy paper; then that is very general and applicable to the field in general. For example, the policy paper kristopher quotes deals with reprocessing in general from any type of reactor, even a production reactor. But that's just a generalization.
The question we have before us kristopher isn't a general policy question. It is a SPECIFIC question about a SPECIFIC REACTOR.
The question is about the proliferation risk for a PARTICULAR reactor; the IFR.
That is a SCIENTIFIC question, not to be answered by Washington policy wonks; but by SCIENTISTS like at the national labs.
As I stated above; that question for the IFR in PARTICULAR was answered by SCIENTISTS at Lawrence Livermore who responded with a report to Congress stating that the IFR was NOT a proliferation risk. That report to Congress was cited by Senators Simon and Kempthorne in their rebuttal to the New York Times:
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/05/opinion/l-new-reactor-solves-plutonium-problem-586307.html
You are mistaken in suggesting that the reactor produces bomb-grade plutonium: it never separates plutonium; the fuel goes into the reactor in a metal alloy form that contains highly radioactive actinides. A recent Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory study indicates that fuel from this reactor is more proliferation-resistant than spent commercial fuel, which also contains plutonium.
Kristopher, do you NOW understand how the NNSA is just the administration agency - it's NOT the scientists?
I'm quoting the results from the SCIENTISTS for the PARTICULAR reactor in question; the IFR.
You are quoting a general policy statement or study from the policy wonks or administrators in Washington; who are NOT SCIENTISTS
It's a SCIENCE question and I'm quoting SCIENTISTS and you are quoting administrators.
I thing someone who MISUNDERSTOOD the who's who in the Government's nuclear enterprise, and didn't know who were merely administrators ( who are necessary and valuable of course ) who are NOT scientists; and which people were the scientists and where they work and for whom; someone with that LACK of understanding should really hang their head in shame. General Groves wan't a nuclear physicist; Oppenheimer was; it's that simple; but evidently kristopher doesn't understand it.
PamW
kristopher
(29,798 posts)So the question is do we take your word or the word of the confirmed experts? I think we can accept at face value the truth of their claim to have "the best science, technology and engineering in the world".
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
"NNSA has the best science, technology and engineering in the world, and we are fortunate to have dedicated professionals who are truly leaders in their fields working every day to promote our nuclear security mission."
http://nnsa.energy.gov/
This framework addresses two primary analytical variables: (1) the ability of alternative nuclear fuel cycles to support established nuclear nonproliferation policy objectives, and (2) a technical evaluation of the nonproliferation features of the alternative processes and technologies. The programmatic alternatives for the domestic nuclear fuel cycle identified in the PEIS vary widely in reactor type, fuel type, and processing of spent fuel. For the purposes of this assessment, these alternatives fall into three broad categories Once-Through Fuel Cycle
Full Actinide Recycle
Partial Actinide Recycle
They evaluated the various technologies in 6 categories and among those the Full Actinide Recycle approach (including the IFR) is rated in the category
"Fuel Cycle:Inherent proliferation risk of technology"
as
"Highest risk: Capable of separating weapons-usable material, though some modification may be needed depending on the separations technology used."
And in the category
"Material Attractiveness"
as
Highest: Removal of fission products and separation of actinides greatly reduces barriers to theft, misuse, or further processing, even without separation of pure plutonium. Fast reactor fuels have higher concentration of weapons-usable materials.
For the category
Safeguards
as
Highest cost and difficulty: Separation processes require continuous monitoring against diversion and novel bulk materials present new measurement challenges.
PamW
(1,825 posts)kristopher,
Yes - the NNSA has the best experts; it's just that you haven't figured out WHO they are talking about.
Let me explain it to you since you are having such a difficult time of this.
When NNSA says that "they" have the "best experts"; they are NOT talking about people at NNSA in Washington.
NNSA's "best experts" are its SCIENTISTS at the national laboratories
The SCIENTISTS who are NNSA's "best experts" are NOT in Washington, DC.
They are referring to NNSA SCIENTISTS who are at the national laboratories.
You know the ones that I HAVE BEEN QUOTING!!
You don't find the scientists that are working in the field in Washington. You find them at the LABS; where else do you think you'd find a scientist.
Occasionally, you get a scientist that becomes DOE Secretary; like Steven Chu, or Ernest Moniz.
For example, the nuclear nonproliferation SCIENTISTS are at the nonproliferation program at Lawrence Livermore:
https://missions.llnl.gov/?q=nonproliferation
That way; the nonproliferation scientists are located at the same laboratory as people who design nuclear weapons; so the latter can answer questions for them about the technology.
However, if you have a question about nuclear weapon design; there are two and ONLY TWO places that have the scientists with the expertise ( and the clearances to access the needed data ) and that is at the USA's two nuclear weapons design labs; Los Alamos National Lab in New Mexico, and Lawrence Livermore National Lab in California.
You don't find nuclear weapons design physicists in Washinton, DC; you find them ONLY in New Mexico and California
Please tell me you understand this now. I think the other denizens of the board are getting bored with me having to "spoon feed" such simple information to you.
You claim above that the IFR was considered in the report you cite; then GIVE the REFERENCE so we can see for ourselves!!!
( I'll bet that the IFR was NOT part of the study that kristopher is citing; but kristopher is just saying it was! Or that the people that made the claim are NOT nuclear weapons physicists. Show us the COMPLETE report and not just some CROPPED "cherry picking" )
PamW
LouisvilleDem
(303 posts)Since PamW seems to have a thing for identifying who is an expert and who is not, let me start off by saying that I am not a nuclear physicist and I have no idea whether or not it is possible to make a bomb from nuclear waste. I have no idea, and frankly I do not care. I do not care because it DOES NOT MATTER. Think about it this way kristopher. According to your own sources, the process for extracting the plutonium is fairly complex. Therefore, even if PamW is wrong and you CAN get material for a bomb from nuclear waste, why would you? It is obviously a hell of a lot easier to simply start with uranium ore and purify it--which is precisely what every rogue state trying to build a nuclear weapon has done or is doing.
That's why this thread is so funny. You are like two people arguing about whether or not the lock on a gun safe containing a pistol can be picked by a teenager, when all the while there is stack of assault weapons sitting on the table next to the safe.
kristopher
(29,798 posts)Last edited Thu Nov 14, 2013, 11:01 AM - Edit history (1)
The entire problem hinges on a core fact: there is no technological solution for nuclear weapons proliferation; no safe reactor, no safe fuel cycle.
In a nutshell here is what is happening. The global consortium of industries profiting from nuclear technologies wants to promote the use of nuclear energy as the primary response to carbon emissions. In order to make that happen to any degree the industry identified 4 problem areas that needed to be overcome:
Cost
Safety
Waste disposal
Proliferation
Based on the claim that with the appropriate set of policies they could indeed overcome those problems, they started an effort about 13 years ago (under Cheney's guidance) to make their revival a reality, and by 2005 had it written into law in the US as a set of policies that gave the industry its entire policy wish list and then some extras they hadn't dared hope for.
The once-through fuel cycle and light water reactors were identified as delivering the most balanced approach for dealing with the 4 problem areas. Other technologies offered advantages in a variety of areas, but unfortunately those benefits are accompanied by problems that make the sum of their features even more problematic than the once-through path.
Time has shown that the claims made by the industry were, shall we say, overly optimistic. Principally, instead of delivering cost reductions from the existing quoted price for nuclear, the price soared into the stratosphere. The "revival" was dead in the water.
Since that became obvious, various voices in the nuclear village have been trying to promote some of the technologies that were rejected by cherry picking and trumpeting to the public the good points of those technologies while ignoring or hiding the bad points.
Small modular reactors, thorium fueled reactors, and IFRs are the most commonly heard about new "new" solutions. These approaches didn't however, suddenly shed their undesirable aspects, so an inordinate amount of time has to be spent setting the record straight against the bait and switch tactics of this snake-oil sales force.
That's the nutshell version. Here is a bit more if you're interested.
DOE explains the proliferation problem this way,
"The principal proliferation risk associated with nuclear energy use comes from nuclear fuel cycle capabilities – particularly enrichment and reprocessing. Most nuclear power plants are light-water reactors that use low-enriched uranium as fuel. But the same technology used to enrich uranium for power reactors can also be used to produce high-enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons. In addition to these risks at the front end of the fuel cycle, there are risks at the back end, after spent fuel is removed from a reactor. Spent fuel can either be disposed of as waste or reprocessed to recycle the plutonium and other fissionable materials contained in spent fuel to generate more electricity. But this same material can also be used directly in nuclear weapons. Therefore, nuclear nonproliferation efforts place a high priority on limiting the further spread of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and the weapons- usable materials they can produce."
The crux of the matter is the once-through fuel cycle presently dominates the industry, and one of the reasons is that it is MORE resistant to proliferation than alternative fuel cycles because more international control can be exercised over the at-risk materials and technologies involved.
So your point is valid, as far as it goes. Given the existing landscape of deployed nuclear technologies, the shortest route to a nuclear weapon is building your own enrichment facilities to service your own fuel needs (energy security argument) and then use those facilities as a foundation for your weapons program. That is what we've seen Iran do over the past 20 years or so.
But the question that we are faced with is still this: what happens if we greatly expand the deployment of nuclear energy technologies? What technology works best to solve the cost, safety, waste, and proliferation problems? If we alter the fuel cycle and build 5000 new reactors, what will the global nuclear landscape then look like for both state and non-state actors that want to acquire nuclear weapons?
From the same DOE study.
The proliferation risk from enrichment services arises because there is little or no distinction between the technology needed for production of low-enriched fuel for power reactors and the technology needed to produce HEU for use in nuclear weapons. Enrichment plants can be converted – or the technology used – to produce HEU, which can be used directly in nuclear weapons. Uranium enrichment plants remain an essential element in the international fuel cycle since many reactor types require LEU fuel. The United States has sought to reduce the proliferation risk associated with uranium enrichment by being a reliable supplier of enrichment services, through the classification of enrichment technology information, and the rigorous implementation of export controls on the technologies.
The United States is not alone in this approach. It is exemplified, for example, by the “Special controls on sensitive exports” section of the NSG Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (INFCIRC/254,Part 134), which states “suppliers should exercise restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and material usable for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. If enrichment or reprocessing facilities, equipment or technology are to be transferred, suppliers should encourage recipients to accept, as an alternative to national plants, supplier involvement and/or other appropriate multinational participation in resulting facilities. Suppliers should also promote international (including IAEA) activities concerned with multinational regional fuel cycle centers.”
Reprocessing Technology
Reprocessing and recycling of plutonium creates direct and indirect proliferation risks. The direct proliferation risk from reprocessing arises from the separation, processing, and transport of plutonium that is directly usable for nuclear weapons. The indirect risk results from setting a precedent in the United States that could encourage or support a global industry and technical community for reprocessing.
U.S. policy has changed from time to time with respect to the salience of the indirect risk of reprocessing. As a result of these policy changes and market forces, a commercial reprocessing industry has not emerged in the United States. However, as noted above, President Bush has decided that “the United States will work in collaboration with international partners to develop recycle and fuel treatment technologies that are cleaner, more efficient, less waste-intensive, and more proliferation-resistant,” and DOE is considering alternatives for recycling spent fuel.35
Regardless of changing policies regarding domestic deployment of reprocessing facilities for civil purposes, the United States has continued and will continue its policy not to interfere with civilian nuclear programs that involve the reprocessing and recycling of plutonium in Western Europe and Japan. In regions of the world of proliferation concern, however, the United States actively opposes plutonium reprocessing and recycling.
The United States will continue to discourage the worldwide accumulation of separated plutonium and to minimize the use of HEU in civil nuclear programs. Among other initiatives, the United States participated in the effort to develop an internationally agreed set of guidelines on the management of civil plutonium. In 1997, the United States reached agreement with Belgium, China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom on International Guidelines for the Management of Civil Plutonium,36 which, inter alia, provide that each state will take into account the need to avoid contributing to the risks of proliferation and the importance of balancing plutonium supply and demand as soon as practical.
Some have asserted that any effort to restrict access to sensitive nuclear technologies is inconsistent with the NPT. However, the Treaty allows for discretion on the part of supplier states regarding the nature of their cooperation with other states. Indeed, during the debates of the United Nations committee that drafted the NPT, multiple proposals were made that would have (1) created a legal duty for suppliers to contribute to the development of nuclear industry in the territories of NNWS, (2) affirmed an “inalienable” right of NNWS to develop nuclear explosive devices for civil or “peaceful purposes,” and (3) extended Article IV nuclear cooperation explicitly to “the entire technology of reactors and fuels.”37 These efforts were considered and rejected.
Since enrichment and reprocessing technologies entail an inherent capability to produce fissile material that can be used in nuclear weapons, the nonproliferation obligations of supplier states call for special restraint in any transfers of these technologies. For this reason, the IAEA Director General has referred to enrichment and reprocessing as the “Achilles heel” of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.38 The United States continues to believe that the best approach is for the commercial market to provide a reliable supply of nuclear fuel at reasonable cost from competing vendors in order to eliminate any need for additional countries to develop enrichment or reprocessing capabilities of their own.
PamW
(1,825 posts)kristopher states:
The entire problem hinges on a core fact: there is no technological solution for nuclear weapons proliferation; no safe reactor, no safe fuel cycle.
Once again kristopher tells us something that is 100% WRONG. I'm not sure what he is reading; but he doesn't understand it.
Unfortunately, the devil is in the details and some like kristopher who doesn't have the scientific credentials makes broad statement about a whole class, when the statement should only be applied to a portion of the class.
Let me see is I can sort out this confused mess that kristopher has created.
First, the Laws of Physics impose limits on what can / can not be used for the fuel of a nuclear weapon. As I stated above, just because some material is "Plutonium" only tells you the chemical species; i.e. how that material reacts chemically. It doesn't tell you how it reacts in nuclear reactions because different "isotopes" of a chemical element react differently in nuclear reactions. Try Googling "isotope". When you want to refer to a specific isotope; you give the chemical symbol followed by the isotope's mass number. In particular, it is Pu-238 that is "fissile" and is the fuel for a nuclear weapon. The other isotopes of Plutonium, Pu-240 and Pu-242 will actually INHIBIT the explosion process.
I've analogized this before as saying a mixture of various isotopes is like a mixture of gasoline and water. Can you use a mixture of gasoline and water to run your car on? DEPENDS!! It depends on the mix. If the mix is 99.9% gasoline and 0.1% water; then that will work in your car because it is mostly car fuel, gasoline. If the mix is 0.1% gasoline and 99.9% water; then the mix will NOT work in your car, since it is mostly water. In order for the mixture to work in your car, there is a minimum percentage that has to be gasoline.
The same with our mixture of isotopes. Pu-239 PROMOTES the nuclear explosion, like gasoline promotes a running car engine. Pu-240 and Pu-242 INHIBIT the explosion process and are analogous to the water in the gas / water mixture. Too much and it doesn't work.
Now the precise value of how much Pu-239 is needed is NOT made public; because it would help non-nuclear weapons states in their quest to obtain nuclear weapons. However, the precise value IS known by the scientists at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore because they design the nuclear weapons in the US stockpile; and they better know the fuel requirements if those weapons are going to work.
The way "weapons grade" Plutonium; that is Plutonium with the proper mix of Plutonium isotopes to be used in a weapon; is made is with "production reactors". The US has specially designed production reactors at Hanford in Washington State, and at Savannah River in South Carolina. At present, all those reactors are shutdown, because the DOE has enough Plutonium and doesn't need any more. The last operating production reactor was shutdown in 1988. So the USA hasn't needed and hasn't made Plutonium in over 2 decades.
If the spent fuel with proper isotopic mix from a production reactor is processed chemically; one can separate the weapons-grade Plutonium from the fission products since they are different chemical species. That's how one gets Plutonium for nuclear weapons.
In the early 1980s, nuclear scientists at Argonne National Lab under the direction of nuclear physicist Dr. Charles Till decided to design a reactor that had certain properties so as to address some of the problems with using nuclear power. They designed their reactor to be "inherently safe" in order to address the safety issue. They also designed it, and its fuel cycle so as to make the reactor and fuel cycle "proliferation proof".
The way you do that is to design a reactor, Argonne called it the Integral Fast Reactor or IFR that did just the OPPOSITE of what production reactors are designed to do. Production reactors are designed / operated to put out a spent fuel that is high in Pu-239 which is what the weapons designers want; and low in Pu-240 and Pu-242 which is what the weapons designers abhor. The IFR does the OPPOSITE; it puts out a spent fuel that is LOW in Pu-239 and HIGH in Pu-240 and Pu-242.
Nuclear physicist Dr. Charles Till who led the effort in designing this "proliferation proof" reactor discusses this property in his interview with Richard Rhodes for the PBS Frontline program:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/interviews/till.html
Q: So it would be very difficult to handle for weapons, would it?
A: It's impossible to handle for weapons, as it stands.
It's highly radioactive. It's highly heat producing. It has all of the characteristics that make it extremely, well, make it impossible for someone to make a weapon.
Dr. Till states that they were successful in achieving their design goals in the design of the IFR. The spent fuel of the IFR has the WRONG isotopic mixture. It's like the 0.1% gasoline and 99.9% water mixture for car fuel. It WON'T work in a nuclear weapon.
The Congress wanted to verify that the IFR spent fuel can't be used for making nuclear weapons; so they had DOE task the nuclear weapons designers at Lawrence Livermore with making that determination. Think about it!!! Who else would you ask to make the determination as to whether some material can / can not be use to make nuclear weapons. You ask nuclear weapons designers!!! They are the ONLY people who would know if a nuclear weapon can be designed to use spent IFR fuel. You need people that know how to design nuclear weapons, and if the nuclear weapons design experts at LLNL can't make weapons from spent IFR fuel; then nobody else can.
LLNL reported that Dr. Till and his minions had indeed achieved their goal in a report to Congress. There's no copy available on the web or I would link it. However, Senators Simon and Kempthorne tell us the results of that report in their letter to the New York Times in rebuttal to an editorial:
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/05/opinion/l-new-reactor-solves-plutonium-problem-586307.html
You are mistaken in suggesting that the reactor produces bomb-grade plutonium: it never separates plutonium; the fuel goes into the reactor in a metal alloy form that contains highly radioactive actinides. A recent Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory study indicates that fuel from this reactor is more proliferation-resistant than spent commercial fuel, which also contains plutonium.
As Dr. Till explains in the Frontline interview; the Clinton Administration had made the decision to cancel the IFR; but they needed some "grounds" on which to attack the program. Their claim was that the IFR was a proliferation risk. The claim was UNTRUE as determined by the BEST SCIENTISTS for making that determination. However, in the US Senate, science doesn't rule the day; politics does. So Senator Kerry promulgated FALSEHOODS in order to do the Clinton Administration's bidding in getting the IFR cancelled.
From Dr. Till's Frontline interview above:
Q: The argument most put on the Senate floor was that the IFR increases the risks of proliferation.
A: Yes. Well, it doesn't. As simply as that. There's no technical reason why one would make that argument. In order to produce weapons, you have to produce pure plutonium. The IFR process will not do that.
By "pure plutonium", Dr. Till means pure Pu-239.
Dr Till also addresses the Senate debate in this article he wrote:
http://www.sustainablenuclear.org/PADs/pad0509till.html
The anti-IFR forces were led by John Kerry. He was the principal speaker and the floor manager of the anti forces in the Senate debate. He spoke at length, with visual aids; he had been well prepared. His arguments against the merits of the IFR were not well informed and many were clearly wrong. But what his presentation lacked in accuracy it made up in emotion. He attacked from many angles, but principally he argued proliferation dangers from civilian nuclear power.
Dr Till hits the nail on the head; the anti-IFR argument is TECHNICALLY WRONG; but it appeals to the emotions. After all, if you want to motivate people to oppose something, tell them (UNTRUTHFULLY) that it will promote nuclear weapons. It's a good PR ploy; and believe it or not, the same ploy used by Kerry in the Senate is being attempted here on Democratic Underground.
It doesn't matter what the TRUTH is; it just matters that you SCARE people toward your side
LousivilleDem brings up a valid point that I've brought up here; and several times kristopher has DODGED it.
Why does it matter? If we are considering the use of a technology INSIDE the USA; then why does it matter if it is a proliferation risk? The US Government isn't going to co-opt IFR spent fuel for weapons. The US Government has its own specially designed production reactors, and they are SHUTDOWN because the US Government DOESN'T NEED THEM.
Are people worried that a proliferation risky technology will be operated in the USA, and the product shipped to would be proliferators? The USA has enrichment plants, the SAME enrichment plants that produced highly enriched uranium bomb fuel for bombs like the Little Boy bomb that vaporized Hiroshima. Did any of the product of those plants find its way to Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, North Korea? NO!!!
Are you afraid of a proliferant nation getting its hands on technology that can be used to make nuclear weapons? That is a valid concern. But just because the USA doesn't use the technology does NOTHING to address whether would-be nuclear weapons states will use it. For example, the USA doesn't use centrifuge technology to enrich uranium. Does that mean that other nations forego centrifuge technology? HELL NO!!!. Centrifuge technology is what Iran is using. Where did people get this NONSENSE idea that if the USA doesn't use a technology; nobody else will? If Iran wants nuclear weapons; they'll use WHATEVER technology to promote that goal; whether or not the USA uses the technology.
It's really DANGEROUS to "think" that way ( If you call it "thinking" ) It can lead to a false sense of security. "Oh, I don't need to worry about any other countries using centrifuges to enrich uranium to make bombs. The USA doesn't use centrifuges, so nobody else will". Iran is the counter-example.
It all just shows how manifestly DESPERATE some anti-nukes are to BAMBOOZLE the public with PROPAGANDA.
I never understand why people have to LIE to promote their side. If you have a good product; then promote the good of your product and overcome your opposition that way. If you have to LIE about the opposition, it could mean that you are having REAL DOUBTS about the advantages of your side!
The good thing about science it that it is true, whether or not you believe in it.
--Neil deGrasse Tyson
PamW
PamW
(1,825 posts)kristopher states,
The crux of the matter is the once-through fuel cycle presently dominates the industry, and one of the reasons is that it is MORE resistant to proliferation than alternative fuel cycles because more international control can be exercised over the at-risk materials and technologies involved.
kristopher,
You know what's EVEN BETTER than having international control exercised over "at-risk" materials like Plutonium?
What's EVEN BETTER is having the "at risk" material, i.e. Plutonium DESTROYED so it can't be used.
Think about it in terms of chemical weapons. What would be better; having a bunch of chemical weapons watched by international watchers.
Or how about if the chemicals in the chemical weapons were INCINERATED. You wouldn't need anyone to watch them; they'd be DESTROYED
Well reactors like the IFR BURN UP Plutonium. That's why the IFR is called an "Actinide Burner".
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/interviews/till.html
Q: The fission products.
A: Fission products. But none of the long-lived toxic elements like plutonium and americium or curium, the so-called manmade elements. They're the long-lived toxic ones. And they're recycled back into the reactor ... and work every bit as well as plutonium.
Q: So they go in, and then those are broken into fission products, or some of it is. Right?
A: Yes.
Q: And you repeat the process.
A: Eventually, what happens is that you wind up with only fission products, that the waste is only fission products that have, most have lives of hours, days, months, some a few tens of years. There are a few very long-lived ones that are not very radioactive.
The IFR recycles the actinides; so eventually the waste is all "fission products" as Dr. Till states. Fission products are "nuclear ash"
You can't make weapons out of "nuclear ash"; there's NO ENERGY in "ash".
So you don't need the international group of watchdogs; the problem is GONE.
The only people that don't like that scenario are the anti-nukes; because it destroys their main "boogey man
PamW
kristopher
(29,798 posts)Yet again the question is do we take your word or the word of the confirmed experts?
As previously stated in response to the same essential claims, I think we can accept at face value the truth of their claim to have "the best science, technology and engineering in the world". I believe we can trust their conclusions more than your self-serving, obviously flawed rationalizations that they have somehow overlooked the relevant characteristics of the IFR.
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
"NNSA has the best science, technology and engineering in the world, and we are fortunate to have dedicated professionals who are truly leaders in their fields working every day to promote our nuclear security mission."
http://nnsa.energy.gov/
This framework addresses two primary analytical variables:
(1) the ability of alternative nuclear fuel cycles to support established nuclear nonproliferation policy objectives, and
(2) a technical evaluation of the nonproliferation features of the alternative processes and technologies.
The programmatic alternatives for the domestic nuclear fuel cycle identified in the PEIS vary widely in reactor type, fuel type, and processing of spent fuel. For the purposes of this assessment, these alternatives fall into three broad categories
Once-Through Fuel Cycle
Full Actinide Recycle
Partial Actinide Recycle
They evaluated the various technologies in 6 categories and among those the Full Actinide Recycle approach (including the IFR) is rated in the category
"Fuel Cycle:Inherent proliferation risk of technology"
as
"Highest risk: Capable of separating weapons-usable material, though some modification may be needed depending on the separations technology used."
And in the category
"Material Attractiveness"
as
Highest: Removal of fission products and separation of actinides greatly reduces barriers to theft, misuse, or further processing, even without separation of pure plutonium. Fast reactor fuels have higher concentration of weapons-usable materials.
For the category
Safeguards
as
Highest cost and difficulty: Separation processes require continuous monitoring against diversion and novel bulk materials present new measurement challenges.
PamW
(1,825 posts)kristopher,
WRONG
I work with the people from NNSA all the time; and I know what they say.
kristopher is MISCHARACTERIZING the opinion of NNSA on IFR.
Look at all the "snipped" "cherry picked" bits and pieces he repeatedly posts.
How about posting the ENTIRE report.
The reason is that the report doesn't say what kristopher wants people to think it says.
PamW
kristopher
(29,798 posts)CAPS LOCK off.
PamW
(1,825 posts)kristopher,
Then SHOW us.
Show us the complete report that you are "cherry picking" from.
Show us where they explicitly say they considered the IFR and said that it was a proliferation risk.
NNSA won't do that; because they get their proliferation information from Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore; and I already showed you what Lawrence Livermore says.
Remember; NNSA itself is NOT the experts. They oversee the experts which are at their national labs.
I've shown you what the scientists at the national labs say.
Now show us the report that you are MISQUOTING and CHERRY PICKING from.
Readers may also be interested in the following from "The Energy Collective":
http://theenergycollective.com/barrybrook/53334/ifr-fad-9-summary-non-proliferation-advantages-integral-fast-reactor
Efficient use of fuel requires reprocessing for re-use and return to the reactor, repeating the cycle over and over again. Over ninety percent is burned. An entirely new process, (pyroprocessing) was developed for this. Its product is primarily plutonium, in a mixture of several other elements. The mixture is well suited to fuel the fast reactor, but not to weapons.
PamW