Amos & Dempsey: Don’t Just Stop Sequester, Save The Ground Force

[unhappycamper]

http://breakingdefense.com/2013/11/amos-dempsey-dont-just-stop-sequester-save-the-ground-force/



Amos & Dempsey: Don’t Just Stop Sequester, Save The Ground Force
By Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.
on November 18, 2013 at 10:01 AM

REAGAN LIBRARY, SIMI VALLEY, CA: Sometimes you have to listen closely to the soft-spoken Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Sometimes the Commandant of the Marine Corps says “hey, Sydney!” and hands you his message on a plate. But this Saturday, both Army Gen. Martin Dempsey and Marine Gen. James Amos were talking about more than just stopping sequestration, as the ongoing 10-year, $500-billion cut to defense spending is known. Of course they want to stop that across-the-board cut. But they’re something more specific they want to stop as well: Both generals warned against slashing old-fashioned ground forces in the hope that high-tech air- and seapower will win us the next war.

Although the Army is under the greatest threat, sequester is pure agony for every part of the Pentagon. Senate Democrats and House Republicans are locked in the 2014 budget conference at this very moment, with a deal to stop, soften, or at least slow down sequester very much in doubt. And it was precisely to raise the pressure for such a deal that East Coast potentates from Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel on down flew 3,000 miles to the resting place of Ronald Reagan — the Republican icon of “peace through strength” — to the first-ever Reagan National Defense Forum.

As painful as sequestration is, however, its real effect inside the Pentagon was to turn up the heat on a debate which was already underway and which will continue even if sequester goes away. (Unlikely). Even without sequester, defense budgets would still be shrinking, 12 years of ground wars would still be winding down, and the air, sea, and cyber threat of China would still be rising in the east like a red sun over the Pacific. Even without sequester, the debate we’ve had after every war since 1945 would have reignited: Should the US pay for a large ground force in time of peace — which the Founding Fathers considered anathema — or should it invest in air- and sea forces that rely on modern America’s favorite answer to every problem, high technology?

The last time we had this debate was from 1991 to 2003. Back then, advocates of a “revolution in military affairs” prevailed with their argument that precision-guided “shock and awe” would eliminate the need for prolonged ground fighting. (It didn’t). Now the war over the next war is starting up again.