Superdelegates? Even the Founders would approve

[TheDormouse]

I think having superdelegates that can override rank-and-file voters' votes is an abomination.

But let's remember that even the Founders were totally into the idea of having the Establishment be able to override the will of the common (property-owning, white, male) citizenry.

Read the original version of the Constitution of the United States of America:

Article I, section 3:
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.

Article II, section 1:
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows

Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.

The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons.... The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President....

[6chars]

1. And the meek shall inherit the earth.

We've taken care of everything
The words you read, the songs you sing
The pictures that give pleasure to your eyes
It's one for all, all for one
We work together, common sons
Never need to wonder how or why

[Warren Stupidity]

2. Well they approved of slavery, denied women the vote,

and restricted voting to property owning white males. So umm your point is?

[TheDormouse]

3. did u notice I mentioned property-owning white males? nt

[enlightenment]

4. That's a stretch.

Especially the bit where the Constitution - in describing the formation of the Electoral College - indicates that "no Senator or Representative, of Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit . . ." will be appointed as an Elector.

Those people ARE the Superdelegates. Elected officials, primarily, with a few special friends of the DNC thrown in for good measure.

Most of the founders would not have approved of Superdelegates because they didn't really like political parties. "Factions", they called them - and anathema to a functioning Republic. They were right about that.

You're absolutely right that Superdelegates are an abomination - but I think you're assigning something to the founders that would have them spitting into their ale.

[TheDormouse]

6. My point is that the Founders didn't trust the citizenry enough to let their votes alone

be the final determinant of who would hold the top positions - president, senators, and Supreme Court.

[enlightenment]

9. Of course they didn't.

My point was that you were stretching the Constitution to make a point. No harm, no foul - but there are simpler ways of doing it.

Your comment here is simple and spot-on. They were the elites of their society, doing what 18th century elites did. To a very large degree, they had good reason to do so, since the majority of the citizenry was only functionally literate, accustomed to being led, and far more interested in surviving the daily depredations of life than running the new country (pretty much like today, come to think of it).

The choices they made worked for the time and circumstances in which they lived. We may see them as horrible, but we have the benefit of hindsight.

[TheDormouse]

10. we'll have to agree to disagree; there are people today who

still think that the common voter cannot be trusted to make the right decisions in choosing who will run the government

And by "people today," I am including the people who run the Democratic Party and who continue to support the superdelegates system, such as

former DNC Chair & former Gov Howard Dean
[link:https://twitter.com/GovHowardDean/status/706219827535462401|

[TheDormouse]

7. from the debate at the Philadelphia Convention:

The delegates at the Constitutional Convention voted 9-1 against having the common citizenry vote directly for president.

[link:http://teachingamericanhistory.org/convention/debates/0717-2/|

The ninth Resolution being taken up, the first clause, “That a National Executive [ie, the President] be instituted, to consist of a single person,” was agreed to, nem. con.

The next clause, “to be chosen by the National Legislature,” being considered, —

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS was pointedly against his being so chosen. He will be the mere creature of the Legislature, if appointed and impeachable by that body. He ought to be elected by the people at large — by the freeholders of the country. That difficulties attend this mode, he admits. But they have been found superable in New York and in Connecticut, and would, he believed, be found so in the case of an Executive for the United States. If the people should elect, they will never fail to prefer some man of distinguished character, or services; some man, if he might so speak, of continental reputation. If the Legislature elect, it will be the work of intrigue, of cabal, and of faction; it will be like the election of a pope by a conclave of cardinals; real merit will rarely be the title to the appointment. He moved to strike out “National Legislature,” and insert “citizens of the United States.”

Mr. SHERMAN thought that the sense of the nation would be better expressed by the Legislature, than by the people at large. The latter will never be sufficiently informed of characters, and besides will never give a majority of votes to any one man. They will generally vote for some man in their own State, and the largest State will have the best chance for the appointment. If the choice be made by the Legislature, a majority of voices may be made necessary to constitute an election.

Mr. WILSON. Two arguments have been urged against an election of the Executive magistrate by the people. The first is, the example of Poland, where an election of the supreme magistrate is attended with the most dangerous commotions. The cases, he observed, were totally dissimilar. The Polish nobles have resources and dependants which enable them to appear in force, and to threaten the Republic as well as each other. In the next place, the electors all assemble at one place; which would not be the case with us. The second argument is, that a majority of the people would never concur. It might be answered, that the concurrence of a majority of the people is not a necessary principle of election, nor required as such in any of the States. But allowing the objection all its force, it may be obviated by the expedient used in Massachusetts, where the Legislature, by a majority of voices, decide in case a majority of the people do not concur in favor of one of the candidates. This would restrain the choice to a good nomination at least, and prevent in a great degree intrigue and cabal. A particular objection with him against an absolute election by the Legislature was, that the Executive in that case would be too dependent to stand the mediator between the intrigues and sinister views of the Representatives and the general liberties and interests of the people.

Mr. PINCKNEY did not expect this question would again have been brought forward; an election by the people being liable to the most obvious and striking objections. They will be led by a few active and designing men. The most populous States, by combining in favor of the same individual, will be able to carry their points. The national Legislature, being most immediately interested in the laws made by themselves, will be most attentive to the choice of a fit man to carry them properly into execution.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. It is said, that in case of an election by the people the populous States will combine and elect whom they please. Just the reverse. The people of such States cannot combine. If there be any combination, it must be among their Representatives in the Legislature. It is said, the people will be led by a few designing men. This might happen in a small district. It can never happen throughout the continent. In the election of a Governor of New York, it sometimes is the case in particular spots, that the activity and intrigues of little partizans are successful; but the general voice of the State is never influenced by such artifices. It is said, the multitude will be uninformed. It is true they would be uninformed of what passed in the Legislative conclave, if the election were to be made there; but they will not be uninformed of those great and illustrious characters which have merited their esteem and confidence. If the Executive be chosen by the national Legislature, he will not be independent of it; and if not independent, usurpation and tyranny on the part of the Legislature will be the consequence. This was the case in England in the last century. It has been the case in Holland, where their Senates have engrossed all power. It has been the case every where. He was surprised that an election by the people at large should ever have been likened to the Polish election of the first Magistrate. An election by the Legislature will bear a real likeness to the election by the Diet of Poland. The great must be the electors in both cases, and the corruption and cabal which are known to characterize the one would soon find their way into the other. Appointments made by numerous bodies are always worse than those made by single responsible individuals or by the people at large.

Col. MASON. It is curious to remark the different language held at different times. At one moment we are told that the Legislature is entitled to thorough confidence, and to indefinite power. At another, that it will be governed by intrigue and corruption, and cannot be trusted at all. But not to dwell on this inconsistency, he would observe that a government which is to last ought at least to be practicable. Would this be the case if the proposed election should be left to the people at large? He conceived it would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a proper character for Chief Magistrate to the people, as it would, to refer a trial of colors to a blind man. The extent of the country renders it impossible, that the people can have the requisite capacity to judge of the respective pretensions of the candidates.

Mr. WILSON could not see the contrariety stated by (Col. MASON.) The Legislature might deserve confidence in some respects, and distrust in others. In acts which were to affect them and their constituents precisely alike, confidence was due; in others, jealousy was warranted. The appointment to great offices, where the Legislature might feel many motives not common to the public, confidence was surely misplaced. This branch of business, it was notorious, was the most corruptly managed, of any that had been committed to legislative bodies.

Mr. WILLIAMSON conceived that there was the same difference between an election, in this case, by the people and by the Legislature, as between an appointment by lot and by choice. There are at present distinguished characters, who are known perhaps to almost every man. This will not always be the case. The people will be sure to vote for some man in their own State; and the largest State will be sure to succeed. This will not be Virginia, however. Her slaves will have no suffrage. As the salary of the Executive will be fixed and he will not be eligible a second time, there will not be such a dependence on the Legislature as has been imagined.

On the question on an election by the people, instead of the Legislature, it [was defeated], — Pennsylvania, aye — 1; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no — 9.

[Mufaddal]

5. I agree, this is a stretch.

A number of the founders explicitly rejected the notion of political parties altogether.

[TheDormouse]

8. from Alexander Hamilton's Federalist paper number 68

on the election of the president:

It was equally desirable, that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations.

[link:http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed68.asp|