Afghan IEDs Hammered Soviets By Greg Grant Tuesday, December 15th, 2009 12:17 pm
Posted in International, Land, Policy
When Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced creation of yet another counter-IED Pentagon task force, he was clearly frustrated with the inability of the military, the intelligence agencies and industry to come up with answers to the simple yet devastatingly effective roadside bomb as the IED war shifts from Iraq to Afghanistan.
The number of IED “incidents” in Afghanistan, defined as IEDs either found before detonating or actual IED attacks, have jumped from around 100 a month during 2006 to over 800 a month this past summer; in August IED incidents topped 1,000. In 2006, 41 U.S. and NATO troops were killed by IEDs. So far this year, 260 coalition troops have been killed by IEDs, according to the web site icasualties.com that tracks troop casualties. IED casualties in Afghanistan don’t approach those of Iraq during the height of the fighting there when some days saw 100 IED incidents, but the trend lines are headed in the wrong direction. As more troops arrive, casualties are sure to increase.
Gates said one of the IED group’s first tasks was to scour records from the Soviet-Afghan war during the 1980s for potential lessons on the Mujaheddin’s use and the Soviet response to IEDs and mines. That war was marked by extreme brutality on the part of all combatants and both sides used land mines liberally. The Soviets ringed their strongpoints with thick mine belts that de-mining teams continue to clear to this day.
The Mujaheddin used mines and IEDs principally as an offensive weapon to bleed the Soviet occupiers, rather than to seize and defend territory. And bleed them they did: the Soviets lost 1,995 soldiers killed and 1,191 vehicles to mines and IEDs during their eight year long war. That’s just killed, certainly there were many thousands more wounded, as IEDs tend to maim more than they kill (the Soviets never produced a true accounting of their losses in Afghanistan, thought to be much higher than publicly available numbers). Those statistics come from the Army War College’s Lester Grau whose translations of Soviet general staff studies of the Afghan war, as well as Mujaheddin accounts of the fighting, are invaluable.
Like the U.S. military, the Soviet army in Afghanistan was road bound, relying on the country’s few roads to resupply scattered combat outposts. Much of the fighting was for control over these lines of communication. The roads linking the major Afghan towns such as Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Khost and Jalalabad were the scene of countless bloody battles.
Rest of article and a pretty good discussion at:
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/12/15/afghan-ieds-hammered-soviets/?wh=wh