Reply #44: interview with Russert before the war [View All]

[Donna Zen]

MR. RUSSERT: There is an article in The Washington Post today, General. It says that part of the reason that France and Russia and Germany and others are giving the United States such a hard time about Iraq is they disagree on the views but also it’s a payback for the heavy-handed and bullying tactics of the last two years of the Bush foreign policy. Do you agree with that?



GEN. CLARK: I do agree with that. I think that’s exactly what they’ve seen and felt in Europe from this administration. It’s an administration which really hasn’t respected our allies. And, frankly, there are a lot of differences and perspectives with our allies in Europe.

One thing I learned in the Kosovo campaign is that if you’re going to have allies, the unfortunate thing is they have their own opinions. And if you really want allies, you got to listen to their opinions, you’ve got to take them seriously, you’ve got to work with their issues. Every one of our allied leaders is an elected leader, at least in Europe. And that means they have domestic politics and political factors at home and economic factors at home that influence their opinions. And those have to be respected just like we would expect them to respect us for our political system in the United States.

If we deal with our allies on a basis of respect, if we give them the opportunity and the evidence and the arguments and the analysis that’s needed to help shape their public opinions, then we can expect them to go along with us.

MR. RUSSERT: You have written extensively about Iraq: an article in Time, Let’s Wait to Attack; an interview with The Washington Post, A General’s Doubts. I want to go through some of your points. This is how The Post characterized it: “Clark fears that the new dangers generated by a war in Iraq might outweigh any gains from disarming Saddam Hussein. Clark cites three tests that the administration must meet before going to war. ...Are you sure you won’t destroy the international institutions you say you are supporting, and thereby undermine the war against terror?” Are we destroying the institutions we are supporting?

GEN. CLARK: Well, we’re shaking really strongly right now. We’ve put both NATO and the U.N. on the block here and demanded they support us. So as we’re moving ahead here, we’ve got to be careful and not just use brute force against these institutions. We’ve got to provide the arguments, the analysis, the evidence, the time, the sense of responsibility. We’ve got to allow opinion to come along to our side on this....

MR. RUSSERT: As you look at this situation now, should the inspectors be allowed more time? Should we hold back going to war with Saddam Hussein?

GEN. CLARK: Well, I think we should right now, simply because we want to get our allies on board.

I don’t have any confidence that the inspectors are going to find anything. This stuff is extremely well- hidden. Some of it’s probably in Syria, as well. And it’s unlikely the inspectors will ever find the so-called smoking gun on this. But if it makes our allies more able to go to their publics and justify their support of our operation, then I think that’s important. And remember, it’s not just France and Germany. There’s a lot of public opinion all through Europe, even in those states that have already signed up for the United States, where the publics just aren’t convinced about the need to do this. We shouldn’t allow an artificial deadline of the weather to affect the more significant, more important decisions about when to start the operation.

MR. RUSSERT: Can you keep 200,000 American troops poised at the ready for months in that part of the world?

GEN. CLARK: Well, maybe not for months, but for another month. I mean, they’re not even there yet in most cases. So I think, you know, we need to—and I can understand why Condoleezza Rice is pushing the urgency of the diplomacy because you can’t not push it. But on the other hand, we’ve got to recognize, objectively speaking, another month is probably what we need.

MR. RUSSERT: In your book, “Waging Modern War,” from 2001, you wrote this, “Nations use diplomacy as a means to advance their interests. But when the interests are significant enough, when dialogue, negotiation, and compromise can’t gain traction, and when nations believe their military advantage is sufficient, they will again employ ‘threat’ to provide additional leverage. Once the threat surfaces, however, nations or alliances are committed. Following through to preserve credibility becomes a matter of vital interest.”

Has the president drawn the sword where he can no longer back down?

GEN. CLARK: I think that’s right. I can’t quite imagine that he could create a scenario in which it would be OK to just implement an enhanced so-called containment regime with inspectors on the ground; not with all the troops there, not with the determination. Because what you’re really going against here is not the presence of the weapons; it’s the intent of Saddam Hussein and his regime to continue to develop these weapons. So you’re in exactly the situation we were in in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s with UNPROFOR. You would put forces on the ground, they’d be blue-hatted, they’d be doing inspections, but they’d be working against the strategic intent of the power on the ground. Conflict would be inevitable. So I think we can all debate alternative strategies and theories and, yes, maybe containment was possible a year or so ago. Now it’s too late. Saddam Hussein has to understand his day is over.

MR. RUSSERT: War is inevitable.

GEN. CLARK: I think war is inevitable.

MR. RUSSERT: What should the administration have done differently? What other strategy could they have embarked on a year ago where we’d have a different result today?

GEN. CLARK: Well, I think you have to go back really—let’s start with 9/11; 3,000 dead in this country underscore the deadly threat of al-Qaeda. Somehow, we got that tied in with Iraq. From the beginning, people were saying Iraq must have been behind it. Well, they weren’t behind it. Why not? Have focused exclusively on al-Qaeda, said, “Here’s our target, set Iraq aside, strengthen containment. OK. We don’t want them dealing with terrorists. They’re a potential proliferant.” But then so is Iran. They actually have a more active terrorist network. They also have weapons of mass destruction, and then here’s North Korea that even has nuclear weapons, and they do sell.

So you have three potential major proliferants, and then you have al-Qaeda. Why not focus on al-Qaeda and then work that very intensively, work it diplomatically? Go into the United Nations and start with indicting Osama bin Laden as a war criminal. That way, you can use international legitimacy and pressure against some of these so-called coalition partners like Syria and others that are sort of sitting on the fence and playing both sides. And then go to NATO. Take NATO and multifunctionalize it. Say to NATO, “Look, you used to be a military alliance. That was appropriate for the Soviet threat. But now, you know, terrorism’s much more complex. We’ve got to harmonize our laws, got to have a standard definition of what is terrorism, got to know what are the elements of proving terrorism is a crime, got to standardize our rules of evidence. If we give you a wiretap and we say, ‘This guy is guilty of conspiring to blow up the Eiffel Tower,’ we don’t want you to say that’s not admissible in your court.”

And so we could have used NATO that way. We could have brought our allies into it in a much more constructive, powerful way, so that when it comes time for a French election or a German election, the issue isn’t about America. It’s about how that country is doing in its war on terror. This is what we did during the Kosovo campaign by using NATO. As Prime Minister Blair told me during our one-on-one meeting on the 20th of April, ’99, he said, “The future of every government in Western Europe depends on the successful outcome of the campaign that NATO is waging against Slobodan Milosevic.”

But, you know, that’s not what’s happened in Europe today. Somehow, we’ve become divided from Europe. So I would have focused on al-Qaeda. I would have used the United Nations and NATO against al-Qaeda. Then I would have drawn NATO into it. Then when it comes time to work against Iraq, or Iran, or North Korea, you’ve got a strong, committed group of allies. As long as the United States stands with Europe, we can move the world. When we become at odds across the Atlantic, everything becomes more difficult.