Reply #26: Here's something that supports the proposition that the House can defer [View All]

[eomer]

to state proceedings if it so chooses:

STANDARD FOR JUDGING A MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON DEFERENCE TO STATE PROCEEDINGS
Mr. Rose also sought dismissal of Anderson's Notice based on Mr. Anderson's alleged decision to forego state law remedies. Congress has repeatedly held that it will follow either state laws or decisions of state courts unless the laws or decisions are unsound. H. Rep. 202, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., Carney v. Smith, at 2586 (1914); see also 6 Clarence Cannon, `Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States' Ch. 162 Sec. 91, 92 (1935) (quoted in H. Rep. 760, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Kyros v. Emery, at 6 (1975)). This determination was upheld by the Supreme Court in a case involving a Senate election, Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972), and has been made by numerous state courts, including the Supreme Court of North Carolina. See H. Rep. 760, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Kyros v. Emery, at 8 (citing cases) (1975); Britt v. Board of Comm'rs, 90 S.E. 1005, 1007 (N.C. 1916). This deference to sound decisions applies to statutes, rulings concerning particular issues of ballot interpretation, and to the final determination of the winner of an election if reversed by rulings on disputed ballots. See, e.g., 2 Lewis Deschler, `Deschler's Precedent', Ch. 9 57.3, 591. (1978) (discussing Oliver v. Hale, H. Rep. 2482, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1958), and Roush or Chambers, H. Rep. 513, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961)).

Although the House's constitutional responsibility to fairly judge the elections and returns of members is not limited by state law or state judicial decision, Mr. Rose correctly pointed out that the House has traditionally treated with respect state election laws and related legal process. 36

[Footnote] In general, deference to state law and procedures is a fair, just, and appropriate procedure for the House.

[Footnote 36: It is clear that this House tradition was grossly breached in the handling of the McCloskey-McIntyre contest. See H. Rep. 58, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., McCloskey v. McIntyre, at 45-58 (1985) (dissenting views).]

It appears to the Committee that Mr. Anderson did indeed seek state relief by his filing of his state complaint a month before the Notice of Contest was submitted. As discussed above, the state Board of Elections certified Mr. Rose's election only under very unusual circumstances. Moreover, the board left open the question of reconsidering the matter once the SBI had completed its investigation. As that investigation was not completed until long after the deadline for filing a contest under the FCEA, Mr. Anderson properly chose to proceed along two tracks.

Once the SBI report was completed and arrangements made for the Task Force to review its contents, staff and consultants to the Task Force reviewed the material. In large part, the Committee's decision in this matter has indeed been guided by the actions and conclusions of the SBI on particular matters raised by Mr. Anderson. Although neither the SBI or the SBE nor any state court has issued a formal review of the results of the election at this time, it is clear that North Carolina authorities are not likely to alter the result of the election. As the Committee has relied generally on the state investigation, has not conducted any independent investigation (except for the field hearing), and has not disturbed the conclusions that Mr. Rose won the election, the Committee indeed has upheld state proceedings. 37

[Footnote]

[Footnote 37: At the same time, however, as noted above, the House has the authority to arrive at its own conclusions on any particular issue affecting the validity of a ballot or return. The SBI report in some respects was clearly flawed or unreliable and the Committee disagrees with these flawed conclusions, even though these issues are not significant enough to deny the Motion to Dismiss.]

http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/T?&report=hr852&dbname=104&