Declassified NIE Does Not Mention Uranium Procurement [View All]

[Torn_Scorned_Ignored]

The declassified portions of the National Intelligence Estimate from October, 2002 does not mention attempts to procure uranium from Africa.

http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_cr/h072103.html

...Although we assess that Saddam does not yet have nuclear
weapons or sufficient material to make any, he remains intent
on acquiring them. Most agencies assess that Baghdad started
reconstituting its nuclear program about the time that UNSCOM
inspectors departed--December 1998.
How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon
depends on when it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile
material.
If Baghdad acquires sufficient fissile material from abroad
it could make a nuclear weapon within several months to a
year.
Without such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not
be able to make a weapon until 2007 to 2009, owing to
inexperience in building and operating centrifuge facilities
to produce highly enriched uranium and challenges in
procuring the necessary equipment and expertise.

If this document was declassified for the purpose of "the public's right to know" about the Niger connection, Niger or Africa are not in this document. Did Libby disclose information that actually was classified? Are we being lied to again?

More from the NIE:
...Most agencies believe that Saddam's personal interest in
and Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain high-strength
aluminum tubes for centrifuge rotors--as well as Iraq's
attempts to acquire magnets, high-speed balancing machines,
and machine tools--provide compelling evidence that Saddam is
reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for Baghdad's
nuclear weapons program. (DOE agrees that reconstitution of
the nuclear program is underway but assesses that the tubes
probably are not part of the program.)
Iraq's efforts to re-establish and enhance its cadre of
weapons personnel as well as activities at several suspect
nuclear sites further indicate that reconstitution is
underway.


State/INR Alternative View

. . . acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq may be doing so, but
INR considers the available evidence inadequate to support
such a judgment. Lacking persuasive evidence that Baghdad has
launched a coherent effort to reconstitute its nuclear
weapons program, INR is unwilling to speculate that such an
effort began soon after the departure of UN inspectors or to
project a timeline for the completion of activities it does
not now see happening. As a result, INR is unable to predict
when Iraq could acquire a nuclear device or weapon.