Reply #98: Here's the whole thing. It isn't copyrighted so it should be available to copy & paste. [View All]

[OmmmSweetOmmm]

Recall, it's CIA that was sharing info with the EU on the rendition; and Plame was retaliated against by OVP: and the OVP blocking the archivist audit. Addington knew about the European Detention centers.Not getting info on the naval-based detention centers.

Recall, Iran-Contra was an NSC-run operation: Cheney was involved. Could be the same kid of thing -- something run out of NSC, not the DoJ or NSA. Not clear that the "NSA" vs "NSC" is a typo: Suspect its different: NSC, not NSA, appears to be running these things.

Recall DoJ met with the intelligence personnel at various sports facilitates in DC. Keep thinking Plame and Cheney were about sending a message to Cheney' private intelligence network -- likely linked through Halliburton -- to send a message: "Plame outing" is what will happen if you crosss the VP. Seems to simplistic to say this is only about oil, and retaliating against others who spill the beans. Libby's name was mentioned in the context of "basketball," another program -- that came up during the Grand Jury reviews; his counsel was worried Fitzgerald had access to NSA-GCHQ-intercepted information of legal counsel.
. . .

Philbin was former OLC, meaning he probably clashed with Addington on the legal aspects of Rendition/prisoner abuse as well. Philbin documented his concerns, which the Congress can ask for since those memoranda and their existence on this subject have been disclosed. Mentioning Philbin may have been merely a suggestion of which people/memoranda to specifically ask for.
Philbin was aware of the "security" issues of GTMO; and likely would have been involved with discussions in detaining prisoners in Eastern Europe.

1. Support Aspect: NSA resources supporting, or outsourced
"NSA" or "NSC" program doesn't necessarily have to mean just data interception, but _use_ and _support_ of other activities: Combat, intelligence analysis, interrogation, or direct support for the CIA. Problem NSA and DOJ have is when CIA -- possibly connected with this "other program" -- have talked to the EU. EU may have more information about this "other program" than the Congress has been directly told or understands.

2. Direct reporting to NSC, outside Congressional oversight
IF this is an NSA "program" it could be a support function for the NSC, or one of the combatant commanders; or made to _look_ that way to hide the real objective of the activity. They may have classified it as an "NSA Program" to bury its real objective as a domestic-CIA-cover action program, which is illegal, an "open secret" but explained away as a "training program" like Operation Falcon: Use of Federal resources at the local level for training, manning support, and domestic intelligence gathering in conjunction with CIFA.

3. Posse Comitatus
This could be a special access program within DoD that is a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, hidden as an "NSA program" but a domestic security force backed by combat forces/special forces units which have the power to issue arrest warrants, detain people, and target those who oppose the illegal activities.

4. Individual Cells, untraceable, multi-agency
I haven't seen anything to suggest that the President could not, through DoD and CIFA, establish a Gestapo-like "NSA program" within the DoD community, and then outsource this to local law enforcement -- JTTF. They've got people that cross flow between the guard units, local law enforcement, FBI, and to civilian jobs all day. They could be creating individual cells within JTTF units that are comprised of NSC contractors, data analysis, and law enforcement whose sole goal is to act as a direct reporting entity to the NSC. They could very well be reporting directly to people working for Cheney, and Congress and JCS might never realize who or what was actually assigned, or relying on DoD assets.

5. DoD Entities With Personnel Assigned Stateside
DoD could ery well have created "foreign entities" in other countries, who then are in charge of these personnel stationed in the US. DoD was given this power to establish foreign intelligence and combat support entities overseas; however, if that's mutated, the NSC may have subcontracted to these DoD entities US-based personnel who directly support NSC: In effect, creating an NSC-NSA support function under DoD foreign entities, but basing their contractors in the US..

SUMMARY
Mueller appears to be referring to a sub-contracted effort which indirectly supports the NSC with a special domestic security unit. These units engage in direct engagement with state-side personnel and civilians. Contractors, law enforcement, and intelligence personnel are assigned under non-direct-NSC-NSA units, but are hidden inside commercial entities. The groups appear capable of moving quickly, with no direct supervision, but act as internal security forces, completely outside FISA oversight. They appear to be entities unrelated to FISA, but are front line units which verify information, gather intelligence domestically, and help NSC pinpoint targets which NSC contractors are assigned.

RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Congress examine the Operation Falcon; determine which NSA/NSC personnel were assigned to oversee.
B. Examine the budget lines inside the DOD foreign entities support accounts; and determine which banks are used to challenge those funds. Determine how the DOD funds are funnelled overseas through the NSC entities, then back to the US to these individual groups.
C. Review the "investigative leads" and ground rules JTTF and local law enforcement use to dissuade detection of the domestic intelligence gathering efforts.
D. Review the destruction logs of the CIFA; and determine who was supposed to keep the logs related to these classified documents.
Determine which signalling systems, monitoring, and other intelligence gathering the JTTF are using; and where this information is sent. Ultimately, it winds up somewhere: Which contractors, NSC staffers have access to these reports.
E. Examine with Congressional Counsel whether it is the intent that these domestic security services operate this way; and whether, as FISA is written, this type of activity would fall outside what the FISA Court can engage.
F. Review the DHS domestic interrogation facilities. Look at the gas mileage for the DHS pick up teams. Review the files they've had access to; and the basis for detaining someone. Review the complaints of citizens being forcibly removed from their cars, engines running, or being taken from their homes while school children are present in the early morning. Evidence includes car impound fees.
G. Discuss with POST and local LE efforts used to dissuade public awareness of intelligence gathering: Excuses given to hide pre-textual stops; and examine whether local officials do or do not keep adequate records related to officer complaints and requests for civilian oversight to examine officer misconduct.
H. Examine problems during audits: To what extent officers in LE, FBI, and DHS are concerned when reports of officer misconduct arise; and what methods auditors are aware to segregate complaints about officer misconduct from auditors:

1. Have they been asked to leave the room; were concerns explained away; were officers complaining they were "short manned" an unable to supervise; and how do these explanations square with the officer conduct.
2. How often are these units employed to provoke innocent civilians to respond to abuse?
3. To what extent are these domestic units used to harass civilians based on a "hunch"?
4. Would these units put the children of minors at risk to entrap a suspected target?
5. Is there no report of any of these personnel ever exposing a minor to a potentially unsafe situation to engage a target?
6. Has the FISA court, Congress, and Judiciary been fully apprised of how these units operate; their procedures; and oversight requirement to ensure 42 USC 1983 claims are minimized?
7. What insurance do these units have if they are engaged in liable action?
Posted by:
Date: July 27, 2007 5:37 PM