Yet starting in 2000, Karimov's stream of advice stopped for a time, perhaps because matters took a turn for the worse in Uzbekistan itself. Suddenly, the government noticed that foreign debt had reached $5 billion, that standards of living were declining dramatically and that foreign direct investment had shrunk significantly. Finally, since 2001, the Uzbek government has been experiencing a severe budget crisis, as income from exports and taxes has fallen. Despite a good cotton harvest in 2004 and favorable world market conditions for cotton, Uzbekistan's main export commodity, the state is still struggling to make ends meet.
To combat the crisis, a state of economic and political emergency was declared. While Karimov scorned shock therapy as a way to transform the command economy into a market economy in the early '90s, by 2002 he was forced to implement it himself, although in altered form. To stabilize the national currency and eventually make it convertible, the state imposed draconian fiscal measures. A war began against private trade, which the government saw as the main source of the shrinking state budget and the eroding national currency.
"Reform" measures were far from civilized: Goods were confiscated from market stalls, pensions and salaries long went unpaid, and legal bank accounts were frozen. Naturally, business' response was to move into the informal sector or escape to neighboring countries where conditions were more conducive to private business. As a result, the tax base continued to shrink and tax revenues decline. Things became so bad that private banks were ordered by the government to sell vodka in order to increase the flow of cash into state coffers. Bankers had no choice but to turn to mafia bosses dealing in shady money.
Shock therapy in its Uzbek form, with its heavy emphasis on tough administrative repression, led to widespread public discontent. The explosions in Tashkent and Bukhara earlier this year and the massive public unrest in the markets of Kokand, Bukhara and other cities this November are the first signs that the system is crumbling. The Uzbek model, once so attractive to some of the country's neighbors and even to Russian presidents, is not looking nearly so promising today. Uzbekistan is seen as less and less stable socially and politically. If the authorities have managed to stay in power, it is due not to a social contract as it was until recently, when elites controlled exports while small businesses controlled the bazaars. Authorities are increasingly turning to force and fear to stay on top.
The recent sensational announcement by Karimov that the death penalty might be suspended in Uzbekistan should not lead anyone astray. This is merely another smoke screen meant to secure the goodwill of the world community as parliamentary elections approach on Dec. 24. These elections will be neither free nor fair. Karimov has made similar pacifying statements in the past regarding torture, but the proposed reforms never got beyond talk and official commissions. There is no other possibility: The regime, as never before, needs to keep the public afraid to keep it obedient. Thus, the regime must talk human rights while continuing brutal scare tactics.
Yet what in the end moved Karimov to start giving advice once again to his colleagues from the former socialist camp? This turn can be explained in part by his ambitious personality. Authoritarian rulers who have grown too accustomed to power and who have surrounded themselves with sycophants and yes men soon lose touch with reality and lose the ability to consider their own actions objectively.
This personality trait is coupled with another, very serious circumstance. Recently, Karimov has been emboldened by his notably expanded audience, an audience that pretends to listen to the Uzbek leader's bits of wisdom. This audience consists mainly of partners from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, where Uzbekistan has been granted a place of honor completely incommensurate with its economic potential. Karimov is gaining more significance from the emerging conflict between Russia and China the on one hand and the United States on the other for influence in Uzbekistan.
The United States has suddenly found itself tied to its military base located in southern Uzbekistan. This base backs up and supplies the U.S. troops in Afghanistan. To all appearances, the United States has also linked the base to various long-term plans as part of a new strategic outlook. U.S. officials need the base as a way of stemming the swelling tide of Chinese and Russian military and economic might.
In this new Great Game being played in Central Asia, the geopolitical stakes in Uzbekistan are rising fast. The superpowers, fighting for control of Uzbekistan, are setting their pride aside and trying to make friends with Karimov. Russia has already pushed the problem of the Russian population in Uzbekistan into the background, much as it has in Turkmenistan. China is pretending not to notice the U.S. base in Khanabad. The United States needs to keep criticism of the repressive Uzbek regime's human rights record under wraps.
How long will Karimov succeed in playing the superpowers off each other? The answer to this question may hinge on the disturbing inconsistencies of Uzbekistan's increasing international clout compared to its stunted economic potential. This contradiction is laying the groundwork for increased instability.
The Uzbek regime, in its pursuit of rewards in return for its loyalty, will be forced to increase its pendulum-like swing between the various geopolitical centers. This in the end could well get on its patrons' nerves, as they want to see a more predictable and manageable leader in Uzbekistan. All parties will cultivate their own proteges in the elite, the military, the security agencies, the media and among the public at large. While this may seem highly unlikely today, tomorrow could bring a civil war of the kind that has turned many African conflicts into bloodbaths. Naturally, this would bode nothing but ill for the Uzbek people.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2004/12/20/006.htmlwow.
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