(Lever?)Voting machines may be history (need paper trail)

[papau]

http://news.newstimeslive.com/story.php?id=74485&category=Local

Voting machines may be history
Federal panel finds Connecticut's lever booths inaccessible to the disabled, prone to error
By Fred Lucas
THE NEWS-TIMES

Connecticut's voting machines are prone to error, and lack accessibility for disabled and non-English speaking voters.
Because of that finding by a federal panel, the state's 3,500 lever machines could be junked before the 2006 election.<snip>

Though the commission's rulings do not have the force of legislative decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that administrative commissions carry deferential weight when courts interpret laws.

EAC spokeswoman Jeanie Layson said it's up to the U.S. Department of Justice to decide whether to enforce the ruling. A U.S. Justice Department spokesman on voting matters reached Thursday said he would research the decision, but did not call back and could not be reached later for comment.

The EAC decision faulted lever machines for not having a permanent paper record for "audit capacity" of votes.

Also, the machines do not have a documented test to show they have an error rate of less than one in 500,000. Further, the machines are not accessible to the handicapped, and have no alternate language accessibility. <snip>

http://news.newstimeslive.com/story.php?id=74485&category=Local

[whistle]

1. Alright, so are Diebold and other touch screen electronic voting

....machines going to be thrown out onto the streets and run over with a steam-roller? Let's see some action instead of all the talk.:yoiks:

[Autumn Colors]

2. I sent my email off

to the Secretary of State already.

Anyone else from CT here??

[papau]

7. Good Question - the current BBV waiver seems even less "logical"

or with only one one state – Nevada – having an electronic voting machine with a contemporaneous paper record law, do we still need the proposed Federal paper trail law “Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2005” (H.R. 550 -a modified version of an unpassed bill in the prior Congress (H.R. 2239) -sponsored by Representative Rush Holt (D-NJ) with 135 co-sponsors in the House, almost all of them Democrats. Also the bill would require that the Election Assistance Commission (“EAC”) conduct a manual recount of two percent of all precincts in the country in each general election. At least one precinct per county would be recounted. This would impose an enormous burden on the EAC, requiring unprecedented coordination among federal, state and local election officials, but would have only modest benefits. ). ?

United States Election Assistance Commission
1225 New York Avenue N.W.
Washington, DC 20005
July 20, 2005

EAC Advisory 2005-004: How to determine if a voting system is compliant with Section 301(a) – a gap analysis between 2002 Voting System Standards and the requirements of Section 301(a)
The United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has received a number of inquiries from several states as to whether one or more particular voting systems comply with Section 301(a) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). In addition, in one of its recent public meetings, EAC was asked to conduct an analysis to identify the gaps between the 2002 Voting System Standards adopted by the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and the requirements for voting systems under Section 301(a) of HAVA. EAC is not required by HAVA to preclear or approve voting systems purchased by states and local election jurisdictions. Furthermore, EAC does not believe that it was the intention of Congress or HAVA for EAC to assume this role. However, it is evident that states and local election jurisdictions as well as testing laboratories are in need of information that will help in determining whether a voting system meets the threshold requirements of Section 301(a). Thus, EAC offers the follwing analysis of Section 301(a) in light of the 2002 Voting System Standards.

Title III of HAVA, entitled “Uniform and Nondiscriminatory Election Technology and Administration Requirements,” imposes certain requirements upon states and local jurisdictions conducting federal elections. Section 301(a) sets forth the standards that voting systems must meet after January 1, 2006. Those requirements include functions and features that, among other things: (1) allow the voter to review his or her selections privately and independently prior to casting a ballot; (2) allow the voter to change his or her selections privately and independently prior to casting a ballot; (3) notify the voter when he or she has made more selections in a single race than are permitted (overvote); (4) provide for the production of a permanent paper record suitable to be used in a manual recount; (5) provide voters with disabilities, including visual disabilities, the same opportunity for access and participation (including privacy and independence) as for other voters; (6) provide accessibility in minority languages for voters with limited English proficiency as required by the Voting Rights Act of 1965; and (7) provide for an error rate in operating the voting system that is no greater than the error rate set forth in Section 3.2.1 of the 2002 Voting System Standards adopted by the Federal Election Commission (FEC).

Although the 2002 Voting System Standards set forth measurable standards that predict compliance with some of the Section 301(a) requirements, those standards do not provide sufficient and adequate guidance as to what is required to meet the accessibility requirements of Section 301(a)(3); do not prescribe testable measures for language accessibility required by Section 301(a)(4) of HAVA; and do not prescribe standards that adequately explain the requirements for overvote notification required by Section 301(a)(1) of HAVA. As such, EAC issues the following policy statement to identify the gaps between the 2002 Voting System Standards and the requirements set forth under Section 301(a) of HAVA and to explain what is needed to meet the requirements of Section 301(a) above and beyond the testing requirements established in the 2002 Voting System Standards.

Section 301(a)(1):

The requirements of Section 301(a)(1) of HAVA are met if the voting system (1) conforms and complies with Section 2.4.3.3 of the 2002 Voting System Standards and (2) notifies the voter through a visual and/or audio message prior to casting the ballot when the voter makes more selections than are legally allowed in a single race or contest (overvote):

(a) that an overvote has occurred and
(b) the effect of overvoting.

Following that notification, the voting system must allow the voter to change his or her selection(s), if so desired. Voting systems that preclude and prohibit overvoting meet this requirement. Notwithstanding the above, certain paper ballot voting systems may meet the overvote requirements of Section 301(a)(1)(A)(iii) of HAVA by meeting the requirements set forth in Section 301(a)(1)(B).

Section 301(a)(2):

The requirements of Section 301(a)(2) of HAVA are met if the voting system conforms and complies with Sections 2.2.5.2.1 and 2.5.3.1 of the 2002 Voting System Standards.

Section 301(a)(3):

Section 301(a)(3) of HAVA requires that by January 1, 2006, at least one voting system in each polling place be accessible to persons with disabilities such that the voting system allows an individual with a disability the same access and opportunity to vote privately and independently as is afforded a non-disabled voter. Compliance with Section 301(a)(3) requires that the voting system is accessible to persons with disabilities as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act, including physical, visual, and cognitive disabilities, such that the disabled individual can privately and independently receive instruction, make selections, and cast a ballot. However, accessibility involves more than the technical features of the voting system. The accessible voting system also must be used in a manner that is consistent with providing access for disabled voters (e.g., the accessible voting system must be set up for use in a space that is accessible to a disabled voter who uses a wheelchair).

Conformance with Section 301(a)(3) is a complex matter, which must take into account the disability of the voter, the advancement of technology and its availability, and the efforts of the elections officials to make the voting process accessible to disabled voters in a private and independent manner. The following are some factors that must be considered in determining accessibility in conformance with Section 301(a)(3) of HAVA:

(1) Section 2.2.7 of the 2002 Voting System Standards;
(2) Section 2.4.3.1 (a) of the 2002 Voting System Standards;
(3) Section 3.4.9 (a-e) of the 2002 Voting System Standards;
(4) The voting system must afford a disabled voter the ability to perform the same functions (e.g., receiving and reading the ballot, making selections, reviewing selections, changing selections, and casting the final ballot) as are afforded to a non-disabled voter. These functions may be provided to the disabled voter through features of the voting system that are different than those used by non-disabled voters. The disabled voter need not and in many cases cannot have an identical voting experience as a non-disabled voter (e.g., a voter with a visual disability is afforded the same access to reading the ballot as a sighted voter when the ballot is read to the visually disabled voter using an audio component of the voting system).
(5) Accessibility of the voting system to the voter includes accessibility to all equipment needed to cast and count ballots. Many jurisdictions use a paper ballot voting system that requires the voter to submit his or her own ballot after casting for purposes of ballot counting. Where such voting systems are in use, such jurisdictions must to the extent reasonably and technologically possible afford a disabled voter the same ability to submit his or her own ballot, in a private and independent manner, as is afforded a non-disabled voter. In this example, visually disabled voters must be allowed to submit the ballot independently, as the disability is one that is capable of being accommodated, and technology and practice provide a means that can be used to allow the visually disabled voter to submit a ballot with the same degree of privacy and independence afforded to a sighted voter (e.g., a privacy sleeve).
(6) There may be certain disabled voters whose disabilities prevent them from voting independently (i.e., without assistance from a person of their choosing or a poll worker). While HAVA requires voting systems to allow independence and privacy, it does not preclude a disabled voter from requesting and obtaining the assistance of another person as provided in Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
(7) Section 301(a)(3)(B) contemplates that an accessible voting system can include a direct recording electronic (DRE) voting system or other voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities. This advisory should not be read to preclude the innovation and use of accessible voting systems other than DREs for purposes of meeting this requirement.

[Peace Patriot]

3. I don't quite understand this. What are "lever booths"?

Into 'Boston Harbor' with Diebold and ES&S election theft machines, I say! (--but a bulldozer running over them would be gratifying, too.)

[LostinVA]

4. You push a little lever next to the name of the person

You want to vote for, and the machine tallies it. I haven't used once in about 15 years.

[Paradise]

5. it's a lever voting-machine, on a stand, surrounded by a closeable curtain

you enter this lever voting-machine booth;

you pull a large lever left-to-right, across the bottom of the machine, to close the curtains;

you pull small individual levers down, on the printed-face of the machine, to vote (can easily be confusing as to whether you are levering for above or below candidates);

you pull that same first large-lever right-to-left, back across, to open the curtains, to register your vote, and to clear the small levers for the next voter;

you leave with nothing but a glowing pride that you have exercised your democratic right-to-vote, and a paradoxical sinking-feeling that you have no idea where your vote is nor how it may be counted...

[Bill Bored]

10. I feel sorry for anyone who has never had the pleasure of voting in one.nt

[robbedvoter]

6. We vote this way in NYC. Efficient, trustworthy, easy recounts.

When THEY go. I'll officially be deprived of my voting rights (not just by it being cancelled by fraud in other states)

[hedda_foil]

8. Sweetie, the lever machines have always been hacked.

Not only do they not produce a paper trail, but it's incredibly easy to change or shave the vote. Big city bosses loved them because of that. Just because New Yorkers and Pennsylvanians seem to be convinced that they're reliable doesn't mean that they are. They're anythin BUT. The reason opscans and punch cards exist is that lever machines were so fraud-prone and unreliable ... and that they didn't produce a verifiable paper trail. The VVPB battle has been fought before ... over lever machines. Now those same machines, that still exist in some states, are not only as crappy as ever, but they don't even produce replacement parts anymore.

[loudsue]

11. Spot on, hedda_foil...

If we don't get rid of the corruption in our elections, we'll NEVER get rid of the republican machine...not before we're all destroyed, anyway.

:kick::kick::kick:

[Bill Bored]

12. I dare anyone to hack 20,000 of 'em with a click of a mouse though! nt

[Wilms]

9. More discussion in ERD

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=203x393822