Union Leader Says Staffing Shortage, FAA Led To Near Miss

[Omaha Steve]

Full story: http://www.aero-news.net/index.cfm?ContentBlockID=97032f46-151c-49aa-b469-21122e35e805




Union Leader Says Staffing Shortage, FAA Led To Near Miss

Thu, 27 Jul '06
Ground Warning System Not Fully Active
Manpower shortages and budget-cuts are to blame for Sunday's very close call on the runway at Chicago's O'Hare Airport... at least, that's how the National Air Traffic Controllers Association sees it.

Local NATCA chief Joe Bellino says there's no doubt that FAA staffing policies were at the root of the near miss between a United 737 and an Atlas Air 747 freighter.

Officials say the United flight had been cleared to take off on Runway 27 Left at around 10 Sunday night. At the same time... the Atlas 747 was cleared to cross the active.

Bellino says the controller handling both aircraft was notified of the conflict by a colleague. He managed to get a warning out to both crews and the 737 climbed over the 747... missing it by as little as 200 feet.

[warrens]

1. Holy shit

Thank god that pilot could react so quickly. 200 feet ain't nothing.

[acmejack]

2. Think it gave the passengers on that side of the 747 a thrill?

They all see a 737 bearing down upon them at takeoff speed 80 yards away! All the window seats on that side of the aircraft must have donuts punched out of the cushions!

[w4rma]

3. It would seem that this would be major national news.

But I guess it doesn't support the GOP agenda of destroying American systems.

[DemoTex]

4. MercurioATC is the DU resident air traffic control expert.

I'm hoping MercuioATC knows a little more about this incident than this sketchy article provides.

The first question that pops up in my mind is: What was the weather? If visibility was no factor, both flight deck crews should have been situationally aware of everything happening on or near that active runway.

Upon receiving takeoff clearance, the B-737 should have turned on all available exterior lighting (especially the ultra-bright landing lights), and any aircraft operating near the active (especially with a clearance to cross the active runway) should have been keenly aware of any aircraft on final approach for landing or on the runway (or taxiing into position) for takeoff. Likewise, the pilots of the aircraft with takeoff clearance should be keenly aware of down-field ground traffic (be it aircraft, snow-plows, fire trucks, etc.) that might, potentially, cross that runway.

If an aircraft or vehicle does pull out onto an active runway in front of an aircraft on takeoff roll, it might be better to horse the departing aircraft into the air prematurely (prior to Vr) with firewall thrust to avoid a potential high-speed collision on the runway. This scenario is in most airlines' simulator training syllabi.

A potential runway disaster between a US Airways jet and a United jet was averted, a few years back, during extremely low visibility (RVR<1000ft, CAT IIIA), night operations at Providence, RI. The alert US Airways first officer was monitoring the ground control frequency (not required, but a good idea in low-vis operations) as the tower cleared the US Airways B-737 for takeoff (on tower frequency). The US Airways first officer was aware that a United B-757 was taxiing - LOST! - on the airport. The US Airways pilots refused the takeoff clearance. Ends up, the wandering United B-757 was indeed on the runway from which US Air had been cleared for takeoff. Had they rolled, the US Air pilots would have been right .. dead right.

[Omaha Steve]

5. Video news on close call

This is the fifth close call at O’Hare International Airport THIS YEAR.

http://cbs2chicago.com/local/local_story_206062822.html

[DemoTex]

6. Atlas landing on 14R, UAL departing 27L. Crossing runway operations.

Simultaneous crossing runway operations are fraught with peril, especially at night. "Land-and-hold-short operations" (LASHO) are fraught with peril, especially at night.

Evidently, the Atlas Air Boeing 747 cargo jet was landing on runway 14R at ORD. Runway 14R is 13,000 feet long. Runway 14R's LASHO distance is 9800 feet, or plenty long for a landing B-747. Runway 27L, the departure runway in this case, is 10,141 feet long. The departing UAL B-737 had 6500 feet of usable runway length between the proximal runway end and the intersection with runway 14R. That nautical mile (plus) of pavement probably saved a bunch of lives.

Was Atlas Air issued a LASHO clearance? The tapes will tell. But an old ORD 20-9 runway chart in my flight bag has a circle (and "HS10") around the intersection of runways 14R and 27L. A box on the 20-9 chart identifies the circles as RUNWAY INCURSION HOT-SPOTS. The text in the box directs the pilot to 20-9A (flip side of 20-9) for description of runway incursion Hot Spots.

The 20-9A text describing HS10 reads: Landing traffic on runway 14R must hold short of departing 27L. A caveat notes that this is information only, not to be construed as ATC instructions. At the minimum, however, it should alert a pilot landing on 14R that a LASHO operation might be required. The captain has the prerogative of requesting that full runway length be made available if the situation requires it (anti-skid in-op, blown tires, etc).

Let's say that the Atlas Air B-747 did, indeed, receive and acknowledge a LASHO clearance for runway 14R (hold short of 27L). How does the flight crew of that B-747, especially at night, determine the hold short point on 14R to keep from violating 27L? Believe me, it is tough.

Some airports (DFW for one) have pulsating in-pavement white lights marking the ending threshold for LASHO operations. These white light bars are extremely effective and resolve all ambiguity as to the point where (or before which) the landing aircraft must be stopped. During LASHO that bar of pulsating white lights must be treated as the end of the landing runway.

However, many airports continue to conduct LASHO operations without light bars. It is a money thing with the FAA. Like cargo compartment fire detection and suppression, it usually takes a significant body-count (in that case, the crash of ValuJet 592 in the Everglades on May 11, 1996, killing 110) to get action. My old chart indicates that ORD had no light bars in 2001. I would be surprised if 14R had an operating LASHO light bar at the time of this incident.

On edit: A little more background on LAHSO:
http://www.alpa.org/easc/DesktopModules/ViewAnnDocument.aspx?DocumentID=2389

[DemoTex]

7. Correction: LAHSO (not LASHO)

I used LASHO and LAHSO. LAHSO is correct (Land And Hold Short Operations).