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Edited on Tue Dec-19-06 02:54 PM by necso
What one might expect to see in a civil war, considered with especial attention to Iraq (nb, the currents described in the following do not necessarily peak at the same time, which can make reading the state and stage of a civil war difficult):
a) Flight from the country of large numbers of people of all ages, but especially those who are not fit material for fighting. (Already significant in Iraq.)
b) The distress sale, loss, abandonment of property (professions). (Already significant in Iraq.)
c) Internal ethnic/sectarian/group (group: any collection of people unified in some way, deliberately or not, temporary or lasting, shifting or fixed) dislocations, relocations, "cleansings". (Already widespread in Iraq.)
It's time to talk a little geography. Different and opposing groups (those that will be separated) can be distributed in various ways (before and after separations; the nature of separation/distribution can change over time). That is, intermixing can be done on a relatively local basis (eg, neighborhoods within a city); a less-local basis (eg, neighboring cities or villages); a more-regional basis (eg, larger areas); or a regional basis (eg, complete, or nearly complete, provinces and large geographically separate areas).
And internal dislocation can change in nature as it progress. For example, starting off as a neighborhood affair and then progressing to where broad geographical areas are occupied only by a single group.
d) Violence in terms of the numbers of dead, wounded, tortured, mutilated. (Already taking place on a large scale in Iraq.)
e) Violence in terms of different geographical types of attacks (like for separation; the two typically take place together): ranging from attacks in mixed neighborhoods to battling for territories (perhaps historically considered as being owned by the group holding it) held by another group. (One imagines that local relocations/fighting would give way to more regional relocations/fighting as fighting progressed -- and that little (and maybe then large) islands of one group or the other would be driven out from broader areas.)
(There is violence taking place locally and less-locally certainly, and possibly at broader levels -- I don't have enough data to render this judgement.)
f) Violence in terms of types and numbers of the weapons and forces used, and the scale of individual fights. (Relatively small stuff is going on, but our forces by their presence and actions make large-scale fights (except for us and the Iraqi "security" forces) less feasible -- attacking large bodies of "troops" is a strength of our military, especially where these opponents lack the best defensive weapons and are in-movement and without fortifications.)
g) Something like de facto governments being setup and operated by different groups (specifically, these being (largely) outside the sway of the central government). (This is taking place, but the central government is so divided, that it's hard to call this one. However, this is the case to some extent.)
h) Fracture into regions, or the conquest of the country by one group. (De facto fracture is happening to some degree with the separation of the various groups.)
i) Assistance by outside forces to (and requests for such assistance by) one group or the other. (Happening, but largely informally.)
j) Actual, formal, physical-intervention by outside forces that results in foreign control of certain areas, if not the whole country (Who'd want Baghdad? ... At least once they'd had it a while. -- The oil is elsewhere.) (Ignoring us and our allies, this is a minor issue now.)
k) Deterioration of the infrastructure, especially other-than-local infrastructure. (Already taking place on a large scale in Iraq.)
l) Deterioration of government services, especially central government services. (Already taking place on a large scale in Iraq.)
m) Collapse of the central government. (What central government? It doesn't govern.)
...
Siege tactics (siege strategy):
The classic (pure) siege tactic is circumvallation (a fortified, manned "earthwork" (trees, rubble, concrete, etc, may be used) completely surrounding the target of the siege -- and completely cutting it off from access (from/by anything except air, weather, etc) in or out; a double circumvallation, incorporating an outer, outward-facing circumvallation around the inner, inner-facing circumvallation, and with fortified accommodations for the besieging troops in between, being the best form to completely isolate the target, as both sortieing troops and relief forces will face manned fortifications). (Typically, more active tactics like bombardment are (also) used in a siege.)
Of course, this sort of thing takes a great of resources and time to construct and man. So partial sieges of all sorts are used, ranging from the discomfitting or discomforting (to the besieged) to the effective cut-off of necessaries, but short of complete, physical isolation.
Siege tactics (and the strategy as a whole) rely on using sickness and suffering, pain and deprivation, to wear down the besieged, weakening their physical strength (and therefore probably their resolve), and causing them to surrender (perhaps, unconditionally), put up less of a fight when attacked, or abandon what they're protecting (where they can). (Attacks of various sorts can speed up this process.)
In the case of Baghdad, I've read things that might indicate that the Sunnis (non-Kurds) are trying to isolate the city with a ring of Sunni-held territory, in addition to (at least) interdicting things considered necessary for a modern city's functioning (like electricity), if not actually necessary for life.
However, there are many Sunnis in Baghdad, and this complicates the picture. Moreover, there are a large number of Shia in Baghdad, and large numbers that live elsewhere that could conceivably act to break any siege (although protecting Baghdad's electricity supply is a pretty tall order).
More generally, the civil war raging there is, and has been, shaped by the presence of our forces. Were these forces to leave -- or dramatically change strategies -- then the nature (and therefore form) of the conflict could change fairly rapidly and dramatically. However, it might take some time for the various players to realize what these changed circumstances mean -- and to act upon it.
...
Troop escalation to deal with the problem:
The number of combat troops involved in any possible escalation will be inadequate to accomplish anything worth the cost -- and, most likely, it will accomplish nothing net-positive and lasting. (Be the total number of troops deployed 20,000, 30,000, 50,000 or 150,000.)
And any such escalation will bring additional costs, additional casualties -- and greater isolation of the Iraqi central government from the consequences of their acts. Moreover, we just don't have the necessary troops, damage has already been done to our military (etc) that will take years to fix, and we risk much greater damage by pushing the military into something the High Command apparently doesn't favor (today, maybe; tomorrow, who knows?). (Mind you, I would support sending in additional forces to expedite our departure -- if this is what they are actually used for.)
Furthermore, policing a hostile population is not what the American Military is designed and prepared for. So, sure, we can kill those who resist our (massed) attacks -- but even if we had the troops to "hold" an area, at best they could just keep a lid on things until, inevitably, we must pull out. (Iraqi security forces just can't be trusted -- and are unlikely to become trustworthy in the foreseeable future.)
Moreover, when one considers the likely use of such escalated forces (going after al-Sadr, sooner or later), a big net-negative is the expected result.
The cowboys-in-charge just cannot bring themselves to realize that they've lost; and scorning anything but "clear victory", they'll bring us worse defeat.
...
A few random observations:
a) One of the big problems In Iraq is the (historical) intermingling of different communities and the volatile nature of local relocations (these can be only stepping-stones to broader relocations).
b) Another diaspora, lost land, etc, problem is being created with displaced Iraqis. (This is a familiar, unhappy and intractable problem.)
c) While sectarian (ethnic, tribal, etc) differences are the more visible ones, it's to the benefit of the oil producing regions to cut other Iraqis out -- leaving the Sunni and Shia in the middle of the country in poor economic shape. So the North and/or South may more-or-less just abandon the middle.
d) Sunnis (Iraqi and foreign) who are conducting terror attacks upon the Shia (especially attacking holy sites) are bringing upon Iraqi Sunnis retaliation that they aren't able to deal with. And this course fosters Shiite unity against the Sunnis, which is exactly what the Sunnis don't need (whether they're just trying to exist -- or if they're trying to take back control of the country, especially the latter.)
e) It's possible that if we stay long enough, the country will have divided itself along lines that can more-or-less hold (in effect, having gotten past the worst of the relocations while we were there -- and dividing Iraq into regions, debatably with more or less harm than otherwise).
f) Beating up on and disarming the Sunnis makes them less able to deal with Shia attacks (whether by Shia militias or security forces that are effectively Shia militias). And this also has the net effect of beating up on those who are nationalists.
g) We should aim for nationalists to dominate in Iraq, because the alternatives are worse (increased influence of certain other nations).
f) We face huge problems in dealing with Iraq domestically, because many players (political, establishment, media, etc) just don't want to deal with the outcome of their past foolishness and weakness. (And they really, really, want something good to happen in Iraq, even if this means grasping fruitlessly at straws.)
g) w has no plan for victory and is probably unable to bring himself to chart the best course among our remaining options (even if such a course keeps him from losing too much face, and shifts much of the responsibility for the outcome onto others) -- but he has defined defeat (leaving Iraq short of "victory": this unknown and uncharted course and end), so we probably won't be doing that, at least as long as w (or some other neocon -- say, Cheney or McCain (a late-bloomer)) is in charge.
h) It's possible that economics may eventually force a solution upon us -- together with a whole new level of war-costs (eg, a depression, collapse of the dollar, etc).
i) Afghanistan is looking worse and worse, in no small part because the demands of the Iraq "war" eat into the available resources (that and things like the neocons not understanding that you have to make people's lives better -- not just spurt ideology and propaganda while empowering and enriching yourselves and your cronies).
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N.b., where wasn't specified.
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