http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/fisher-louis2.htm This relates to this story.......
In Chapter 4, Fisher reviews the manner by which the U.S. Supreme Court had become involved in the case of the German saboteurs. After the district court had rejected the request to review whether the military court was properly constituted, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments on July 29 and 30. The next day, July 31, 1942, the Court issued a short per curium opinion upholding the constitutionality of the proclamation. It took until October 29 for the Court to complete a full written opinion explaining their decision. Because the majority of the saboteurs were executed on August 8, Chief Justice Stone believed it was critical to have a unanimous opinion to justify the government's action. Although such support was eventually achieved, several justices expressed misgivings about the matter. The final holding in EX PARTE QUIRIN
(1942) upheld the chief executive's authority to create the military tribunal and distinguished the circumstances of the case from that of EX PARTE MILLIGAN (1866), where the Court determined that President Lincoln's use of a military tribunal to prosecute a U.S. citizen during the Civil War was unconstitutional.
Chapter 5 relays the immediate reaction to the EX PARTE QUIRIN decision and how it affected subsequent court rulings on the application of military tribunals. As opposed to the positive public response to the Supreme Court's decree, the academic and legal community opposed the holding. In later reflections on the case, Justice Felix Frankfurter stated that the "Quirin experience was not a happy precedent;" while Justice William Douglas found it "extremely undesirable to announce a decision on the merits without an opinion accompanying it." Fisher finds that throughout World War II, U.S. "federal courts largely deferred to executive and military authorities" (p.144) and that the "broad scope given to military trials did not begin to narrow until 1955" (p.156). After nearly fifty years, the specter of military tribunals "seemed quaint if not antiquated" (p.159). But the events of September 11, 2001 changed that, reviving the issue as it pertained to punishing those who provided assistance to the terrorist attacks against America. The authorization of military tribunals by the George W. Bush administration followed closely the precedent set by Franklin Roosevelt as far as the admission of evidence, vote required for conviction and sentencing, and the procedure for review. Congressional hearings and an American Bar Association Task Force questioned the expansiveness of President Bush's directive.
Fisher contends that the creation of the military tribunal by President Roosevelt in the German saboteurs incident was "deeply flawed" (p.172) and that the United States seems to be duplicating the mistakes that led to the expedient execution of most of the aforementioned participants. He clearly regards EX PARTE QUIRIN as a precedent not worth repeating, but one that must "be understood within the context of American constitutional law, the relations between Congress and the President, and the tradition of an independent judiciary" (p.175).