NYT: CIA Had Only Very Little Data on Iraq Arms, Ex-Inspector Says

[kskiska]

WASHINGTON, Jan. 25 — American intelligence agencies failed to detect that Iraq's unconventional weapons programs were in a state of disarray in recent years under the increasingly erratic leadership of Saddam Hussein, the C.I.A.`s former chief weapons inspector said in an interview late Saturday.

The inspector, David A. Kay, who led the government's efforts to find evidence of Iraq's illicit weapons programs until he resigned on Friday, said the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies did not realize that Iraqi scientists had presented ambitious but fanciful weapons programs to Mr. Hussein and had then used the money for other purposes.

Dr. Kay also reported that Iraq attempted to revive its efforts to develop nuclear weapons in 2001 and 2002, but never got as far toward making a bomb as Iran and Libya did.

He said Baghdad was actively working to produce a biological weapon using the poison ricin until the American invasion last March. But in general, Dr. Kay said, the C.I.A. and other agencies failed to recognize that Iraq had all but abandoned its efforts to produce large quantities of chemical or biological weapons after the first Persian Gulf war, in 1991.

more…
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/26/international/middleeast/26KAY.html?hp

[pinkpops]

1. duh

[Amager]

2. I'll just bet they failed to recognize Iraq had all but abandoned it's

efforts to produce chemical or biological weapons. Sure.

[Pax Argent]

3. I'd love to see his proof regarding projects

like, say, working weapons? How about facilities to actually create any of this? A little something to show that all of the lives and dollars lost in this little soiree are worth it.

In regards to Kay's statements on the CIA's information, O'Neill says the same thing in his book. The intelligence agencies had suspicions and theories, but precious little actual data regarding existing programs. That didn't stop the Warchimp from getting his precious war in a proper timetable to declare victory in time for the 2004 elections.

Now it seems that Saddam merely had intentions to pursue programs of weapons of mass destruction while his advisors and scientists were scamming him?

I sometimes have trouble working through the contempt I have for these people.

:mad:

[radwriter0555]

4. That's RIGHT. THE MAJORITY of the lies on iraq come from RUMSFELD

and his pack of crap 1998 Security Commission Report as WELL as the pack of crap lies concocted by the PNAC on their website.

THANK you for proving once again that rumsfeld and the felons in the bushco are the assholes in charge of ALL the lies on iraq.

[Barrett808]

5. CIA won't take the fall -- expect more leaks!

Or so we may hope.

[ElsewheresDaughter]

6. "Ofifce of Special Plans" is responsible for false/bad Intel NOT the CIA

Kay is also doing the blame Clenis routine in defense of bad intel
:grr: :grr: :grr:
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/wot/iraq/office_of_special_plans.html

“They were a pretty shadowy presence. Normally when you compile an intelligence document, all the agencies get together to discuss it. The OSP was never present at any of the meetings I attended.” - Gregory Thielmann, a senior official in the state department's intelligence

"That office was charged with collecting, vetting and disseminating intelligence completely outside of the normal intelligence apparatus. In fact, it appears that information collected by this office was in some instances not even shared with established intelligence agencies and in numerous instances was passed on to the national security council and the president without having been vetted with anyone other than political appointees"- Democratic congressman David Obey

Soon after September 11, a small intelligence office was created by the Pentagon to assess the threat that Iraq allegedly posed to the U.S. It remained relatively secret during the first year of its existence, known only by Donald Rumsfeld's inner circle of neoconservative ideologues. Sources within the intelligence community told reporters that the group, known as the Office of Special Plans, cherry-picked intelligence from questionable sources to support the case for invading Iraq. The intelligence team's conclusions were presented directly to the White House and National Security Agency without first being vetted by other intelligence agencies, like the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The office was also blamed for the administration's lack of post-war plans in Iraq and accused of undermining the administration's policy towards Iran.