Source:
The Guardian The US army has told of errors, poor planning and complacency among its own top commanders in a warts-and-all official history of the steep descent into violence that followed the Iraq war.
In a 696-page account, army historians fault military and political leaders for focusing excessively on toppling Saddam Hussein in 2003 without looking towards a broader transition towards a stable society. Actions by the former defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld and the top US commander during the Iraq invasion, Tommy Franks, are singled out in the study, which was delayed for six months to allow senior army figures to review drafts.
"The transition to a new campaign was not well thought out, planned for and prepared for before it began," says the history, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign, published by an internal army thinktank called the contemporary operations study team. "The assumptions about the nature of the post-Saddam Iraq on which the transition was planned proved to be largely incorrect."
It says Franks took senior colleagues by surprise by moving to a slimmed-down, short-staffed headquarters shortly after the invasion of Iraq was complete. He told his officers to be ready to cut back on forces in preparation for "an abbreviated period of stability operations".
The study describes defence chiefs in Washington as ambivalent from the start about a "ponderous, troop-heavy, logistics intensive and costly" ongoing campaign to restore stability. "The
did commit resources to the planning of post-invasion operations," it says. "In retrospect, however, the overall effort appears to have been disjointed and, at times, poorly coordinated, perhaps reflecting the department's ambivalence towards nation-building."
Read more: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jun/30/iraq.usforeignpolicy