There are also people saying it can only enrich to 5%, that's incorrect:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2009/09/25/DI2009092501605.html<snip>
James Acton: There is no essential difference between the technology required to enrich to 5% and 90%. Once Iran has mastered the technology to produce low enriched uranium, it can reconfigure the equipment to produce HEU relatively simply. There is some technical debate among experts about how long it would take to do so--but none that it is possible.
<snip>
Iran's original agreement with the IAEA (its so-called Subsidiary Agreements) specified that new facilities should be declared to the IAEA 180 days before nuclear material was introduced. However, in 2003 Iran, by an exchange of letters, Iran agreed to the modified "Code 3.1" which obliges it to report new facilities as soon as the decision to build one is taken. When Iran agreed to this in 2003 it was the last state with significant nuclear activities to do so.
In 2007 Iran tried to claim that its modified Code 3.1 wasn't binding because it hadn't been ratified. However, this argument is wrong because exchange of letters is the standard procedure for modifying Subsidiary Arrangements.
I am almost certain (although would like to double check) that Subsidiary Arrangements (unlike Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols) are not ratified by national legislatures. So it is absurd to claim that changes to Subsidiary Arrangements need ratification.
Finally, I'd point out that under para 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement it cannot unilaterally modify a subsidiary arrangement.
has tried to claim that Code 3.1 isn't binding but this agreement can only be modified with the permission of both the IAEA and Iran. So, the new facility is indeed a violation of Iran's safeguards agreement. They can only be changed with the permission of both the state and the IAEA.
<snip>
http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2476/parallel-fuel-cycles<snip>
First, the unclassified US talking points state that the facility would be capable of producing about a weapons worth of material per year. A 3,000 centrifuge facility using Iran’s antiquated IR-1 centrifuges would be able to produce about one and a half weapons worth of high enriched uranium per year (39 kilograms with tails set to 0.4 per cent and 34 kilograms with tails set to 0.3 per cent). If equipped with more advanced centrifuges, the facility becomes quite lethal. The last generation of SNOR designs, for instance, if installed in Qom, could easily produce up to 80 kilograms worth of weapons grade uranium per year. The centrifuges would require little room, about 30 meters square, and draw very little power.
<snip>
Finally, we are definitely looking at a safeguards violation. It’s worth recalling that Iran did upgrade its subsidiary arrangements to oblige them to report facilities to the IAEA when they were at the design stage. They did this in 2003. They unilaterally pulled out of this arrangement in 2007. As James Acton correctly points out, the arrangement entered into force through simple exchange of letters. As in any contract, the principle pacta sunt servanda prevails (just put that term in Google).
A state can no more pull out of a contract than you can get out of, say, a mobile phone contract before it expires. It takes two parties to terminate an agreement. And the IAEA never accepted Iran’s withdrawal.
Not that it matters. It would seem like construction started at some time before March 2007. That is, at a time when even Iran itself considered itself bound by Code 3.1.
This is going to be very difficult to explain away, even by Iran’s highly talented spin-doctors.
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