India's PM says China's territorial ambition must be challenged

Turborama

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Tue Sep-07-10 03:42 PM
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India's PM says China's territorial ambition must be challenged

Edited on Tue Sep-07-10 04:41 PM by Turborama

Source: Telegraph (UK)

India must prepare to counter China's territorial ambitions in South Asia, Manmohan Singh, India's prime minister, has warned.

By Dean Nelson in New Delhi.

He was speaking against a background of growing tensions between the world's two fastest growing economies and a number of diplomatic incidents relating to their long-standing border dispute. The two countries fought a war in 1962, and China still claims parts of Indian-controlled Jammu and Kashmir and Tawang district in Arunachal Pradesh.

India has become increasingly concerned in recent months at China's growing influence in neighbouring Burma, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Pakistan.

Beijing has funded a number of strategic roads and deepwater ports in these countries, known as the "String of Pearls". The Asian rivals most recently clashed over Beijing's refusal to grant a visa to an Indian general from Kashmir, which it regards as disputed territory. New Delhi is also alarmed by Beijing's support for road and power projects in Gilgit-Baltistan in the Pakistan-controlled part of Kashmir which is claimed by India.

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"China would like to have a foothold in South Asia and we have to reflect on this reality. There is a new assertiveness among the Chinese. It is difficult to tell which way it will go. So it's important to be prepared," Mr Singh told the editors, according to The Times of India.

Read more: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/7987115/Indias-PM-says-Chinas-territorial-ambition-must-be-challenged.html

Robert Kaplan and Fareed Zakaria did a really interesting piece on China's growing regional influence recently.

I've found http://edition.cnn.com/video/data/2.0/video/podcasts/fareedzakaria/site/2010/08/29/gps.podcast.08.29.cnn.html">the video of the interview
and http://archives.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1008/29/fzgps.01.html">the transcript.

Also, here's Kaplan's article that's well worth a read

The Geography of Chinese Power

By Robert D. Kaplan

The English geographer Sir Halford Mackinder ended his famous 1904 article, "The Geographical Pivot of History," with a disturbing reference to China. After explaining why Eurasia was the geostrategic fulcrum of world power, he posited that the Chinese, should they expand their power well beyond their borders, "might constitute the yellow peril to the world's freedom just because they would add an oceanic frontage to the resources of the great continent, an advantage as yet denied to the Russian tenant of the pivot region." Leaving aside the sentiment's racism, which was common for the era, as well as the hysterics sparked by the rise of a non-Western power at any time, Mackinder had a point: whereas Russia, that other Eurasian giant, basically was, and is still, a land power with an oceanic front blocked by ice, China, owing to a 9,000-mile temperate coastline with many good natural harbors, is both a land power and a sea power. (Mackinder actually feared that China might one day conquer Russia.) China's virtual reach extends from Central Asia, with all its mineral and hydrocarbon wealth, to the main shipping lanes of the Pacific Ocean. Later, in Democratic Ideals and Reality, Mackinder predicted that along with the United States and the United Kingdom, China would eventually guide the world by "building for a quarter of humanity a new civilization, neither quite Eastern nor quite Western."

China's blessed geography is so obvious a point that it tends to get overlooked in discussions of the country's economic dynamism and national assertiveness. Yet it is essential: it means that China will stand at the hub of geopolitics even if the country's path toward global power is not necessarily linear. (China has routinely had GDP growth rates of more than ten percent annually over the past 30 years, but they almost certainly cannot last another 30.) China combines an extreme, Western-style modernity with a "hydraulic civilization" (a term coined by the historian Karl Wittfogel to describe societies that exercise centralized control over irrigation) that is reminiscent of the ancient Orient: thanks to central control, the regime can, for example, enlist the labor of millions to build major infrastructure. This makes China relentlessly dynamic in ways that democracies, with all of their temporizing, cannot be. As China's nominally Communist rulers -- the scions of some 25 dynasties going back 4,000 years -- are absorbing Western technology and Western practices, they are integrating them into a disciplined and elaborate cultural system with a unique experience in, among other things, forming tributary relationships with other states. "The Chinese," a Singaporean official told me early this year, "charm you when they want to charm you, and squeeze you when they want to squeeze you, and they do it quite systematically."

China's internal dynamism creates external ambitions. Empires rarely come about by design; they grow organically. As states become stronger, they cultivate new needs and -- this may seem counterintuitive -- apprehensions that force them to expand in various forms. Even under the stewardship of some of the most forgettable presidents -- Rutherford Hayes, James Garfield, Chester Arthur, Benjamin Harrison -- the United States' economy grew steadily and quietly in the late nineteenth century. As the country traded more with the outside world, it developed complex economic and strategic interests in far-flung places. Sometimes, as in South America and the Pacific region, for example, these interests justified military action. The United States was also able to start focusing outward during that period because it had consolidated the interior of the continent; the last major battle of the Indian Wars was fought in 1890.

China today is consolidating its land borders and beginning to turn outward. China's foreign policy ambitions are as aggressive as those of the United States a century ago, but for completely different reasons. China does not take a missionary approach to world affairs, seeking to spread an ideology or a system of government. Moral progress in international affairs is an American goal, not a Chinese one; China's actions abroad are propelled by its need to secure energy, metals, and strategic minerals in order to support the rising living standards of its immense population, which amounts to about one-fifth of the world's total. To accomplish this task, China has built advantageous power relationships both in contiguous territories and in far-flung locales rich in the resources it requires to fuel its growth. Because what drives China abroad has to do with a core national interest -- economic survival -- China can be defined as an über-realist power. It seeks to develop a sturdy presence throughout the parts of Africa that are well endowed with oil and minerals and wants to secure port access throughout the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, which connect the hydrocarbon-rich Arab-Persian world to the Chinese seaboard. Having no choice in the matter, Beijing cares little about the type of regime with which it is engaged; it requires stability, not virtue as the West conceives of it. And because some of these regimes -- such as those in Iran, Myanmar (also known as Burma), and Sudan -- are benighted and authoritarian, China's worldwide scouring for resources brings it into conflict with the missionary-oriented United States, as well as with countries such as India and Russia, against whose own spheres of influence China is bumping up.

Full piece:http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66205/robert-d-kaplan/the-geography-of-chinese-power?gp=66351:1a10a7744c9a409b

If that link doesn't work, try the link here: http://edition.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/fareed.zakaria.gps/