with the number cited in the leaked cable. The cable says 100 IGLA-S shoulder-fired with 96 gripstocks were delivered to Venezuela in 2009.
The IGLA-S MANPAD (Man-Portable Air Defense Systems) is a state-of-the-art weapon that can blow a low-flying aircraft (think Blackhawks, Hueys, Warthogs) out of the sky up to 6 klicks away. This post is long but it gives a clear idea of how the United States is and has been working against the Venezuela of President Hugo Chavez.
The cable and related others were published by El Pais of Madrid several days ago:
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S E C R E T STATE 081957
NOFORN
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION AND REMOVING CLASSIFICATION
SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2019
TAGS: PARM, PREL, RS
SUBJECT: REPORT OF U.S.- RUSSIA MANPADS EXPERTS MEETING
JULY 9-10, WASHINGTON, D.C.
REF: A. A. STATE 152989 B. STATE 100646 C. STATE 112304
B. D. STATE 32213 E. STATE 33076 F. STATE 27306
Classified By: EUR/PRA Acting Director Kathleen Morenski
for reasons 1.4 (a,b,c,d)
Summary
1. (S/NF) On the same week as the successful U.S.-Russia
Presidential Summit in Moscow, the United States and Russia
held their sixth Experts Meeting under their bilateral
Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) Arrangement July
9-10 in Washington. Several items of interest were covered,
including: 1. a framework for the exchange of information on
domestic MANPADS destruction; 2. the risk of diversion of
MANPADS from Venezuela to the FARC; 3. illicit MANPADS
proliferation from Eritrea; 4. potential cooperation on
MANPADS destruction projects with other states; and 5. next
steps to facilitate the transfer of Russian-made Finnish
MANPADS to the U.S. for countermeasures testing. The Russian
side again requested U.S. help preventing the spread of
MANPADS in the Caucasus, in particular information on
Polish-supplied MANPADS to Georgia that were discovered in
Chechnya following the August 2008 conflict. In response to
our non-paper on the subject, the Russian MFA informed us it
had begun a dialogue with the Polish government. The next
Experts Meeting was tentatively scheduled for fall 2010 in
Moscow, at the earliest. The U.S. delegation was co-chaired
by Steven Costner (Deputy Director of PM/WRA) and Anita
Friedt (Director of EUR/PRA). The Russian delegation was
chaired by Col. Oleg Skabara from the MOD. See para 31 for a
full delegation list. End Summary.
2. (S) Both sides provided the details of their quarterly
MANPADS transfers. The U.S. submitted its first quarter
report, which reported no transfers from January 1-March 31,
prior to the meeting. The U.S. provided its second quarter
report (due by September 30), which covered April 1 through
June 30, during the meeting, which also reported no
transfers. The Russians provided their first quarter
exchange prior to the meeting, which reported the transfer of
100 IGLA-S missiles and 90 associated gripstocks to
Venezuela. (see below para for more details on the Venezuela
discussion).
------------ snip -------------
Venezuela MANPADS transfers
5. (S) In response to the U.S. paper outlining U.S. concerns
about the possibility of diversion to non state actors of
IGLA-S systems being delivered to the Government of Venezuela
(GOV), the Russian delegation stated that they understood the
concerns raised at high levels between our Secretary of State
and the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as
between Russian Ambassador Kislyak and WHA A/S Shannon.
Skabara assured the U.S. delegation that Russian law provides
specific measures to prevent illegal transfers to third
parties. He then stated that the issues raised in the paper
were reflected in end user checks as well as in the contract
between the GOR and GOV, and that the GOR has required an
end-user regime that guarantees that transfers to third
parties will not take place. Skabara said that the U.S.
delegation had seen how well the Russians secure their
stockpiles and assured the U.S. that these same controls were
written into the contract with Venezuela. Along with this,
the GOR has had dialogue with the GOV evaluating the GOV's
physical security of the systems, which specifically featured
a discussion about the FARC. GOR assured the U.S. side that
transfers from Venezuela to the FARC cannot take place.
6. (S) Questions and comparisons were raised by the U.S.
side about Russian ammunition, sold to Venezuela, and found
in possession of the FARC. Skabara first suggested that the
ammunition did not come from Russia, but was probably a sale
from "unlicensed production" a suggestion that it was
manufactured in a third country without appropriate permits
from Russia. When the U.S. side pointed out that the
ammunition carried factory stamps, and that we provided this
information, the Russians responded that the meeting was to
discuss MANPADS, not ammunition, and that these are different
weapons and the approach, scale, and control applied to them
are different. He said the U.S. did not provide enough
information to the Russians on the confiscated ammunition for
them to fully investigate the discovery; however Russia is
carrying out an investigation. He added that it would be
"impossible" for a similar scenario to take place with
MANPADS, as they have an ongoing dialogue with Venezuela that
allows them to evaluate the security and use of these
MANPADS, and thus none of these MANPADS can be transferred to
the FARC.
7. (S) Giovanni Snidle from WHA/FO said that he was pleased
to be able to report to Ambassador Shannon that an
investigation is ongoing into the Russian cartridges found
with the FARC and that the U.S. would appreciate if the
Russians shared the findings. Snidle expressed that the
concerns were not Venezuela-specific, but a concern with the
Western Hemisphere as a whole, noting that when new MANPADS
were provided to the Venezuelans, it was possible that the
older, excess MANPADS could be transferred to others in the
region. He asked the Russians to consider the following
parameters (also outlined in a non-paper provided in advance
of the meeting) when signing MANPADS contracts with western
hemisphere countries:
-------------- snip ------------
16. (S/NF) The U.S. side then gave a briefing on the MANPADS
black market in Latin America. The MANPADS black market in
the region is small, the number of potential users is low,
and prices are high compared to other regions such as the
Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. Central American
countries historically have posed the largest proliferation
risk because of the availability of systems unrecovered after
civil conflicts in the 1980s. The U.S. side stated concerns
about the FARC's apparent desire to obtain MANPADS, but said
that the likelihood that they have already is very low.
Specific instances where there would be heightened risk of
proliferation could include when MANPADS are deployed to
forward operating bases (as in the case of Venezuela).
MANPADS are generally secure when they are in central
stockpiles; however, when they are deployed they may be lost
in combat, corruption, or to the black market. The U.S. side
reiterated that any proliferation to the FARC is important
and is likely to lead to a significant increase in the air
defense threat to Colombian and US aircraft operating in the
region.
Full text of the cable
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Cable/venta/material/militar/Rusia/Venezuela/elpepuint/20101208elpepuint_49/Tes ------------------
Cable of U.S. pressure on Russia with Moscow telling the United States to go jump in a lake:
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2. (S) Nonetheless, Antonov stressed that there was no
international restriction on selling arms, including MANPADS,
to Venezuela. Russia also recognized the U.S. as a
competitor in the international arms trade, with the
motivation of restricting Russia's market access. Russia
respected the U.S. right to determine U.S. policy on arms
sales to Venezuela, but "that is your decision, not ours; we
have our own policy." Antonov said that if U/S Joseph raises
this issue with Deputy FM Kislyak, Kislyak "will say the
same." PolMinCouns noted that the issue of military sales to
Venezuela remained of great concern to the U.S., and this
would be a continuing subject of bilateral discussion.
3. (S) Regarding sales of AK-103 rifles, Antonov confirmed
that the sale was indeed moving forward. He maintained that
Venezuela was a legitimate market for Russian arms, and that
Russia intends to remain active in this market. He also
commented that the tone in parts of ref A points was
demeaning to Russia. The U.S. should not "speak to us like
we are Gabon or Mali," he remarked. Antonov said that Russia
does not and will not give out specific information, such as
serial numbers of AK-103 rifles, to others.
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Cable/presiones/EE/UU/Rusia/venda/armas/Venezuela/elpepuint/20101208elpepuint_38/Tes----------------
U.S. stragdy to prevent Russia from selling MANPADS to Venezuela
-----
3. (S/NF) The Igla-S (SA-24) is Russia's most advanced
MANPADS and considered one of the most lethal portable
air defense systems ever made (Ref A).
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Cable/estrategia/estadounidense/Rusia/vendar/armas/Venezuela/elpepuint/20101208elpepuint_44/Tes --------------
Cable calling for pressure on Spain and Sweden regarding arms sales to Venezuela
Talking Points for Embassy Stockholm:
--We appreciate your efforts to work with Colombia and to
press Venezuela for an explanation on how three M-136 AT4
anti-tank missiles Sweden sold to Venezuela in 1988 ended up
in FARC stocks.
Talking Points for Embassy Madrid:
--Diversion of conventional weapons, including MANPADS, to
terrorist and criminal organizations, such as the FARC,
presents a clear threat to peace and security in Latin
America.
--We prefer that EU members not transfer arms to Venezuela.
If arms are transferred to Venezuela, we ask that EU Member
States work to strengthen transparency and accountability
measures for such exports, such as through post-shipment
verification to ensure that the arms remain in Venezuelan
hands.
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Cable/presiones/Suecia/Espana/vendan/material/militar/Venezuela/elpepuint/20101208elpepuint_41/Tes