from Dec 14, 2009:
Hardliners Step Up Attacks Against Iranian Opposition
http://www.payvand.com/news/09/dec/1149.htmlThe harshest attack against the reformists was issued today from the Supreme Leader's representative with the Revolutionary Guards, Mojtaba Zolnori...He accused various senior reform figures of insulting Ayatollah Khomeini the leader of the 1979 Revolution and of smuggling people out of the country. He also accused Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, Chairman of the Expediency Council of playing into the hands of "global oppressors" and "sending his law-breaking son out of the country." He also remarked that they are prepared to confront the opposition leaders as soon as the Supreme Leader gives the go ahead.
There are also other links included in this article talking about the targeting of Rafsanjani. A posting on the NIAC blog also links to this article and mentions that:
"These players want Rafsanjani expelled as Chairman of the Expediency Council."
To understand how significant the fall of Rafsanjani is, Bhadrakumar (link in previous post) describes the Rafsanjani power structure:
For those who do not know Iran better, suffice to say that the Rafsanjani family clan owns vast financial empires in Iran, including foreign trade, vast landholdings and the largest network of private universities in Iran. Known as Azad there are 300 branches spread over the country, they are not only money-spinners but could also press into Mousavi's election campaign an active cadre of student activists numbering some 3 million. The Azad campuses and auditoria provided the rallying point for Mousavi's campaign in the provinces. The attempt was to see that the campaign reached the rural poor in their multitudes who formed the bulk of voters and constituted Ahmadinejad's political base. Rafsanjani's political style is to build up extensive networking in virtually all the top echelons of the power structure, especially bodies such as the Guardian Council, Expediency Council, the Qom clergy, Majlis, judiciary, bureaucracy, Tehran bazaar and even elements within the circles close to Khamenei. He called into play these pockets of influence.
Then Bhadrakumar explains, quite coldly, how brutal the fall of Rafsanjani was:
Simultaneously, Rafsanjani also rallied his base in the clerical establishment. A clique of 14 senior clerics in Qom joined issue on his side. It was all an act of desperation by vested interests who have become desperate about the awesome rise of the IRGC in recent years. But, if Rafsanjani's calculation was that the "mutiny" within the clerical establishment would unnerve Khamenei, he misread the calculus of power in Tehran. Khamenei did the worst thing possible to Rafsanjani. He simply ignored the "Shark".
And then there were other signs that the "Green Movement" was defeated. In early 2010, there were supposed to be large protests in support of the Green Movement but Ahmadinejad supporters outnumbered the protesters by a very large margin. From a posting on the NIAC blog on Feb 11, 2010 (
http://niacinsight.com/2010/02/11/bearing-witness-22-bahman/):
“There were 300 of us, maximum 500. Against 10,000 people,” one protester said. “It means they won and we lost. They defeated us. They were able to gather so many people.
It looks like it could be a long time before there are any real reforms in Iran, especially when so many Iranians suspect the reformers as being agents of the United States.