- Wikipedia has good overview of the Darfur conflict, with a good selection of links.
- Alex de Waal's Tragedy in Darfur is one of the better recent summaries of the conflict.
- Ali B. Ali-Dinar's pointed Why Khartoum Wants War in Darfur distills the grievances against Sudan's NIF (National Islamic Front) government. The Sudan Tribune has presented an eclectic mix of views. Search under the rubric "Opinions," and scroll down to see the latest analyses. Objectivity is in short supply, as one would expect, but there are some real gems on those pages.
- Cedric Mohammad's BlackElectorate.com has a good series of interviews, the latest of which is Asking the Right Questions about Darfur, Sudan, Part XI. Previous installments are linked at the bottom of the piece. Also see Ethnic Warfare as Policy from Mohammad's Black Commentator. BC has positioned itself editorially between criticism of the government of Sudan and criticism of US policy, which is providing some insightful back and forth if nothing else. See the latest issues and the archives for the last few months.
To answer you question in a nutshell, the government of Sudan has organized itself in such a way that it has alienated millions of its citizens in Darfur. Faced with an armed rebellion, the government of Sudan reacted by organizing wholesale attacks on the ethnic groups to which the rebels belong.
From the point of view of the government of Sudan, the rebellion has been instigated and/or exploited by the US and Israel through its proxies in Eritrea, Uganda, Chad, and among the SPLM/A, the Southern faction in Sudan's longrunning civil war. I cannot say how widespread or sincere this belief is among the NIF's militant cabal in Khartoum, but it is often expressed. Eritrea, Uganda and the SPLA have serious grievances with the government of Sudan, and relations between Sudan and Chad have deteriorated since the conflict in Darfur began. The US of course has not been friendly with Khartoum, although its explicit policy has been to promote peace between Khartoum and the SPLA, a prospect which is not aided by the conflict in Darfur.
From the point of view of the SLA (Sudanese Liberation Army), the largest rebel group in Darfur, the decision to take up arms was made only after it became clear that the government of Sudan was intent on destroying the "African" (principally Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa) peoples of Darfur. While it is often claimed that hostilities broke out in February of 2003, in fact the DLF (Darfur Liberation Front), which was the precursor to the SLA, announced its intentions to take up arms as early as December, 2002, in response to a series of militia attacks that began in 2001. Leaders of the DLF were drawn from an educated class that had attempted political reconcilation (through the National Democratic Alliance) and a nonviolent redress of grievances to no avail. Dr. Sharif Harir, who has been a lead negotiator for the SLA, had written critically of the governments use of ethnically-based proxy militias as far back as 1993.
Critics of the rebels question their genuine concern for the welfare of the people, and suggest that they have exploited the conflict in order to be included in the peace deal with the SPLA, and so gain a share of Darfur's oil wealth and other concessions. They had to have known that government of Sudan would respond the way they did, and their appeals for international intervention can be seen as manipulative. The legitimacy of the SLA's initial attacks, it seems to me, hinges upon whether or not the government of Sudan had systematically disarmed the "African" tribes, while arming militias drawn from "Arab" tribes and encouraging them to attack "African" villages. Since the government of Khartoum released Musa Hilal from prison to help organize the infamous Janjaweed militia, and since the onset of the campaign of coordinated attacks involving Janjaweed and the Sudanese armed forces, there can be little doubt that the rebels have a legitimate claim to defense by force of arms.