Sokolsi: Getting prepared for a nuclear-ready Iran

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STOPPING PROLIFERATION

Getting prepared for a nuclear-ready Iran

By Henry Sokolski
June 19, 2005

(snip)

Iran might give its nuclear capabilities to terrorists or strike Israel or the United States but these are not the threats Iranian officials are currently making, and with good cause: If they dared to take any of these steps, the risks to them, their continued rule, and their people could easily be as great as they might be to us or our friends. More important, in focusing on these extreme scenarios, U.S. policy planners have been drawn to acute options – such as bombing, invasion, and various forms of appeasement – that ultimately are only likely to make realization of the worst of what Iran could conceivably do with its nuclear capabilities more probable.

Sadly, the debate over these extreme options has distracted us from dealing with the more probable threats presented by a nuclear-ready Iran. These threats deserve our attention because the lower risks they pose for Tehran make it more likely Iran will act on them as Iran becomes nuclear-ready and because we and our friends could neutralize most of these threats if we chose to do so.

Finally, hedging against these more probable dangers would significantly reduce the military and political advantages Iran might otherwise realize if it acquired nuclear weapons. What are these more probable threats? The first are actions Iran has already taken or threatened to take against the United States or its friends. They include mining international waterways, including the Suez Canal; threatening closure of the Straits of Hormuz by permanently deploying anti-shipping systems nearby; supporting and planning terrorist action against Israel, Lebanon, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, U.S. forces in the Gulf and targets within America; demanding chairmanship of OPEC to manipulate the price of oil; extorting its neighbors and other energy customers to invest in Iran on terms acceptable to Tehran.

These possible threats can be mitigated significantly through a variety of measures. They include addressing oil and gas production and transportation vulnerabilities in the Persian Gulf by completing several Saudi pipelines and hardening certain facilities, diplomatically besting Iran in talks over freedom of passage in the Gulf, encouraging Israel to take the lead in establishing a new high standard for regional denuclearization, and promoting tighter border and export controls and key forms of defense cooperation in the region. These ideas are a good place to start.

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Editor's note:

These two commentaries on stopping nuclear proliferation in North Korea and Iran are adapted from congressional testimony earlier this year by Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington, D.C.
(www.npec-web.org).

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1. Sokolski: Treat north korea as a nuclear challenge

STOPPING PROLIFERATION

Treat north korea as a nuclear challenge

By Henry Sokolski
June 19, 2005

In thinking about the North Korea nuclear threat, there is a natural tendency to focus on the immediate effects Pyongyang's possession of nuclear weapons might have on its closest neighbors. It is this instinct that has prompted our diplomats to work most with Russia, China, South Korea and Japan to influence North Korea. This regional focus is also why so much attention has been focused on China, North Korea's staunchest ally and strategic supplier of much of the food and fuel that Pyongyang needs to survive.

As our diplomats have noted repeatedly, China is the key to getting North Korea to behave. With China we gain leverage needed to make North Korea heel. Without China little or no progress with Pyongyang is likely. There is only one problem with this insight: So far, it has not helped us much. China, for a variety of reasons, has not leaned much on North Korea.

What's unclear is whether this is because China has been unwilling to leverage North Korea or because China is unable to do so. My own view is that we don't clearly know what China is capable of doing vis-a vis North Korea if only because after nearly two years of six-party regional nuclear talks, we seem reconciled to the meager influence China so far seems to have had on Pyongyang. If the security stakes of North Korea cheating on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and withdrawing from it with impunity were low or if we already had made every reasonable attempt with our allies to leverage China against North Korea's continued nuclear misbehavior, such resignation might be acceptable. Neither point, however, is right.

Certainly, the security impact of Pyongyang's actions when combined with that of Iran's latest nuclear maneuvers, threaten nothing less than a total breakdown of the nuclear rules and a world crowded with North Koreas and Irans. More important, several opportunities to leverage China on North Korea have recently arisen that have not yet been exploited. Certainly, North Korea's bad nuclear behavior is no longer merely a regional problem. North Korea is the only nation the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA, has twice reported to the United Nations Security Council to be in noncompliance with its NPT safeguards obligations. The last IAEA noncompliance report was filed in early 2002 shortly after North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT. The Security Council has not yet taken action on this report.

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