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Turning Point in North Korean Nuclear Dispute: Greg Elich

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teryang Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Sat Oct-22-05 10:39 AM
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Turning Point in North Korean Nuclear Dispute: Greg Elich
Edited on Sat Oct-22-05 10:41 AM by teryang
Mr. Elich has a well researched article on the new state of affairs in northeast Asia. The US position there has been circumvented by unilateral S.Korean initiatives to the North. Four of the six parties in the six party talks stand against US sanctions policies.

http://www.globalresearch.ca

A Turning Point in the North Korean Nuclear Dispute


by Gregory Elich

October 20, 2005


<snip>Had the talks fallen apart it could well have marked the end of the diplomatic road. Certainly senior U.S. officials were hinting as much, and the American delegation was talking about returning home. The Bush Administration would have interpreted a breakdown in negotiations as a signal that the time had come to implement non-diplomatic measures. It was a pivotal moment. The Chinese delegation knew it had to act quickly, and prepared a new draft statement that carefully balanced the opposing positions. The new document was presented on Friday, September 16, with the delegations being told that they had until the next afternoon to respond. The U.S. delegation immediately rejected the statement. But the Chinese held firm, telling the Americans, "This is the final draft. Take it or leave it." The deadline passed with no sign of movement from the U.S. delegation, so talks were extended into Sunday. Throughout the weekend, Christopher Hill was in frequent contact with Secretary of State Rice. The U.S. delegation made persistent but unsuccessful efforts to get the Chinese delegation to water down the proposed statement. The Chinese warned the U.S. delegation that if it failed to sign the draft statement, then they were prepared to blame the U.S. for the collapse of talks. "At one point they told us that we were totally isolated on this and that they would go to the press," acknowledged an Administration official. "China really dug in," said an official close to the talks. By Sunday night, Secretary of State Rice and President Bush relented and instructed the U.S. delegation to sign the document, but only on condition that each party could issue a statement offering its own interpretation. "We didn’t want to lose the argument over this," explained a U.S. official. For the Bush Administration, the worst possible outcome would be for the talks to collapse with the U.S. being singled out for public blame. That would have made it impossible to garner international support for punitive measures against North Korea. Going it alone on North Korea would have been problematic, too. Washington had its hands full with ongoing efforts to win international backing for isolating and pressuring Iran for its pursuit of nuclear power plants. Furthermore, any hostile measures taken against North Korea carried an inherent risk of escalating into conflict, and the U.S. military was tied up in the occupation of Iraq. The Iraqi resistance was placing serious constraints on the ability of the U.S. to create new crises. For these reasons, intervention at this time in North Korea was simply unfeasible without allied support. Faced with these disagreeable choices, the Bush Administration apparently concluded that the best option was to in effect kick the ball down the field by agreeing to the document in hopes that a later time would bring a more advantageous set of circumstances. (22)<snip>

<snip>On a surface level, the statement of principles signed at the September talks appeared to accomplish nothing more than committing the parties to further dialogue. At the same time, it also marked a crucial turning point in relations in Northeast Asia. Restive over Washington’s approach, the other parties at the talks boldly offered their own vision of the future for Northeast Asia. There may be little hope for a negotiated settlement in the remaining years of the Bush Administration. But South Korea, China and Russia feel they can at least compel the U.S. to make some concessions and refrain from confrontation with North Korea. The Iraqi resistance deserves a great deal of credit for tying Washington’s hands, but it is China, Russia and above all South Korea that have played the major role in circumventing U.S. plans to plunge the Korean Peninsula into crisis or possibly war...<snip>
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