Spain's El País newspaper published today Sunday 1/1/2006 (and on Saturday in Catalunya) a 2-page interview with Mohamed el Baradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Authority, by the very experienced investigative reporter Ernesto Ekaizer (who a month or two ago also interviewed Joe Wilson in Washington) in Vienna.
The source, in Spanish, is here:
http://www.elpais.es/articulo/elpdomrep/20060101elpdmgrep_8/Tes/Allow me to offer, in my own crude translation, some illustrative, and I think illuminating, excerpts. (Explanations in brackets are mine).
Mods: since I'm presenting here my own work as a translator, I hope these fairly extensive quotes (maybe 25% of the interview) are permissible.
1. Wiretapped. Iran.Question: Exactly a year ago I interviewed you in this same room (el Baradei's office in Vienna). Everything here is just the same as then. But what a change of scene! That very day you received a telephone warning that the Bush Administration was bugging your telephones because it distrusted your attitude towards Iran, and they intended to use the recordings to prevent your re-election for a third mandate. Now you are director general for another four years and you have won the Nobel Peace Prize!
Answer: Yes, that's true... In relation to Iran there is still a lot of tension. We have still not seen the light at the end of the tunnel. Things have moved in the right direction, although not at the pace that we would like. Europeans just as much as Iranians want to return to the negotiating table in the coming weeks. Apart from whether we are going to witness an escalation, through a report to the UN Security Council or not, the problem will only be solved by means of dialogue. We had not until now, it seems to me, understood that access to nuclear weapons on the part of some countries is a symptom and that it is necessary to understand the underlying causes in order to act correctly. And the causes are insecurity, tensions and regional rivalry.
Q. And at a personal level?
A: It has been painful. They bugged my telephone, there were maneuvers to prevent a third mandate that the overwhelming majority of the countries members of the IAEA had offered me. And I would have felt guilty for not continuing when I felt myself in the middle of this war of nuclear proliferation. And they have said that we are partial in Iran and that we failed in our inspection in Iraq. Luckily, all these affirmations have since disappeared. We continued using our own weapons: integrity, impartiality and independence.
...
2. Data / Intelligence.Q: Doesn't the Iranian case remind you of Iraq? This time, the strongest evidence (against Iran) is a portable computer that was stolen in Iran in which are found (plans for) detonators for an atomic bomb.
A: Yes, of course, but each example of nucear proliferation has its own characteristics. Irán has them, North Korea shows its own, Irak, Libia. There are also underlying similarities which unite these cases. They share, first, fear of insecurity or, if you prefer, the need to project power. Second, seeking nuclear weapons is part of a wider image. A first lesson seems to me important: we know that there is information and there is disinformation. And that we should be very careful as regards the way we receive information supplied by the intelligence services. That is to say, we must confirm that it is authentic, that it turns out to be correct and that it is not an attempt to manipulate. The second relevent lesson, which we should not underestimate, is that if we are moving towards achieving our goal, if we do not see straightforward proof that there is an immediate threat, we must very carefully verify that data. The verdict about Iran is still not written. I am not saying that it has a peaceful nuclear program, but neither can I affirm that it has a program to develop nuclear weapons.
Q: When in February 2003 you were supplied with the presumed documents which were purported to prove that Iraq was trying to buy enriched uranium in Níger, you checked them out and announced that they were false. Have you seen the portable computer that was stolen in Iran?
A: (Laughter). I cannot go into detail on intelligence issues. We have received a lot of information that we are testing to be sure that it is reliable and in order to share this data with the Iranians so as to be able to listen to their point of view and the explanations that they choose to offer us.
...
3. Nuclear Technology Black Market / Proliferation.Q: The mystery surrounding the black market in nuclear technology that emerged in relation to the Pakistani scientist Abdul Qader Jan, is it now clarified?
A: We have received further data. I do not have 100% of the information, but we have 90%. Now we better understand the network that was established. Cooperation with Pakistan has improved. We have still not had direct access to Mr. Jan... Today he is viewed in Pakistan as a national hero. We have sent to the (Pakistani) authorities the questions we wanted to ask, and they were put to Mr. Jan. We have received his answers. When the time comes, obviously, we would like to interview him ourselves. While he was the 'managing director' (president) of the network, there were also other directors (vice-presidents) we would like to interview, but they are at the moment involved in judicial proceedings.
Q: Is there any solid information about the theoretical possibility that terrorist groups could have access to radioactive material?
A: We have seen nothing. We cannot assert that radioactive substances or material have passed into terrorist hands. That is not to say that it might not have happened. But we have no proof. We hope that such groups do not have in their power such materials, and this is still our most imprtant concern. It is improbable, but not impossible, that this has happened.
...
4. On Niger / Joe Wilson / Valerie Flame. (this, after an introductory question, to which el Baredei replies that he has not followed the case very closely. "I assure you," he says, "in the little free time my job permits me, I prefer to attend classical music concerts in the company of my wife.")Q: I can tell you that Ambassador Wilson, in an interview with EL PAÍS, declared that he was very happy that you had been awarded the Nobel Prize.
A: Oh yes? If he has been slandered, if they have mistreated him, he has every right to defend himself and to restore his good name.
Q: Maybe if he had revealed before the start of the war, after you had reported that the Niger documents were false, that he also was aware of the falsification, since he had carried out an official investigation there, things could have turned out differently. Did you ask him why he did not do so at that time?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: What was his answer?
A: He explained that even if he had revealed his mission to Niger before the War, nothing would have changed, because it was a decision that had been taken long before. But perhaps what happened to Wilson is very understandable, above all once we know that the US Administration threatened to punish him, revealing that his wife was a CIA agent, that is to say, so that he would be afraid to take that step, 12 days before the invasion of Iraq. I believe..., and this is not only in relation to Iraq, I sincerely believe in what Jean-Paul Sartre had to say about individual responsibility. Each and every one of us bears responsibility at an individual level. Each one of us should do his (or her) work without thinking about what others might do. And if we do this, we can influence events. The war could have been avoided if we had all done our duty (or our homework). If we had all spoken out before the war on Iraq... I was the only one who asked for more time before the war. Clearly. I remember that I said: "This additional time to continue the inspections will be an investment in peace". I said that we needed three months. And if each of us had done something similar, if all those who were in a position to do so had taken a step forward in order to say "these data are not correct, this information has no credibility, we perceive that we are not heading in the right direction...". Well, if this had happened, maybe events would not have turned out the way they did. It is necessary for people to understand that, unless we all do what we can, what we are able to do, things will turn out as planned...Because this is a fatalistic attitude: "The decision to go to war has already been made...". "What can I do?". Or "nothing that I could say would change the course of events". No. We can do much as individuals, as a civil society. These decisions about war and peace affect our way of life. We must play an active role, in government and outside it, in every direction. And I think, once again, in relation to the war in Iraq, that people must commit themselves. Anyone who has information about what happened and is happening should step forward and speak out. Many people, especially in the United States, became frightened and ran away from participation in the debate that preceeded the war on Iraq, because they thought that in that time of tension they should be very careful (not anticipate events). Everyone should contribute his (or her) five cents, because it is important. We have to be very sure when we take a decision such as going to war, that is to say, that we should be able to assure ourselves that that is the best decision. I do not support going to war, unless that is the only and the best possible decision.
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