Martin Woollacott (Guardian Unltd): The power of a man willing to die

[Jack Rabbit]

From the Guardian Unlimited (UK)
Dated Friday November 14

The power of a car, a bomb and a man willing to die
Ordinary Iraqis want to see the back of the Americans - but not yet
By Martin Woollacott

It is ironic that the United States and Britain, who would never have invaded Iraq had it not been for the superior technology which they trusted would limit their casualties to a tolerable level, now face a military and political crisis in that country precisely because of the primitive technology which those resisting them are employing. What the US army snootily calls "improvised explosive devices" have wrecked convoy after convoy. A few cheap shoulder-fired missiles have been enough to hamper helicopter use, the main means of rapid mobility possessed by the coalition forces. And the combination of an automobile, a bomb, and a man willing to die has proved devastating in attacks on the coalition's camps and outposts, military and civilian, and on the offices of international organisations.
For the attackers, it has been as "target-rich" an environment in its different way as any in which an American fighter-bomber was able to pick and choose during the few weeks of the war proper. Supply, movement, fixed positions and the commitment of allies and helpers - both Iraqi and international - have all been affected. Hence the urgency of the re-thinking that has been going on in Baghdad and Washington, and the evident search for new policies.
With all the lessons that have been learned about the power of the weapons of the weak, from Vietnam to the West Bank, all this might have been expected. Yet almost always in the past such weapons have been employed in the context of substantial support for resistance among the general population. The paradox of Iraq is that the occupiers face a militarily successful resistance which is not at all popular except in limited areas and among limited groups.
A further paradox is that this is a resistance without an identity and without a programme, without an announced plan for the nation and without objectives - except for the withdrawal of foreign forces. That, it may be said, is the cry of the occupier through the ages, always claiming the allegiance of the majority and always classifying those resisting as bandits or fanatics. But, while the evidence is admittedly largely anecdotal, the picture in Iraq does seem to be one in which a majority, while by no means pro-American, very definitely do not want those resisting them to prevail.

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[Vitruvius]

1. Americans have fought to the death when needful -- it's no surprise

that Iraqis will also give up their lives for their country and for what they believe in.

I think most Americans know this. But it's something the Bu$h chickenhawks will never understand.

[Martin Eden]

2. Iraqis' "wait and see" attitude

Assuming that Mr. Woollacott's observations are basically correct concerning the attitude of most Iraqis, a very important question is raised:

Can any Iraqi government installed by the U.S. survive our departure?

The majority of Iraqis seem to be somewhat non-committal -- glad to be rid of Saddam but not ready to fully endorse the US efforts; not wanting the insurgents to succeed, but not ready or willing to actively collaborte with the US in the formation of a new government.

They are cautious, suspicious, and conditioned to being unempowered within previous regimes.

But not all Iraqis are being passive right now. 50,000 insurgents (mostly home-grown) are taking action to drive out the occupiers. They may have no cohesive or coherent agenda for post-occupation Iraq, but they certainly represent the segment of the population that will undoubtedly continue to be active after the US departs.

Considering that this group (and much of the world for that matter) sees the US invasion and occupation as illegal and illegitimate, I ask again:

Can any Iraqi government we install survive our departure?

Will "our" Iraqis -- those we see fit to pass power to and to implement a constitutional democracy -- will they have the strength and legitimacy to hold that government together, to maintain security against a continued insurgency, and to build the national institutions with broad-based support that are necessary to sustaining such a democracy?

I'm not saying that Iraqis are inherently incapable of having a successful democracy. I'm saying that any democracy has a much better success when it arises from within a society, rather than being imposed from without. And especially under the circumstances of a foregin invasion under a fraudulent pretext, opposed by the world community, and vehemently denounced by the Arab/Islamic world.

What is the long-term prognosis for a government born in those circumstances installed by the invaders -- even one that has the stamp of national elections?