The vulnerable line of supply to US troops in Iraq

[bemildred]

ALEXANDRIA, VA. – American forces in Iraq are in danger of having their line of supply cut by guerrillas. Napoleon once said that "an army travels on its stomach." By that he meant that the problem of keeping an army supplied is the prerequisite for the very existence of the force.

A 21st-century military force "burns up" a tremendous volume of expendable supplies and continuously needs repairs to equipment as well as medical treatment. Without a plentiful and dependable source of fuel, food, and ammunition, a military force falters. First it stops moving, then it begins to starve, and eventually it becomes unable to resist the enemy.

In 1915, for example, this happened to British forces that had invaded Mesopotamia. A British-Indian force traveled up the line of the Tigris River, advancing to Kut, southeast of Baghdad. They became besieged there after their line of supply was cut along the river to the south. Some 11,000 troops ultimately surrendered, after the allies suffered another 23,000 casualties trying to rescue them.

American troops all over central and northern Iraq are supplied with fuel, food, and ammunition by truck convoy from a supply base hundreds of miles away in Kuwait. All but a small amount of our soldiers' supplies come into the country over roads that pass through the Shiite-dominated south of Iraq.

CSM

[FloridaPat]

1. Halliburton is running those supply lines - KR&B. Go defense contractors.

Just throw them some more money. I'm sure that will help everything just fine.

[necso]

2. Neither Jordan or Turkey offer

likely alternative supply-routes. Nor are there any other obvious alternatives, at least alternatives that don't require extensive military action -- or stunningly effective diplomacy. Besides, we need an alternative that's geographically separated enough to be distinct. (I have argued in the past for the desirability/necessity of such alternative supply-routes, but not their practicality.)

In the case of Jordan, a supply-route would involve using Aqaba, which is not a large facility (apparently), traveling through the "L" of Jordan (or passing through Saudi Arabia), and passing through dangerous areas in Iraq. This route would be vulnerable to interdiction, even in Jordan, and using it might be destabilizing to Jordan (even if they would agree to this, which is questionable). (In general, many of our "moderate" allies in the region are not particularly strong states, and we have given too little thought to the effects of our actions on these states. They, in turn, did not realize the sheer incompetence of this administration: that is, in areas other than looting, dirty politics, power acquisition/abuse, manipulating the chumps, and the like.)

The route through Turkey, while more attractive in terms of facilities and security (apparently), faces the hurdle of approval by that state (which seems unlikely, given our lack of attention to their problems with Kurdish "fighters" from northern Iraq and other issues). Moreover, the relative security of Northern Iraq is not a given.

And, in either case, there are other factors which make opening a second supply-route impractical (if something approaching a military necessity): the cost involved (startup costs; costs of maintaining some redundancy and overcapacity as a safety factor; other additional, inherent operational costs); the time element to do so (planning, approval, setting up supply bases, force-repositioning, staffing, etc); logistical complications (stuff goes more places, which complicates logistics); the strains already placed on our military; etc.

Besides, relying on civilian transport of military supplies in (even potentially) insecure areas is an incredible piece of folly, which opens up a vulnerability that it's rather hard to believe the High Command ever agreed to. (Although this is consistent with "privatization", and other thinly-disguised neocon excuses (covers) for looting and power-acquisition by the already powerful (as one small example, there are now effectively sizable private armies) -- at whatever cost to national security and wellbeing.)

We screwed up badly by invading Iraq, and we screwed up badly by not sticking to the original plan, which called for a northern "pincer", with its attendant supply-route (that became impossible when we treated Turkey undiplomatically, resulting in them not cooperating with our plans). And we screwed up badly by not resolutely pursuing diplomacy in the region as a way of trying to ensure stability, starting to heal old wounds, and attempting to acheive our objectives. But what can you expect from a collection of armchair, "think"-tank (type) militarists, kite-high on ignorance, arrogance, egotism, and aggression.

Sometimes when you make a mistake, there's just no way to recover from it. And sometimes even when you can begin-to-recover from some mistake, the price that you must pay is much higher than it would-have-been, had you not made the mistake in the first place.

Now, this is a rather grim point-of-view, and the realization of being in such a situation can be heartbreaking, but such is life in the world. And you either deal well with that world, or you are likely to be a victim of it -- no matter how great your (apparent) power... or hubris.