The generals who told President George W. Bush before the war that Donald Rumsfeld's shock-and-awe fantasy would not work were not enough to persuade him to change his strategy in Iraq. The rise of the insurgency did not do the trick. Nor did month after month of mounting military and civilian casualties on all sides, the emergence of a near civil war, the collapse of reconstruction efforts or the seeming inability of either Iraqi or American forces to secure contested parts of Iraq, including Baghdad, for any significant period.
So what finally, after all this time, caused Bush to very publicly consult with his generals to consider a change in tactics in Iraq? The president, who says he never reads political polls, is worried that his party could lose some of its iron grip on power in the congressional elections next month.
It is not necessarily a bad thing when a politician takes stock of his positions in the teeth of an election. Elected leaders are expected to heed the will of the people. And there has been a chorus of pleas for Bush to come up with a more realistic approach to Iraq.
But the way this sudden change of heart has come about, after months in which Bush has brushed off all criticism of his policies as either misguided, politically motivated or downright disloyal to America, is maddening. For far too long, the White House has looked upon the war as a tactical puzzle for campaign strategists. The early notion of combining Iraq and the war on terror as an argument for re-electing Republicans robbed the United States of any serious chance for a bipartisan discussion of these life-and-death issues. More recently, the administration seems to have been working under the assumption that its only obligations were to hang on, talk tough and pass the problem on to the next president.
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/10/22/opinion/ediraq.phptaken from this NYT article
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/22/opinion/22sun1.html?_r=1&oref=slogin