The WSJ's Daniel Henninger
(snip)
The years 2003-2005 don't exist in the ISG study, which is almost wholly about the horrors of the past year. But in the war's immediate aftermath, from May 2003 onward, Baghdad was rebuilding, notwithstanding continued violence. Retail commerce came to life. A strong real-estate market emerged. New cars filled the streets, and Iraq's universities reopened. But it was also in May that someone in the Bush administration made the worst decision of the war, as described on this page in June by Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari in an interview with our Robert Pollock.
"The biggest mistake, honestly, if you go back," said Mr. Zebari, "was not entrusting the Iraqis as partners, to empower them, to see them do their part, to fill the vacuum, to have a national unity government."
The opportunity existed at that moment to form an Iraqi unity government, likely consisting of the religious Shiites Ibrahim al-Jaafari and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the Sunni Adnan Pachachi, Kurdish leaders Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, and secular Shiites Ahmed Chalabi and Ayad Allawi. Instead, someone in Washington (it has never been clear exactly who) decided to push them aside in favor of the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority. This was fatal because for two years, until last December's election, Iraqis had nothing -- other than tribes, sects and militias -- to commit themselves to politically.
(snip)
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116554228133044170.html?mod=todays_us_opinion (subscription)