High-Tech Weapons: A Loss Of Control?
The Pentagon may be ceding too much power to Boeing and other contractors
At the core of the Bush Administration's campaign to transform the U.S. Army into a leaner, more technologically advanced fighting force is something known as Future Combat Systems. A vast computerized network, FCS would link soldiers and commanders to a galaxy of sensors, satellites, robots, drones, and armored vehicles, both manned and unmanned. While debate rages over the military's performance in Iraq, the five-year-old FCS has sparked concern about whether the Pentagon is too eager to surrender control over complex weapons to the companies that design and make them—in this case, to Boeing Co. (BA )
In a little-noticed report issued on June 7, the Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of Congress, warned that Boeing's influence over FCS poses "significant risks to the Army's ability to provide oversight." Because of the program's complexity and cost, GAO auditors urged the Office of the Secretary of Defense to assume direct supervision. The projected bill for FCS through 2030 has already more than doubled, to $230 billion. Boeing would receive an undetermined fraction of that. The estimated price tag has ballooned even as former military officials and other experts question whether the ambitious program can accomplish its goal of allowing U.S. forces to cut through the confusion of battle.
FCS "misunderstands the frailty of the technologies, the limitations of the sensors, what they can and can't and never see," says Winslow T. Wheeler, a former GAO auditor of military programs who now directs the Center for Defense Information, a private research group in Washington. U.S. Army and Boeing officials counter that FCS remains on track and that the Pentagon hasn't ceded too much influence to the company. "We think
is going to revolutionize how we conduct warfare," says Lieutenant General Stephen M. Speakes, who heads the program to outfit 15 combat brigades, or about 60,000 soldiers, with the innovative gear.
Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld took office in 2001 pledging to transform a plodding Cold War force to a smaller, more mobile fighting machine, based on technological superiority. Much of that agenda fizzled when Rumsfeld encountered stiff resistance from uniformed leaders and Congress to trimming spending for tanks, nuclear submarines, and other expensive weapon systems designed for a war with the Soviet Union. Rumsfeld was forced from office in December, 2006, when his strategy of occupying Iraq with a relatively spare force failed to quell the bloodshed there.
more:http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_26/b4040042.htm?campaign_id=rss_daily
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