A lesson in Iraqi illusion (Boston Globe)

[Eugene]

Source: Boston Globe

ROBERT MALLEY AND PETER HARLING
A lesson in Iraqi illusion

By Robert Malley and Peter Harling | July 8, 2007

TO IMAGINE what Baghdad will look like after the surge,
there is no need to project far into the future. Instead,
just turn to the recent past. Between September 2006
and March 2007, British forces conducted Operation
Sinbad in Basra, Iraq's second largest city. At first,
there were signs of progress: diminished violence,
criminality, and overall chaos. But these turned out to
be superficial and depressingly fleeting. Only a few
months after the operation came to an end, old habits
resurfaced. Today, political tensions once again are
destabilizing the city; relentless attacks against
British forces have driven them off the streets; and
the southern city is under the control of militias,
more powerful and less inhibited than before.

Operation Sinbad, like the surge, was premised on belief
that heightened British military power would help rout out
militias, provide space for local leaders to rebuild the
city, and ultimately hand security over to newly vetted
and more professional Iraqi security forces. It did nothing
of the sort. A military strategy that failed to challenge
the dominant power structure and political makeup, no
matter how muscular it was, simply could not alter the
underlying dynamic: A political arena dominated by parties
-- those the British embraced, no less than those they
fought -- engaged in a bloody competition over power and
resources.

So, what happened? While British forces were struggling to
suppress the violence, the parties and organizations
operating on the public scene never felt the need to modify
their behavior. Militias were not defeated; they went
underground or, more often, were absorbed into existing
security forces. One resident after another told us they
witnessed murders committed by individuals dressed in
security force uniform. This, of course, with total impunity
since the parties that infiltrate the security services also
ensure that their own don't get punished.

-snip-

In short, Operation Sinbad, at best, froze in place the
existing situation and balance of power, creating an illusory
stability that concealed a brutal and collective tug-of-war-
in-waiting. Once the British version of the surge ebbed, the
struggle reignited.

For Baghdad, the implications are as clear as they are
ominous. ...

-snip-

Robert Malley is Middle East program director and
Peter Harling a Damascus-based senior analyst at
the International Crisis Group.


Read more: http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/07/08/a_lesson_in_iraqi_illusion