Larry C Johnson: Questions Congress Needs to Ask about the Latest NIE

[laststeamtrain]

Questions Congress Needs to Ask about the Latest NIE

Larry C Johnson

There is a significant and unexplained disconnect between the latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Defending the Homeland and the April 2006 NIE, Trends in Global Terrorism.

<snip>

So, how do we get from “seriously damaged” to “regenerated”? According to the latest NIE, a significant share of the blame resides with and in Pakistan. But do we really know what is going on?

A careful reading of the NIE on The Terrorist Threat to the Homeland fails to reveal any empirical or intelligence data to justify the conclusions. For example, if we had intelligence that an increasing number of foreigners had crossed into Waziristan during the last three years, received training, and departed the area then there would be some legitimate basis for concern about a “regenerated” Al-Qa’ida. But no such evidence or facts are proffered to make such a case. That is odd. Even in unclassified key judgments one should expect some reference to the underlying data supporting the assessment that a capability has regenerated. But there is none.

More troubling is the underlying assumption that there are active training camps in this area? Really? Then why are they still standing? Why have we not seen a smoking hole in the ground where these alleged camps once stood? George Bush promised in the wake of 9-11 that a country must decide if it is with us or against us. And that countries that harbored terrorists would pay a price.

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http://noquarterusa.net/blog/2007/07/23/questions-congress-needs-to-ask-about-the-latest-nie/

[napi21]

1. I'm glad when someone like Larry assess what these NIE's really

mean. I'm so sick and tired of hearing nothing but lies and distortions from this admin. I can't believe ANYTHING they say anymore! In fact, it's actually WORSE that that! When they say something, I instantly think the opposite must be true!!!!

[frogcycle]

2. I don't believe the NIE has any credibility

Even though it supposedly comes from multiple agencies and is independent, the administration has taken control of everything. They tell NASA scientists what they can/cannot say, they tell generals what to say...

Nothing is believable any more.

Every snippet of information made public is manufactured in the WH basement, processed, laundered, passed on to someone else to say...

[Maribelle]

3. Caveat Emptor

ca·ve·at emp·tor (kàvvee aat émp tawr) noun

buyer's risk: the commercial principle that the buyer is responsible for making sure that goods bought are of a reasonable quality, unless the seller is offering a guarantee of their quality

(Early 16th century. < Latin , "let the buyer beware")

Back 2002, before the big vote, Senator Bob Graham of Florida requested first and NIE on Iraq then an unclassified, public version of the 90-page NIE - - because he knew from his work on the intelligence committee Bush was not being truthful with Congress and the American people.

In February 2002, after a briefing on the status of the war in Afghanistan, the commanding officer, Gen. Tommy Franks, told me the war was being compromised as specialized personnel and equipment were being shifted from Afghanistan to prepare for the war in Iraq -- a war more than a year away. Even at this early date, the White House was signaling that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein was of such urgency that it had priority over the crushing of al Qaeda.

At a meeting of the Senate intelligence committee on Sept. 5, 2002, CIA Director George Tenet was asked what the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) provided as the rationale for a preemptive war in Iraq. An NIE is the product of the entire intelligence community, and its most comprehensive assessment. I was stunned when Tenet said that no NIE had been requested by the White House and none had been prepared. Invoking our rarely used senatorial authority, I directed the completion of an NIE.

Tenet objected, saying that his people were too committed to other assignments to analyze Saddam Hussein's capabilities and will to use chemical, biological and possibly nuclear weapons. We insisted, and three weeks later the community produced a classified NIE.

Graham was extremely troubled and saddened by the 25-page redacted document give to Congress, and at the time expressed grave reservations.

From my advantaged position, I had earlier concluded that a war with Iraq would be a distraction from the successful and expeditious completion of our aims in Afghanistan. Now I had come to question whether the White House was telling the truth -- or even had an interest in knowing the truth.

On Oct. 11, I voted no on the resolution to give the president authority to go to war against Iraq. I was able to apply caveat emptor. Most of my colleagues could not.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/18/AR2005111802397.html