Guest Op-Ed - Juan Cole: (William R.) Polk on Insurgency & American History

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Guest Op-Ed: Polk on Insurgency & American History


Executive Summary of the conclusion of Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism & Guerrilla Warfare from the American Revolution to Iraq. By William R. Polk, to be published on September 15, 2007 by HarperCollins.



Fighting insurgencies is enormously expensive in both lives and treasure. In Iraq, nearly 3,500 American servicemen and women have lost their lives and at least 25,000 have been wounded of whom half will never fully recover and many will spend the rest of their lives in hospitals. About one in five soldiers who served in Iraq has been “at least partly disabled.” More than one in three of the 500,000 Marines and soldiers sent there over the past four years needed mental health treatment. Neurologists predict that hundreds of thousands more – at least one in each three soldiers who have engaged in combat for four months or longer – will suffer blindness, deafness and/or mental impairment from concussions. Many others will possibly develop cancer and/or will conceive children who will be born with severe defects because of exposure to the depleted uranium used in artillery shells and bombs. Crassly put, the walking wounded will not only be unable fully to contribute to American society but will be a burden on it.

The monetary costs are great and rising. Current costs are running at more than $7.1 billion a month --$10 million an hour – and are rising more than 20% a year. The direct costs of the war are expected to rise shortly to at least $700 billion. But this outlay is only the tip of the iceberg. According to Nobel Prize Laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz and former Assistant Secretary of Commerce Linda Bilmes, the real cost to America, as it would be figured by standard accounting methods, is between one and two trillion dollars.

What have these costs bought? No well-informed observer believes that the war in Iraq is approaching success by any definition. As the historical record makes clear, any increase in numbers is less likely to overawe the natives than to provide more targets. In fact, the Iraqi insurgency appears to be gaining rather than losing power. Even the most protected area in Iraq, the “Green Zone,” is under almost constant attack and the insurgency is now self-financing. Is there “light at the end of the tunnel?” No. The new senior American commander, General Odierno, believes that, under President Bush’s new strategy, the war will last for years.

Is there some new magic formula for success? Generals David Petraeus and James Amos argue that there is. They have laid out a counterinsurgency doctrine. (December 2006 Counterinsurgency Field Manual). But it is not new. When tried in Vietnam, it did not work. As Petraeus and Amos admit, the key element in insurgency is political: “each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate.” Is this a feasible objective for foreigners? One searches the historical record in vain for an example of success. The foreign occupying force, by definition, is alien. Vietnam showed that even when the aliens (us) had a numerous and established local ally (the South Vietnamese government) that ally was more apt to be alienated by its association with the foreign military force than that force was to be “Vietnamized” by their native ally. In sum, the single absolutely necessary ingredient in counterinsurgency is extremely unlikely ever to be available to foreigners.

Can we not, therefore, “Iraqize” the war? We tried in Vietnam to “Vietnamize” that war by empowering the South Vietnam Government. But there, and elsewhere, natives always see such action as facades behind which foreigners stay – as the British did in Iraq. So the foreign-supported governments are not supported and have little power. We saw this in Vietnam and are already seeing it in Iraq and Afghanistan. No insurgency has been defeated in this way for at least the last century. In fact, trying this ploy in Vietnam, and gradually withdrawing over four years, cost an additional 21,000 American lives.

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http://www.juancole.com/2007/08/executive-summary-of-conclusion-of.html