Spies, Lies, and Weapons: Atlantic Monthly

[fjc]

How could we have been so far off in our estimates of Saddam Hussein's weapons programs? A leading Iraq expert and intelligence analyst in the Clinton Administration—whose book The Threatening Storm proved deeply influential in the run-up to the war—gives a detailed account of how and why we erred

by Kenneth M. Pollack

http://www.theatlantic.com/cgi-bin/send.cgi?page=http%3A//www.theatlantic.com/issues/2004/01/pollack.htm

[gristy]

1. Hmmm... I may wait for my hardcopy in the mail

I like this disclosure early on:

This issue has some personal relevance for me. I began my career as a Persian Gulf military analyst at the CIA, where I saw an earlier generation of technical analysts mistakenly conclude that Saddam Hussein was much further away from having a nuclear weapon than the post-Gulf War inspections revealed. I later moved on to the National Security Council, where I served two tours, in 1995-1996 and 1999-2001. During the latter stint the intelligence community convinced me and the rest of the Clinton Administration that Saddam had reconstituted his WMD programs following the withdrawal of the UN inspectors, in 1998, and was only a matter of years away from having a nuclear weapon. In 2002 I wrote a book called Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq , in which I argued that because all our other options had failed, the United States would ultimately have to go to war to remove Saddam before he acquired a functioning nuclear weapon.

But I worry about Pollack's choice of sources when he says

According to Judith Miller, a New York Times reporter,...

[salin]

2. have to agree with that

her "reliable sources" seemed to have always been long-time exile (and crooked businessman according to the govt of Jordan) Chalabi.