Our motives may have been rational but our deductions display our naivety, writes Hugh White.
The truth about the role of our intelligence agencies in Australia's decision to invade Iraq is very simple. They played no key role at all. The Government's decision was not based on intelligence assessments about Iraq's WMD, or about anything else. It was based on judgements - policy judgements - about our alliance with the United States, and the kind of role the US should play in the world.
So those who want to probe and question the basis for the Government's decision - and on such a momentous issue it is surely right that we should - are missing the point in focusing on what the intelligence agencies knew, and said, and why, in the weeks and months leading up to the war. We need to look instead at those policy judgements, and ask were they right or wrong?
(snip)
So what prompted that decision? Apart from political expectations that Australian involvement in Iraq would be popular at home, I think two policy judgements made inside the Government underpinned Australia's choice for war.
The first was that support for Washington in Iraq would further strengthen our alliance with the US. Or you could put it slightly differently.
Given our strong and consistent record of support for US military operations over many years, a decision not to help in Iraq would have seemed to Canberra to risk sending a chill through the relationship with Washington. That was especially a concern so soon after September 11, when the pass mark in the loyal ally test was set pretty high.
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http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/02/25/1077676839139.html