Abusing Secrets
http://www.tompaine.com/feature2.cfm/ID/10238 David Corn, Washington editor of The Nation, is the author of The Lies of George W. Bush: Mastering the Politics of Deception (Crown Publishers).
The White House decision to release the now-infamous Aug. 6, 2001 President’s Daily Brief not only shows the Bush administration could not be trusted when it previously characterized the document as merely a "historical" analysis that made the obvious point that Osama bin Laden was interested in traditional hijacking. This briefing—which noted that bin Laden was determined to strike within the United States and that Al Qaeda apparently had set up a support structure in this country—also provides proof, if any more is needed, that this White House cannot be trusted whenever it argues it must keep information secret. The PDB episode is but one in a line of instances when the Bush White House hid information and claimed releasing the material would compromise national security or the presidency, when the real motive was protecting its own rear end.
The PDB does not appear to contain material that would burn specific sources or compromise national security if publicly known. Three times the briefing attributed information to a foreign intelligence service. But the White House deleted the identities of these services—as it could have done in providing a copy to the intelligence committees. And even if the PDB had included material that should not become public, the White House could have shown it to the intelligence committees and not permitted them to disclose the most touchy parts.
Moreover, the intelligence committees are supposed to oversee the intelligence agencies, and this means they have an interest in (and are obligated to) examine the intelligence produced by federal agencies for the president. That information should be available to Congress under the appropriate safeguards. But the White House told the intelligence committees to get lost, and the committees chose not to confront Bush. (At the time, the Senate intelligence committee was chaired by Bob Graham, a Democrat, and the House intelligence committee was led by Porter Goss, a Republican.) Now it’s clear that the White House, in blocking the intelligence committees, was more interested in defending itself and its prerogatives than in safekeeping legitimate secrets.
A lesser-known 9/11 controversy also indicated that the Bush administration will abuse the rules—national security, executive privilege, you name it—to place self-interest over the public’s right to know. When the House and Senate intelligence committees released an interim report in September 2002, they included a hot-damn piece of information, noting that a "briefing prepared for senior government officials at the beginning of July 2001 contained the following language:
'Based on a review of all-source reporting over the last five months, we believe that UBL
will launch a significant terrorist attack against U.S. and/or Israeli interests in the coming weeks. The attack will be spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties against U.S. facilities or interests. Attack preparations have been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning.'"
Here was a warning of a spectacular Al Qaeda attack two months before that dreadful day. The obvious question was: Did Bush get this information and, if so, how did he respond? But the Bush administration refused to let the intelligence committees tell the public whether this intelligence warning had been provided to the president. The reason given: doing so would compromise national security. Think about that one. The administration was saying it was okay to reveal the existence of this warning but that the country could be endangered if people knew this warning had reached the person it should have reached: the president. Committee sources told reporters that the warning had indeed been presented to Bush. But the intelligence committees were unable to declare so in their report. Thus, misusing the classification system permitted the Bush administration, two months before the congressional elections, from having to deal with discomfiting questions and a round of criticism and bad press.