Why is Bob Woodward’s latest book, “Plan of Attack,” is being promoted by the administration? Because it portrays an in-charge President Bush and presents him as genuinely concerned (and seemingly misled) over the threat posed by Iraq’s “weapons of mass-destruction.” Unfortunately, the nation’s most-famous investigative reporter got it wrong.
You would not know from Woodward’s book that the CIA’s National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction – used with Congress to hype the threat - was written several months after the administration decided to make war on Iraq. That decision had little to do with WMD or with supposed ties between Iraq and al-Qaeda. It had everything to do with the imperative seen by Bush’s neoconservative advisers to gain dominant influence over strategic, oil-rich Iraq and to eliminate any possible threat to Israel’s security. With that twin aim, the rationale was generally consistent with several decades of U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East. Where the Bush administration broke new ground was in its decision to launch a preemptive war when there was nothing to preempt.
To honest analysts—including some within the “coalition of the willing”—the actual U.S. purpose was a no-brainer. Australian intelligence analysts, for example, had done their homework in reading the neoconservatives’ rationale in the documents of the Project for a New American Century and were able to make confident judgments regarding underlying U.S. motives. Senior Australian intelligence analyst Andrew Wilkie has testified to his Parliament that Australian intelligence gave his government “detailed assessments in which it was made very clear that the U.S. was intent on invading Iraq for more important reasons than WMD and terrorism. Hence, all this talk about WMD and terrorism was hollow.”
The U.S. Congress was not likely to acquiesce in attacking Iraq on the basis of the strategic vision of the neoconservatives. Rather, it was necessary to coerce our lawmakers by conjuring up ominous specters like the frequently adduced “mushroom cloud.” Enter the NIE on Iraq and weapons of mass destruction prepared hurriedly in September 2002. Secretary of State Colin Powell has admitted that the target audience for the Estimate was Congress. The NIE and its various initial drafts became the centerpiece of a successful campaign to persuade our elected representatives to relinquish to the executive the war-making power vested solely in them by the framers of the Constitution.
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http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0430-04.htm