The Resources of the Cuban Opposition

[Judi Lynn]

March 30, 2010

Cuba Must Pay Tribute for Every Tiny Change in U. S. Policy
The Resources of the Cuban Opposition
By RAFAEL HERNANDEZ

Hunger strikes and suicides justified by strong moral, ideological, patriotic or religious beliefs usually touch people's conscience. From Bobby Sands and the ten other Northern Ireland IRA youths who died in British jails in 1981, to the many cases of Basque and anarchist political prisoners protesting last January against bad prison treatment or the political manipulations by judicial authorities and police personnel in Spain and France, the issue of hunger strikes and their significance has had a continuous presence in the political arena in recent decades.

From this perspective, the case of the Cuban dissident Orlando Zapata, who died February 23 as a result of a hunger strike, or that of the current example, Guillermo Fariñas, are not unusual events. The death of Zapata is a human tragedy but that does not explain how it became a cause celebre. If one tries to understand it in context - something hard to do given the shower of opinions that have inundated the media - one has to take a step back from the news to examine some essential questions. Who are the Cuban dissident groups? What is the current national and international political context on the island? What factors are involved in the reactions to the event by political actors in Europe and the United States? How does the international press contribute to the problem? What can be expected of Cuban policy toward the dissidents?

These opposition groups are not essentially different from the Cuban exiles in their methods and objectives. The most powerful anti-Castro organizations in Miami and New Jersey today no longer support war with bombs and armed groups. Dissidents and exiles do not agree on everything (for example, support for the embargo) but they share the same objective (to exchange the system for a capitalist model), a common ideological denominator (anti- Castroism and anti-socialism) and the same allies (the United States, anti-communist governments and parties in Europe and other countries).

Their political character is not captured with the adjective "mercenary," since it is likely that many, though they may receive money from the United States, have authentic ideological beliefs. Under the umbrella group convergencia democrática, dissidents, including social democrats, bring together their interests, personalities and tendencies. But their core tendency is toward the center-right. Although this partly explains their lack of acceptance in Cuban society, the main reason it is not a viable movement is that it lacks two essential political ingredients: leadership and legitimacy.

As opposed to the anticommunist organizations of the 1960s, which had a social and political base and a coherent ideology, the dissidents do not have roots in civil society. They lack influence in religious organizations or the working class, as in Poland; they lack prestigious intellectuals as in Czechoslovakia; they have no record of struggle against odious or corrupt regimes, as in Rumania. If they had these, they would represent movements of considerable impact. They are not "civil society;" they are opposition micro parties.

Minorities, of course, play a political role and a small group can develop into a great social movement. Therefore, why do the dissidents not appeal to larger sectors? I will take up three main reasons.

First, most of their criticisms of the system already form part of the debate among Cubans whether they are socialists or not. To suppose that dissidents are the lone heroic voices who dare to point out errors and to make demands of the government shows ignorance about contemporary Cuba. Dissent is manifested today within (and without) institutions, the intellectual movement, the various communications media, social, religious and cultural organizations and inside the ranks of the political militancy.

Second, dissidents' proposals do not constitute a coherent economic and political program, but rather a hodge-podge of imprecise ideological slogans ("national reconciliation," "strengthening of civil society," "pluralism"), and the classic nostrums of economic liberalism that have been well known in Latin America for the past 20 years. Anyone who takes the Varela Project as a serious plan for political reform based on the Constitution of 1992, has not read the Constitution closely; and above all, does not know the significance of the issues in the real public debate.: decentralization; participation and effective political control of the bureaucracy by the Popular Power; reordering the economy and making it more efficient; enlarging the private sector; extending cooperatization; improvement in income levels consistent with work and buying power; an end to generalized subsidies and bonuses; new social policies for the most at-risk sectors; public opinion reflected in the media; enlargement of spaces for free expression; strengthening of laws and constitutional order; and the democratization of institutions (including political institutions).

Third, it is very difficult for Cubans, regardless of whether they are in sympathy with Fidel and Raul Castro or share socialist ideals, to accept as legitimate groups that are supported by the United States, European parties and the most powerful exile forces whose reputations as champions of liberty and democracy are not very convincing.

More:
http://www.counterpunch.org/hernandez03302010.html