The Authoritarians

[Joanne98]

"The Authoritarians" is a book written by Bob Altemeyer, Associate Professor of Psychology at the University of Manitoba. It is available for free download here.

http://members.shaw.ca/jeanaltemeyer/drbob/TheAuthoritarians.pdf

In the author's words:

"It's about what's happened to the American government lately. It's about the disastrous decisions that government has made. It's about the corruption that rotted the Congress. It's about how traditional conservatism has nearly been destroyed by authoritarianism. It's about how the "Religious Right" teamed up with amoral authoritarian leaders to push its un-democratic agenda onto the country."

In my words:

This is a damned good book, and a must-read for anyone who wishes to understand what is happening to our country right now. Altemeyer provides clear, documented scientific research that gives us insight into the Authoritarian mind. During the course of reading it, you will become enlightened on the fallacies and the dangers of Right-Wing Authoritarianism.


In this book, you will also be able to take a test that will measure your own level of authoritarian belief, and see how you stack up against others.

Following is one of Altemeyer's accounts of just how dangerous this plague of the mind can be.

Unauthoritarians and Authoritarians: Worlds of Difference

The setting involved a rather sophisticated simulation of the earth's future called the Global Change Game, which is played on a big map of the world by 50-70 participants who have been split into various regions such as North America, Africa, India and China. The players are divided up according to current populations, so a lot more students hunker down in India than in North America. The game was designed to raise environmental awareness, and before the exercise begins players study up on their region's resources, prospects, and environmental issues.

Then the facilitators who service the simulation call for some member, any member of each region, to assume the role of team leader by simply standing up. Once the "Elites"in the world have risen to the task they are taken aside and given control of their region's bank account. They can use this to buy factories, hospitals, armies, and so on from the game bank, and they can travel the world making deals with other Elites. They also discover they can discretely put some of their region's wealth into their own pockets, to vie for a prize to be given out at the end of the simulation to the World's Richest Person. Then the game begins, and the world goes wherever the players take it for the next forty years which, because time flies in a simulation, takes about two and a half hours.

http://www.opednews.com/articles/1/The-Authoritarians-by-JC-Garrett-110116-740.html

Fascinating

[Gregorian]

1. This deserves more attention.

I intend to, when I get some time, take excerpts from the book and post them as a distilled view of the book. Sort of a list of what makes up the "other side".

Thanks for posting.

[OnyxCollie]

2. Once you understand the belief system of your audience,

a message can be crafted to easily manipulate them. Just use the biases, stereotypes, etc. to lead them in any direction you want.

I wrote a paper on this topic for a class I had. Here is part of the lit review:

“Behavior results from a process that involves, or functions as it entails, conscious
choice” (Monroe & Maher, 1995). These choices are developed through a method by which the
actor’s preferences are ordered and evaluated to determine which will provide the greatest utility
and what course of action should be taken to achieve them (Monroe & Maher, 1995). These
preferences include a predilection for survival (Chatterjee, 1972; Monroe & Maher, 1995).
Established and uniform, these preferences are shaped through the acquisition of information
(Jost et al., 2003) from opinion leaders whose function is to attach idea-elements together
(Converse, 1964).

This process of acquiring information from authoritative sources to satisfy preferences
which include survival is described as laying the foundation for a belief system (Converse, 1964;
Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999a, 1999b as cited in Jost et al., 2003; McGuire, 1985, as cited in
Jost et al., 2003). Converse (1964) and Kunda (1990, as cited in Jost et al., 2003) suggest that
this belief system is regulated by multiple constraints. The constraints offer a probability that a
specific attitude held in a belief system will result in certain other attitudes being held (Converse,
1964). These constraints are identified as logical, psychological, and social (Converse, 1964).
Jost et al. (2003) further expand on the concept by describing these constraints as existential
(fear, curiosity), epistemic (authoritarian, liberal), and ideological (group dominance,
egalitarianism). According to Jost et al. (2003), belief systems fulfill psychological needs.

Within the constraints, belief systems provide a principled doctrine by which new
information obtained is compared to prior associations in order to choose a course which
provides the greatest utility (Jost et al., 2003). However, these belief systems do not operate in a
vacuum; uncertain conditions and numerous variables can influence personal motivations by
invoking emotional responses, leading to a reformulation of logic that while not syllogistically
sound, is principled nonetheless (Jost et al., 2003).

Information gathering in early childhood requires the formation of relationships (Weber
& Federico, 2007). Attachment theory states that relationships are sought in order to reduce
anxiety and provide a sense of security (Sroufe & Waters, 1977, as cited in Weber & Federico,
2007). Successful proximity-seeking efforts create a secure attachment style, inspiring selfconfidence,
curiosity and an openness to new experiences (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall,
1978, as cited in Weber & Federico, 2007). Failed proximity-seeking efforts result in anxiety
stemming from the lack of security, compounded by distress over the failure to establish a
relationship (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003, as cited in Weber and Federico, 2007). Recurring
failure or inconsistency (Ainsworth et al., 1978, as cited in Weber & Federico, 2007) in
proximity-seeking efforts creates two insecure attachment styles; anxious and avoidant (Weber &
Federico, 2007).

Anxious attachment style is associated with fixations on proximity-seeking and emotional
support (Weber & Federico, 2007). Avoidant attachment style abandons proximity-seeking and
instead relies on self-dependence to control anxiety (Weber & Federico, 2007). Brennan, Clark,
& Shaver (1998, as cited in Weber & Federico, 2007) have determined that anxious and avoidant
attachment styles in adults manifest themselves as either elevated states of arousal with a fixation
on close relationships, or as an emotional disconnect with an aversion to close relationships,
respectively.

Duckitt (2001, as cited in Weber & Federico, 2007) proposes that childrearing practices
lead to the development of personality traits which endorse world views that form ideology.
Children who have attained a secure attachment style are open to new information more than
those with either of the two insecure attachment styles (Cassidy, 1986, as cited in Weber &
Federico, 2007), as well as being less dogmatic and less reliant on ethnic stereotypes
(Mikulincer, 1997, as cited in Weber & Federico, 2007). Additionally, Mikulincer & Florian
(2000, as cited in Weber & Federico, 2007) have shown that secure attachment styles “mitigate
the effect of mortality salience on the denigration of moral transgressors” (p. 394).

It has been demonstrated that children who have attained insecure attachment styles later
as adults develop Right Wing Authoritarian (RWA) ideologies, in which the world is viewed as a
dangerous place (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003, as cited by Weber & Federico, 2007),
or Social Dominance Order (SDO) ideologies, in which the world is viewed as a competitive
jungle (Duckitt, 2001, as cited by Weber & Federico, 2007). RWA’s are defined by a deference to
authority figures, an endorsement of severe punishment by authority figures, and a high degree
of conventionalism (Altemeyer, 2006). SDO’s differ from RWA’s in that rather than embracing
authoritarianism as a means of protection against an out-group which threatens society, SDO’s
feel that society has already fallen and that only the strong shall survive, prompting group
domination, punishment, and humiliation against out-groups (Altemeyer, 1998). Altemeyer
(1998, as cited in Jost et al., 2003) and Pratto, Sidanious, Stallworth & Malle (1994, as cited in
Jost et al., 2003) have shown that SDO’s correlate with Republican party identification.

In response to criticism that scales of authoritarianism neglected left-wing personalities,
Rokeach (1960, as cited in Jost et al., 2003) developed a scale of dogmatism which included
measures of logically contradictory beliefs and denial of contradictions in belief systems.
According to Rokeach:

All belief-disbelief systems serve two powerful and conflicting sets of
motives at the same time: the need for a cognitive framework to know
and to understand and the need to ward off threatening aspects of
reality. To the extent that the cognitive need to know is predominant
and the need to ward off threat is absent, open systems should
result. . . . But as the need to ward off threat becomes stronger, the
cognitive need to know should become weaker, resulting in more
closed belief systems (p. 67, as quoted in Jost et al., 2003, p. 346).

Thus, closed belief systems reduce ambiguity-induced anxiety by satisfying the need to know
(Rokeach, 1960, as cited in Jost et al., 2003).

Understanding of issues and concepts is dependent upon the strength of the connotation
associated with them, as well as effectiveness of the constraints by which the referred issues and
concepts operate (Converse, 1964). In his research, Converse (1964) tests the hypothesis that if
one idea-element in the belief system should change, an individual must either change his
position on the issue or change his position on the party. Examination reveals a majority of the
population sampled are unable to express an understanding of the constraints affecting political
parties and issues without being prompted by political elites (Converse, 1964). Furthermore, the
majority of the population view the treatment they and other groups received from political
parties as their primary means of identifying parties (Converse, 1964).

Altemeyer, B. (1998). The other “authoritarian personality.” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 30, 47–92.
Altemeyer, B. (2006). The authoritarians. Manitoba: University of Manitoba.
Chatterjee, P. (1972). The classical balance of power theory. Journal of Peace Research, 9(1), 51-61.
Converse, P. (1964). The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In D. Apter (Ed.), Ideology and discontent (pp. 206–261). New York: Free Press.
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129(3), 339-375.
Monroe, K.R. & Maher, K.H. (1995). Psychology and rational actor theory. Political Psychology, 16(1), 1-21.
Weber, C., & Federico, C. M. (2007). Interpersonal attachment and patterns of belief. Political Psychology, 28(4), 389-416.

[Gregorian]

3. I'm unable to put words to this. Dense, important. Well thought out.

I'm in a frazzled state this morning. Too much going on all at one time. But I tried to read this with concentration, and I can say it is very densely packed with careful thought and observation.


I found the following to be of incredible value. We have all experienced this kind of behavior. But I haven't seen it in this context before.

"Thus, closed belief systems reduce ambiguity-induced anxiety by satisfying the need to know."

[OnyxCollie]

6. Thanks.

It's a condensed version of what I wanted to write. (It was a research methods class, so the focus was to be on the quantitative analysis more than the belief system topic.)

I tested whether fear would cause people (liberals, moderates, conservatives) to choose an authoritarian candidate and authoritarian measures.

For the first hypothesis (voting), the effects of the causal variables on the dependent
variables will be measured initially with crosstabulations and chi-square tests of independence
and later with independent sample t-tests. For the second hypothesis (support for authoritarian
measures), the effects of the causal variable on the dependent variable will be measured by a
factorial ANOVA.

It will be predicted that in the first hypothesis, fear from the 9/11 terrorist attacks will
affect voters’ approval of and willingness to re-elect their congressional representatives, and will
increase the likelihood of voting for the Republican candidate. The Republican image of being
strong militarily protectors will persist, despite the failure to prevent the attacks from occurring.
It will be predicted that in the second hypothesis, fear from the 9/11 terrorist attacks will
affect respondents, in particular moderates and conservatives, to support laws to aid in terrorism
investigations and to sacrifice freedoms in support of those laws. Moderates will support laws
because they view things by group interest, i.e. as they have been attacked they will respond by
facilitating measures to prevent it from reoccurring, while conservatives will support laws
because of their authoritarian tendencies.

To test the first hypothesis, crosstabulations between the dependent variable,
congressional election vote (Democratic candidate or Republican candidate), and the
independent variable, re-elect representative or look around, yielded a response of 62% of those
choosing to re-elect their representative choosing to vote Republican, while those choosing to
look around was nearly evenly divided, with 52% choosing the Democratic candidate, chi-square
(1, N = 1002) = 1.38E1, p < .01. Adding a dichotomous control variable, concern over being
personally victimized by terrorism, produced significant results for both groups, with 59% of
those concerned about terrorism choosing to re-elect the Republican candidate and 57% of those
looking around choosing the Democratic candidate, chi-square (1, N = 280) = 6.96,
p = .008. Of those not concerned about terrorism, 64% were willing to re-elect the Republican
candidate while 48% of those looking around would choose the Democratic candidate, chi-square
(1, N = 451) = 6.07, p = .014.

An independent sample t-test was conducted between the dependent variable, re-elect
congressional representative, and the independent variable, trust (“Most people can be trusted”,
“Can’t be too careful”). A significant result occurred, t(834) = -4.58, p < .01, with those
responding “Can’t be too careful” having a higher score than “Most people can be trusted”.
Another independent sample t-test between the dependent variable, congressional election vote,
and the independent variable, trust, failed to produce significant results t(745) = 1.37, p = .171.

A factorial ANOVA to examine the effects of liberal conservative ideology and concern
over being personally victimized by terrorism on support for laws to make the FBI’s
investigation of terrorism suspects easier was used to test the second hypothesis.
Figure 1.



Results indicated a significant effect for concern over terrorism, F(3, 72) = 5.09, p = .002, eta
= .17. Contrary to what was hypothesized, liberals who experienced a great deal of concern over
terrorism showed greater support for laws (M = 1.38) than did moderates (M = 1.14) or
conservatives (M = 1.15). Liberals who were somewhat concerned showed a decrease in support
(M = 1.18) but still more than moderates (M = 1.06) or conservatives (M = 1.13). However, when
the measures on concern for terrorism dropped to “not too much” and “not at all”, liberal support
for laws rose (M = 1.43, M = 1.44). Moderates followed a similar pattern (M = 1.27, M = 1.31).
Conservative support dropped however, from “somewhat concerned” (M = 1.13) to “not too
much” (M = 1.06), before rising slightly on “not at all” (M = 1.16). (See Figure 1.) A significant
effect was found for ideology, as well F(2, 72) = 10.18, p < .01, eta = .2. There was no
significant interaction between concern over terrorism and ideology F(6, 72) = 1.8, p = .097, eta
= .15.

Since Levene’s test of equality was violated, the Games-Howell post hoc test was used. (See Table 1.)



Hypothesis two was also tested with a factorial ANOVA to measure the effect of liberal
conservative ideology on the willingness to sacrifice freedoms in the investigation of terrorism
suspects. Results indicated no significant relationship between liberal conservative ideology on
the willingness to sacrifice freedoms F(2, 76) = 1.79, p = .168, eta = .09. No significant
relationship was detected between concern over being personally victimized by terrorism on the
willingness to sacrifice freedoms F(1, 76) = .015, p = .904, eta = 0. No significant relationship
was detected between liberal conservative ideology and concern over being personally
victimized by terrorism on the willingness to sacrifice freedoms F(2, 76) = 1.70, p = .183,
eta = .09. (See Table 2.)



((Full disclosure: Levene's Homogeneity of Variances wasn't met (the assumption that all groups are equal.) The result was insignificant, however. I tried to fix it, but I got confused using the Compute Variable in SPSS, so instead of the four point scale of concern I cheated and used a dichotomous yes/no variable for concern. It met Levene's assumption, didn't change much, and was still insignificant. It was a stupid question anyway, so fuck it.))

"Thus, closed belief systems reduce ambiguity-induced anxiety by satisfying the need to know."

"God works in mysterious ways." I hate that saying. It's what people say when they don't know what they're talking about, but want to rid themselves of the fear from anxiety. I hate it because it because once dogma starts, thinking stops.

It brought They Thought They Were Free to my mind:
http://dynamics.org/~altenber/LIBRARY/EXCERPTS/MAYER_MILTON/

But Then It Was Too Late

What happened here was the gradual habituation of the people, little by little, to being governed by surprise; to receiving decisions deliberated in secret; to believing that the situation was so complicated that the government had to act on information which the people could not understand, or so dangerous that, even if he people could understand it, it could not be released because of national security. And their sense of identification with Hitler, their trust in him, made it easier to widen this gap and reassured those who would otherwise have worried about it.

“This separation of government from people, this widening of the gap, took place so gradually and so insensibly, each step disguised (perhaps not even intentionally) as a temporary emergency measure or associated with true patriotic allegiance or with real social purposes. And all the crises and reforms (real reforms, too) so occupied the people that they did not see the slow motion underneath, of the whole process of government growing remoter and remoter.

“You will understand me when I say that my Middle High German was my life. It was all I cared about. I was a scholar, a specialist. Then, suddenly, I was plunged into all the new activity, as the universe was drawn into the new situation; meetings, conferences, interviews, ceremonies, and, above all, papers to be filled out, reports, bibliographies, lists, questionnaires. And on top of that were the demands in the community, the things in which one had to, was “expected to” participate that had not been there or had not been important before. It was all rigmarole, of course, but it consumed all one's energies, coming on top of the work one really wanted to do. You can see how easy it was, then, not to think about fundamental things. One had no time.”

“Those,” I said, “are the words of my friend the baker. “One had no time to think. There was so much going on.” “Your friend the baker was right,” said my colleague. “The dictatorship, and the whole process of its coming into being, was above all diverting. It provided an excuse not to think for people who did not want to think anyway. I do not speak of your ‘little men’, your baker and so on; I speak of my colleagues and myself, learned men, mind you. Most of us did not want to think about fundamental things and never had. There was no need to. Nazism gave us some dreadful, fundamental things to think about — we were decent people — and kept us so busy with continuous changes and “crises” and so fascinated, yes, fascinated, by the machinations of the “national enemies”, without and within, that we had no time to think about these dreadful things that were growing, little by little, all around us. Unconsciously, I suppose, we were grateful. Who wants to think?

[Gregorian]

7. I wonder what the percentage of immigrants are conservative voters.

I say this because I saw what I thought was a large percentage of those coming to the US after WW2, as being fearful, and tending to fall victim to the conservative "hype".

Another thing that I find strange is how given the same parents, offspring can be of both ends of the spectrum. I see it in my relatives. Ultra liberal, and super conservative, from one set of parents.

And like Michael Moore was saying tonight, that Americans have this thought that by having a gun they can defend themselves from intruders in their homes. Yet the likelihood of that happening is almost as remote as being struck by lightening.

The bottom line is logical and independent thought. Actually thinking instead of reacting.

I like what you've done, even if I don't understand most of it. I think it's a valuable tool.

[Fuddnik]

4. An excellent book, and best of all, it's free.

It really gets into how authoritarian followers develop a highly compartmentalized thought process. As Orwell called it, Double-think. The ability to hold different opposing ideas in ones mind, and believe them all to be true.

Also, when their leaders are caught in wrong-doing, any excuse or reason, no matter how ridiculous is sufficient to discredit the facts.

[Faryn Balyncd]

5. Should be required reading in Civics class...K and R.